Studies in Bhartrhari\u27s Vakyapadiya. by Davis, Lawrence Ward
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1978
Studies in Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya.
Lawrence Ward Davis
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Davis, Lawrence Ward, "Studies in Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya." (1978). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2125.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2125

STUDIES IN BHARTMARI’S vXkYAPADTyA
A Dissertation Presented
by
LAT7RENCE WARD DAT^IS
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 1978
Philosophy
©
Lawrence Ward Davis
All Rights Reserved
1978
STTJDIES IN BHARTRHARI'S vakYAPADTYA
A Dissertation Presented
By
Lawrence Uard Davis
Approved as to style and content by:
GarWth B. Matthews, Chairperson of
-kTR
Committee
Hr u. //. 'r A i 4
Terence Parsons
,
Member
-vCcA
Barbara Hall Partee, Member /
/
Robert c. Sleigh Jr. Department Head
Philosophy Department
ACKNOULEDGEHEfITS
This dissertation has been strongly influenced by classes
and discussions with linguists and philosophers at the I^niversity
of Massachusetts at Amherst. I do not think there is another place
where I could have been as well trained in the areas of Western
philosophy and linguistics I was interested in.
The members of my Dissertation Committee have contributed to
this dissertation in the following ways: As Head of the committee,
Gareth R, Matthews has provided a good deal of encouragement,
has noted many parallels to V/estem philosophers, and has pointed out
infelicities and mistakes which infected previous drafts j this draft
is much better than its predecessors, thanks to his editorial skill.
Barbara Hall Partee’s campaign to acquaint the world with the merits
of Montague Grammar found a ready convert in me; her instruction
provided the basis for Cliapters I and II; her remarks on Chapters I-IV
have strengthened the presentation and have caused me to eliminate
some errors in formalization, Terence Parsons has been my instructor
in several remarkably good seminars; when I was working out the semantic
system in Chapter IV Parsons was my most frequently consulted source
of v7isdora; overall, it is Parsons’ standards I have attempted to adopt
in doing philosophical research (although I do not think I have met
them)
,
Other members of the University of Massachusetts faculty and
some of the students who have helped me i.n this project in discussion
or consultation include Edmund L, Cettier III, Emmon Bach, Roger
IV
VHiggins, Rich Saenz, James Waldo, Earl Conee, Mary Clark, David
Austin, Alan McMichael, Rick Wiley, Elisabet Engdahl, and Ed Matthei.
To Wendy Russell and Alex Bruskin go my thanks for being
patient and of good cheer when the going got hard,
Indira Shetterley, from whom I took Sanskrit, was good enough
to check the Sanskrit examples for grammaticality
,
to recommend changes
in the fragment which made it resemble natural Sanskrit more closely,
and to rule on the acceptability of my readings of the sentences of
the fragment. There are doubtless errors which occur in what follows,
and for them I bear full responsibility.
ABSTRACT
Studies in Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya
. September, 1978
Lawrence Ward Davis, B.A., University of Colorado
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Gareth B. Matthews
Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya was the work in which the speculations
of the Indian Grammarians found their fullest expression. In this
dissertation three topics treated in the Vakyapadiya are explicated:
akankga
,
spho^a
,
and sabdabrahman
. A Montague-style categorial
grammar for a fragment of Sanskrit is given to provide an explication
of the term akahk^a
. The semantics of that fragment is discussed in
connection with the concept spho^a and it is argued that Bhartrhari's
theory of spho^a was not the one currently attributed to him by
scholars of his work. The concept of sabdabrahman is discussed with
reference to two questions: Why did Bhartrhari think that the study
of Grammar leads to salvation, and how can a monistic position be
consistently asserted? The formal machinery of the earlier chapters is
employed in these discussions. Another concept— that of metalanguage
hierarchies— is discussed but the intent is to demonstrate that such
hierarchies need not be employed in a formal treatment of Bhartrhari's
work and a different system is given within which such hierarchies
may be accommodated without recourse to a different language.
vi
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is a Western treatment of three concepts
discussed in the Vakyapadlya of the Indian philosopher of language
Bhartrharl. The following remarks may he useful as background
information to the reader.
1, Concerning The Grammarians 1
According to tradition the first Indian Grammarian was the god
Indra, who received instruction from the god Rrhaspati? Many analyses
of the syntax of Sanskrit were proposed in the years which followed
this event, culminating in Panini’s Ast^dhyayT, written (most likely)
in the fifth century b,c», P"^ini’s stature among Western linguists
is great, as these remarks by Leonard Bloomfield indicate:
(1) Cl^^ini*s grammar isj one of the greatest monuments of human
lo te lligence
, , , , I t describes, with the minutest detail, every
inflection, derivation, and composition, and every syntactic
usage of its author's speech. No other language, to this day,
has been so perfectly described. ( Langiiage
.
1933, New York, p, 11)
(2) Hindu grammar described the Sanskrit language completely and
in scientific terms, v/ithout prepossessions or philosophical
intrusions. It was from this model that ^Testcm scholars
learned, in the course of a few decades, to describe a
language in terms of its own structure. ("Linguistic Aspects
of Science", Bloomfield (1^39))
Panini's stature in India was greater still; he is frequently referred
to as "divine" in the literature and tradition has it that some
verses of his Astldhyayi were divinely dictated.
Panini's treatment of Sanskrit syntax had two effects. It
elevated the version of Sanskrit which he formalized to the level of
IX
Xa divine language, rendering it innune to the ordinary processes of
linguistic change, and it provided a solid basis for speculations
of the Indian schools of philosophy about the nature of language and
meaning.
The Grammarians of India themselves formed such a school,
called the Vy^arapas
. (In this work I use the English term
Grammarians*' for them.) After Pan ini cane several Grammarians whose
work has been lost, including Vyadi and KStyayana. They were
followed by Patanjali, who wrote a famous commentary on Panini's
As^adTyyT
,
the Mahabhagya
.
Other Grammarians succeeded Patafijall
in the period up to the fifth century a.d., but little is known of
them, except that the Grammarian school had dwindled in numbers and
many of its adherents were not capable of understanding Paninl*s
work directly. At that time a Grammarian named Bhartrhari, having
been instructed by a guru named Vasur^ta, v/rote a commentary on
Patanjali's Mahabha?ya and a book of his own, the VakyapadTya
,
which
set forth the theories of language which were known in Bhartfhari’s
time, contrasting them with his views. This book is regarded by
many scholars as the highest point in the history of Indian thought
about the nature of language.
There were other Grammarians x^rho came after Bhartrhari, Two of
them—Rhattoji PTksita and NSgesa Bha^ta—expanded Bhartrhari *s theory
of spbo^a and seem to have modified it. The Grammarian school con-
tinued to grow and develop in India. At the present time it has a
number of adherents and the educated Indian learns Sanskrit by working
with Panini's grammar.
xi
2, Concerning Rhartrharl
About Bhartrhari’s life there is little kno.m for certain.
The nost extensive historical account of him is that of the Chinese
pilgrim I-tsing, a Buddhist who made a journey to India in the seventh
3
century a.d,. I-tsing wrote that a Grammarian named Bhartrhari had
died about 650 a.d., had been a Buddhist, had vacillated between the
secular and holy ways of life seven times, had written a commentary
on the ?tahabha^ya of Patanjali, had written a work called the VSkya-
dis course in two books with a commentary, and had written another
volume called Pelna
.
Much of this information— in partictilar, all of it relating
to Bhartrhari’s private life—has been shown to he doubtful. Iyer
writes that "There is enough evidence to push jBhartrhari' s3 date back
by at least two centuries."^ That Bhartrhari was a Buddhist seems
doubtful, given his reliance on the Vedas and his adherence to the
Advalta Vedanta interpretation of them. His vacillation between
secular and holy life is generally attributed to the poet Bhartrhari,
who wrote a series of verses called the Subhasitatri'^atT
.
There is a
good deal of dispute whether the Grammarian Bhartfhari was the poet
Bhartrhari, and the best informed opinion today seems to be that
we do not know who wrote the poems of Bhartfhari. Fragments of
Bhartrhari’s commentary on the Mahabha?ya exist today, as do the tv/o
works cited by I-tsing. Taken together, the l^kya-discourse and the
Pcina make up the Vakyapadiya
,
the subject of this dissertation.
Uhat we Imow more or less for certain of Bhartrhari, then, is
this: He lived in the fifth centur^» a.d., was the pupil of a
xii
Grammarian named VasurSta, wrote a commentary on Patanjail's work,
and wrote the treatise In which the speculation of the Grammarians
culminates. The rest Is lost In the fifteen centuries which come
between his time and our ovm,
3. Concerning the VSkyapadTya
I assume that the VSkyapadlya Is composed of three hooks, al-
though there Is some dispute on this point. Filial holds that only
Books I and II are properly called the Vakyapadlya
. citing as evidence
the facts that Bhartjharl's and Punyaraja's commentaries only cover
Books I and II, I-tsing’s account of the size of the vgkya-dlscourse
is that of Books I and II, Helaraja's commentary is on Book IH alone,
and the conclusion of Book II Is stylistically the termination of
a work rather than a less-than-fInal part of it.^ Plllai's translation
entitled The V^.yapadTva, is of BookI and Book II alone.
Iyer disputes this account of the composition of the I'akyapadTya
as strongest evidence that all three books constitute it the
following verse from Book II;
(3) Here (i.e., in Cantos I and II) only the bare essentials of
a fev7 systems are given. There will be a study in details
in Canto III. (VP II 483, Pillai)
Pillai does not discuss this verse when he cites evidence for his
views on the composition of the l^^yapadTya
,
perhaps viewing it as
a later interpolation.
Concerning these matters my intention has been to provide an
account of certain concepts of Bhartrharl’s philosophy of language.
There is no dispute concerning the authorship of the three books;
xiii
the views in those three books cohere; passages from all three
illuminate the theories contained in any one of them. For these
reasons I treat them as a unit and call the group of the three of them
the Vakyapadlya. One who is sympathetic to Pillai’s views may read
the phrase "the Vakyapadiya " as "the V^yapadTva and the PrakTnjaka"
wherever it appears in the text.
There are some disputed interpretations of texts and a few
apocryphal verses. The apocryphal verses aren’t crucial to the
research presented here, but in several cases the disputed texts
are crucial. In such cases the fact is noted.
It is difficult to characterize the subject matter of the three
books of the l^^-yanadTya in an ordered way because each discusses a
wide variety of topics, often without transition, and points made in
one book are often brought up or elaborated in another. Traditionally
the first book is known as the Frahmakapcja (Brahman-book), the second
as the Valcyakanda (Sentence-book)
,
and the third as the Padakragda
(Word-book). However the most useful passages about Brahman are found
in Book III and a good deal of discussion of the nature of words is
found in Book II. For these reasons I do not attempt a summary of
the ideas presented in each book, relying instead on quotation to
present the ideas in the texts as I discuss them.
I have used Filial 's translation and numbering of the verses
of Books I and II for purposes of quotation and have had recourse to
Biardeau's translation into French of Book I and its Commentary
when puzzled, although I do not quote from it here. For Book III
I have quoted from Iyer's translation. ^Jbenever a passage is quoted
from the Vakyapadiy
a
,
the letters "^^P" follow it with the name of
xiv
the translator and the passage number. The Sanskrit originals are
not quoted, because this dissertation is written for Western readers,
and the Sanskrit original of the translated passages would occupy
a good deal of space without enlightening the intended reader.
A. Concerning The Commentators
The follcn^ing commentators are referred to at many points in
the chapters to come: Filial for his remarks on Rooks I and II
which precede the text, for his transitions between verses, and for
his parenthesized passages interspersed with the translations which
make clear the sense of a passage; Iyer for his transitions between
verses of Rook III, for his elaboration of difficult verses, for
his summary of Helaraja's commentary, and for Iyer(l<56b)
,
a volume
devoted to Bhartrhari s work upon which I have relied heavily;
and HelSraja's commentary on Book III, written early in the tenth
century a.d. and sumraararized in Iyer’s translation of Rook III.
There are other ancient commentators on the \^kyapadiya
who have influenced Filial and Iyer in their translations, but who
have not had direct influence on the research which follows, save
the V]rtti of Harivrsabha (which may be a commentary of Bhartrhari ’s)
In Biardeau's translation of Book I.
There are modem scholars of the Crammarian school who are
quoted frequently in the chapters to come: Brough, Kunjunni Paja
(sometimes referred to as "Raja" in the text), Chakravarti, and Staal.
The Vakyapadiya is written in verse form so that it will be easier
to memorize. For this reason it contains highly compressed treatments
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of many of the topics discussed in it. It is hard going and without
the aid of the commentators much of what is said is lost to the
reader. I have relied to a great extent on the elaborations and
interpretations of the commentators in the chapters which follow,
departing from their views only when it seems philosophically expedi-
ent to do so.
5. Concerning this Work
My training has been primarily in the area of Western philosophy,
with particular attention paid to the philosophy of language. I
first read about the Grammarians to satisfy a point I was curious
about. Tty interest was piqued and it deepened until it has become
something of an obsession, culminating in the plan to write a disserta-
tion which presented a unified account of Bhartrhari’s thought.
Problems of time and space have eroded that plan so that it is only
three concepts of Bhartrhari's theory which are thoroughly discussed
in the chapters which follow— the notions of akankga
,
spho^a
,
and
s abdab rahman
.
These three concepts are connected in Bhartrhari's
thought and stand at the heart of it, but there is much in what he
wrote which is not touched on in an exposition of them.
Soiiie characterization of these three concepts may serve to orient
the reader in the discussions to follow. Ak'^k??
,
literally,
'expectancy', is a syntactic notion used to describe the follox<7ing
feature of v;ords; words or phrases of different sorts have expectancy
for words or phrases of other sort. If such expectancy is satisfied
a sentence results. Tliis concept was not originated by the Grammarians,
xvi
having developed in the l^Imamsa philosophy of language. Its applica-
tion is based on the syntactic work of P^ini. however, and Bhartrhari
»
uses it in his discussions of the nature of the sentence as a sequence
of words. For these reasons I take some pains to formalize the notion
of ak_arik?a by means of a categorial grammar of the !fontague sort for
a fragment of a version of Sanskrit. (The version, it should be noted,
treats words taken out of sandhi for simplicity. This feature of it
will shock the e^erienced reader of Sanskrit, although the student of
Perry's A Sanskrit Primer X7ill recognize the fragment as that of the
early lessons in Perry's book.) The fragment has quantifiers, inten-
sional contexts, and translations into the predicate calculus—all the
most recent features of the Montague style of doing semantics. The
grammar and its informal presentation take up Chapter I and Chapter II
of this dissertation.
Sphota is a concept which is peculiar to the Grammarian school.
Kunjunni Raja writes,
(4) Next to the Sphota theory of linguistic symbols advocated by
Bhartfhari.
.
. the most important contribution of ancient India
to general linguistics is the concept of ak^hksa
.
Some commentators are not so kind to the doctrine; I believe that this
fact is related to the fact that it seems to have been misinterpreted.
The doctrine itself has to do with langtiage viewed as an integral
unit. Crudely put, Bhartrhari would say that words express a sentencc-
sphot:a
,
which is an indivisible entity. (In particular, sentence-
sphot^as are not divided into words or word-meanings). This view was
in contrast to the view of the Mimarjjisakas
,
which was that sentences are
xvii
conglomerations of words and sentence-meanings conglomerations of
word-meanings. It was the doctrine of sphota which first interested
me in Rhartrhari; partly because it seemed lovely, dark and deep;
partly because I sensed an obstruction between the theory and me, the
result of misinterpretation by Bhartrhari’s successors and commentators.
Two years later I believe I have identified the obstruction, explained
why it is there, and redeveloped the sphota theory which Rhartrhari
actually held. (The reader will have to decide this point for his or
her self.) In treating the doctrine of sphota some changes are rung
on the Sanskrit fragment introduced earlier. The intent is to provide
a formal version of the idea that meanings may be assigned to letters
in such a way that sentence-meanings are derived from the interaction
of letter-meanings. These topics occupy Chapter III of this dissertation.
Chapter IV is devoted to a demonstration that the machinery of
metalanguages usually employed in discussions of semantics need not
(indeed, ought not) be used in representing Rhartrhari 's thought. In
a sense this chapter constitutes a study of a fourth concept in
Bhartrhari’s work, that of the metalanguage. Since the object of
the study is to prove that Rhartrhari did not use the concept and
need not have used it, I have not counted it as a concept which is
explicated here. In fact, my intention is to bring about the whole-
scale demolition of the metalanguage idea as a sine qua non of semantic
discourse.
(Tiapter V treats Bhartrhari's theory of Brahman (the ultimate
reality of the Vedic tradition) as it is related to his theory of
language. It may seen peculiar that this doctrine should figure in a
xviii
work devoted to a careful treatment of syntactic and semantic concepts.
This apparent anomaly deserves discussion.
In order to understand the V^kyapadtya it is necessary to
understand its connection to the Vedic tradition, for it was written
to defend that tradition and at times it invokes the Vedas in its
own defense. Bhartrhari’s belief was the Vedantic belief that the
Vedas are eternal documents whose function is to show people the way
to salvation—union with Brahman. The latter sections of the Vedas,
the Upanlsads, were regarded by Vedantists as the summation of Indian
religious thought in terms of statements about Brahman. It was common
for Brahman to be characterized in the Vedas as linguistic in nature,
as in this passage:
(5) The highest Brahma, your Majesty, is in truth speech.
> £'had-'^ranyaka Tip an i? ad, IV. 1.2, Hume p. 127)
In this tradition lies part of the explanation for Bhartrhari’s pre-
occupation with the relation between grammar and Brahman--a relation
which is referred to frequently in the course of the \^kyapadTva
.
Another part of the explanation lies in the tradition that Grammar is
a divine discipline. Following the traditional account, the first
Grammarian--Indra—was divinely taught and this beginning seems to have
lent to linguistics the status of the primary science in India, (It
O
is colloquially known as the "Veda of the Vedas" ), This is in
comparison to the Western view that mathematics is the queen of the
sciences. Speaking very generally, this difference in stress may
account for the fact that God is characterized as the ultimate geometer
or the ultimate mathematical entity in the West and that Brahman is
xix
characterized as the ultlnate language user or the ultimate linguistic
entity in India. An appreciation of the status of linguistics in
India explains Rhartrharl’s frequent reference to Rrahnan in his
writing—he was attempting to justify the tradition which led him to
study language in the first place. The relation between that tradition
and the formal models of language developed in earlier chapters is
explored in Chapter V. It is my intent there to point to the formal-
ism developed in connection with Banks'S and s phot a as forming a
metaphor for Bhartrhari’s view of the relation between Brahman and the
world. The reader will have to judge the success of the application.
(a final Note; Sabda—Brahman * speech—Brahman* is Bhartj’harl’s term
for Brahman as the ultimate linguistic entity. In Chapter V I
skorten it to B rahman
.
as Bhartphari does frequently in his text.)
Throughout this volume my intent has been to render the concepts
discussed clearly and precisely. To this end I have used some
formal notation developed in the Nest. The sections of the disserta-
tion which are primarily formal are described informally so that a
reader who wishes to can read a prose account of what is done without
undergoing the rigors of logical notation. Nhile one may get through
the research in this way, I do not believe that the subtleties of the
formal rendering will be appreciated from the prose account. The
formalism used in this description of my research seems to me to
provide an understanding of the concepts formalized which is not
possible to provide in ordinary prose. I do not mean by this that
one is to view the formal" languages" used as distinct from ordinary
XX
language; it seems to me that it is ordinary language sharpened into
a formidable tool. (How this can be is one of the subjects treated
in Chapter IV.) With the precision of the formalism comes an under-
standing of the nature and consequences of vievjs first formulated
less precisely—an understanding which I believe worth the trouble it
takes to get the formalism right.
For information on the texts quoted from— Pallai, Iyer,
Raja, etc., the reader is referred to the Bibliography.
FOOTNOTES
1 For a fuller account of the history of the Granmarian school,
the reader is referred to Misra (1066), pp. 11-28.
2 Ghakravarti (1930), pp. 2-3. Ghakravarti refers to the TaittirTya
Samhita VI. 4. 7 and the Mah'abhasya, ^’’ol. Ip. 5 as texts.
3 I-tsing’s account is reproduced in translation in Staal (1072),
pp. 12-17.
4 Iyer (1969), p. 2. The primary evidence for the earlier date
is the fact that Bhartrhari is quoted in a Tibetan text of Oihnaga,
who is believed to have flourished circa 500 a.d..
5 See Iyer (1969), pp. 10-13. Iyer refers especially to a study
by Kosambi which concludes "for all that, we still do not know who
he was."
6 Pillai, pp. xv-xvii.
7 Iyer (1969), p. 6
8 See Ghakravarti (1930), p. 34.
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CHAPTER I
AKXnk?X ; TflE SYNTACTIC BEHAVIOR OF WORDS
^
1. Expectancy (Akariksa)
The characterization of a sentence was a perennial subject of
concern for the Indian philosophers of language. In Book II of the
VakyapadTya Bhartrhari discusses eight definitions of the sentence
which were in use when he wrote. In the next chapter his preferred
view is considered. In this chapter we discuss a view he presented
as an artificial way of getting to the truth—a view that sentences
are sequences of words which have a certain property. According to
this view, Bhartfhari's definition of a sentence is the following;
(1) Bhartrhari *5 loose definition of the sentence
. A sentence
is a sequence of words which expresses a complete meaning.
This definition subsumes another well-known definition of the
sentence, that of the MTmamsaka school of philosophy;
(2) A sentence is one which has its parts possessing mutual
expectancy when they are considered separately, but not
possessing expectancy for anything else when in combination,
which has the verb as its principal element, and has
qualifying words and one unified meaning. O-T* II 4, Pillai)
The last t\70 parts of this definition were regarded as expendable,
as we shall see, but the first part was considered to be the essence
of the Mlmamsaka theory. The notion of expectancy, or akahkga
,
is
described by Raja in Raja (1963) in this way;
1
2( 3 ) .Iimaipsaka-s first enunciated, and the other schools ofthought later accepted with slight modifications, the threefactors of phon_etic contiguity or samidhi
. logical consis-tency or j ogyata , and syntactic expectancy or akahk§"? amoncthe parts of a sentence as constituting the bases of syntac-
t c un ty. Of these three, akahkga is all-comprehensive andthe most important, (p, 151)
(A) The knowledge of the syntactic unity of a sentence is mainly
on the basis of the akahk??
,
or the mutual expectancy, of
the words, (p. 156)
(5) A word is said to have -akahk^ for another if it cannot,
without the other, produce knowledge of its inter-connection
in an utterance. In every language certain words necessarily
require certain other words to complete the sense. Thus a
noun in the nominative case requires a verb to convey a
complete meaning; a verb like ’bring’ has expectancy for a
word denoting some object, A string of words such as ’cow,
horse, man, elephant’ does not convey a complete sense, as
^h^re ^s no connection between them owing to lack of
akahksa
, (p, 156)
A definition of a sentence based on ~akariks~a. then, would be this
(6) The Mimaiii^saka akahkga definition of a sentence, A sentence
is a sequence of words which lacks 'akanks'a.
The concept of "akahksX struck me early in my research as one
which ought to be susceptible to formalization by means of a
categorial grammar, (A categorial grammar is a grammar in which every
expression is a member of a category. In particular, expressions of
category A/B are the sorts of things which combine with expressions
of category B to yield expressions of category A, In ^^I7^a^Jsaka
terms, an expression of category R/A has expectancy for an expression
of category A,) I believe this impression to be correct. In
Chapter II a categorial treatment of
"
akankslT for a fragment of
Sanskrit is given and some examples of the principles employed
are worked out, Tlie result will be described in this section.
In chapters to come the fragment will be used to make more precise
the. points under discussion.
3The grammar in Chapter II discusses expressions of two lan-
guages. The first. Surface Level Sanskrit ("SLS"), is a fragment
of Sanskrit as one might read it when the words are taken out of
sandhi relationships. Correlated with the v;ords of SLS are expres-
sions of a language called Categorial Sanskrit ("CS”) which have
expectancies appropriate to those of the SLS words. If the SLS
expressions correlated with a sequence of CS words may combine
categorially to produce an expression of the category of sentences,
then the grammar declares the SLS sequence a sentence.
Let us consider an example and its treatment in the style of
the grammar for SLS:^
(7) Rahas dh~avat
i
'Prana' in nominative singular, *run* in
third person present singular active. 'Rama runs'.
According to the grammar in Chapter II, Ramas is correlated with a
nominative noun phrase of CS and dhiavati is correlated with a verb
phrase, an expression which takes a nominative noun phrase to make
a sentence. Since an expression of the category of sentences results
from their combination, (7) is declared a sentence.
The notion of ~ak'ank?a‘ is modelled here by the creation of an
unambiguous categorial grammar with which sequences of SLS words are
correlated. If the CS expressions may combine to produce a CS
expression of type S, then the SLS sequence is said to lack 'akahk-s'5—
that is, to be a sentence.
There are many details to work out in making the model work,
but it seems to me that it does work. The grammar in Chapter II
makes precise the notion of ~akar\k.sa for the fragment of Sanskrit
4which I treat. (There are many interesting features of Sanskrit
which are not treated in the fragment. Later on some of then are
mentioned.
)
To ray knowledge the system in Chapter II is the first grammar
which provides a characterization of the sentences of a fragment of
a natural language of comparable complexity by processing surface
expressions. (The grammars with which I am familiar—Montague Grammars
3-1^^ frsTis formational GrammarS“—define the class of grammatical
sentences by generating them from deeper structures in various ways.)
The SLS fragment is intentionally patterned on the fragment
of English treated by Richard Montague in "The Proper Treatment of
Quantification in Ordinary English” (Montague (1973)), hereafter ”PTQ")
.
In PTQ Montague uses a categorial grammar^ but employs expressions
such as ”a”, "every”, "such that” and others which are not expressions
of the categorial language but are introduced syncategorematically
It may be of interest to students of JIcntague’s work to see that the
grammar may be carried out in a strictly categorial way as well.
Students of Sanskrit may be interested to see some of the
complexities involved in the treatment of vhat are superficially
simple sentences of Sanskrit.
Wliat follows in this section of this chapter is a description
of the grammar in Chapter II together with an account of the use
Bhartrhari would make of it. The reader who wishes may skip the
foinalisn of the chapter, although the full power of the categorial
approach to grammar and the neatness with which it renders the
akanksa concept seem to me to be derived best from a perusal of the
real thing.
5_Su_rface Level Sanskrit. The syntax of SLS is uncomplicated.
There are six cases—nominative, accusative, instrumental, dative,
genitive, and locative. There are the three genders masculine,
feminine, and neuter. The lexicon contains the following common
nouns and proper nouns in all six cases;
Masculine; ^ 'cow*, nara 'man', gha^a 'pot', Rama
.
Govinda
.
£a (pronoun), artha 'meaning', narasiipha 'man-lion', and ^ (pronoun).
Feminine; nari 'woman', Lak?mi
.
grT
.
ta (pronoun), ya
(pronoun), and jati 'universal'.
Neuter; gi^hara 'house', (pronoun), (pronoun), pada 'word*,
v^ya 'sentence', and dravya 'substance*.
All genders; bhavin 'entity*.
The following adjectives in all cases and genders are in the
lexicon; sadhu 'good', mithy'a 'false', earn 'beautiful', satya 'real',
and ^l.thyTT 'true*. (mithya is declined here but not in natural Sanskrit.)
The operators £a 'and', va 'or* and yada
. .. tada 'if... then*
are in the lexicon.
The operator na 'not* is in the lexicon.
The relativizer _ta 'such that* is in the lexicon.
The determiner sarva 'every* is in the lexicon.
The verbs m£ 'die', dhlv 'run', stha* 'stand* or 'exist',
bhu 'exist', snih 'love', dr<p 'see*, vac 'express', 'be*,
yaj 'sacrifice', and yam ‘give* are in the lexicon (most in both
active and passive form) in third person present singular form.
Any sequence of v;ords from the SLS lexicon is a SLS sequence,
SLS sequences are correlated with expressions of CS
,
word by word.
6t^egorlal Sanskrit. Some of the words of SLS are ambiguous
between several forms. Gj^am, for example, is the nominative and
accusative form of ’house’. As a nominative noun, intransitive
verb phrases have expectancy for it to make a sentence; as an accusa-
tive noun, many transitive verbs have expectancy for it to make an
intransitive verb phrase. Ta is a pronoun as well as the relativizer
such that*. Cases of this sort are frequent and one difficulty
encountered by the student of Sanskrit is that of choosing which of
such alternative forms one uses in order to derive a sentence reading
from a sequence of words.
CS is a language in which such ambiguities do not exist. The
idea is that a SLS word vd.th several possible expectancy readings
is correlated with constructions of expressions of CS,- each member
of which represents one of the expectancies of the SLS v/ord.
"Gfham", for example, is correlated with a nominative common noun
expression and an accusative common noun expression. (There are others
as well, as we shall see).
There is another sort of ambiguity found in ordinary Sanskrit
which is treated in a similar way. It has to do with specifying
the sense in which to take some occurrences of common nouns. Consider
the following sentences:
(8) Maras dhavati
. ’man’ in nominative, ’runs’
(9) S'adhu6 naras dhavati . ’good’ in masculine nominative, ’raanj,
’ runs
’
(10) Sarvas s~adhus naras dha'vati
. ’every’ in masculine nominative.
* good' » ’man’, ’runs’.
7Sentence ( 8) is ambiguous. The common noun naras may be taken
in a definite sense or an existential sense, so that (g) may mean
'The man runs' or 'A man runs’. The sense of common nouns is often
undetermined in Sanskrit. For this reason when expressions of SLS
are correlated with CS expressions, common nouns are correlated with
determiners corresponding to the two senses just described. These
determiners will be separate from their common nouns, for reasons
demonstrated by sentences like (9). ’The good man runs’ and ’A good
man runs’ are possible readings of (9). in these cases we see that
the adjective sadhus
’good' has modified the common noun naras before
the determiner has operated on the common noun phrase. Hence
determiners will be of a type with expectancy for common noun phrases,
Th^ are correlated with SLS common nouns but are autonomous and may
delay combining with then so that adjectives may interact first.
Another sort of ambiguity occurring in Sanskrit is treated
in a similar way. The Sanskrit sentence
sadhvi nari
. ’jri’, 'good' in feminine nom.
,
’woman’ in
fern. nom.
means a good woman’ or ’Jri is the good woman’. It is common
for the verb a^ ’be’ to be omitted. In the grammar in Chapter II
_as is introduced along with nominative nouns and common nouns in the
set of expressions of CS correlated with SLS words.
Another sort of ambiguity arises from the use of pronouns.
It is treated here is a different v;ay. Tlie Sanskrit sentence
(I2) I^mas Govindaya tasya gha^am yacchati ’ R"araa gives Govinda
his pot’
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is ambiguous (whose pot is It?) In Sanskrit pronouns of any gender
may have as antecedents nouns of the same gender. Ambiguity arises
when there are several nouns of the appropriate gender to which a
given pronoun may refer. In addition, there are ambiguities of
scope of the sort treated in PTQ which were not, to my knowledge,
discussed by the Grammarians. These facts-that pronouns may be
ambiguous In reference, that scope nay be ambiguous, and that
pronouns refer to antecedents of their own gender—requlre some
machinery in CS which is not a part of SLS.
Each pronoun of CS is an ordered triple whose last two members
mark its gender and case. Its first member contains the pronoun
form with a nunerical subscript. The subscript serves to differ-
entiate pronouns of the same gender for possible refer.ence to
different antecedents. The pronouns of the same subscript and gender
may be taken to refer to the sane antecedent.
Reference to an antecedent is brought about by the use of
binding operators operators which combine noun phrases and other
phrases so that the noun phrase is related to pronouns
of the proper subscript and gender in the other phrase. Each binding
operator is subscripted; it binds only those pronouns v/hich have its
subscript. There are three categories of binding operators,
representing these three scopes of the noun phrases which are the
antecedents; sentence, verb phrase, and common noun phrase.
The rules for combining binding operator, phrases containing pronouns,
and noun phrases require that the noun phrase and the pronouns to
be bound have the same gender.
9The relation between noun phrase and pronouns is represented
in the predicate calculus— the best tool for displaying the neaning
of natural language expressions in a precise way I know of.
There is another sort of ambiguity not explicitly discussed
by the Grammarians or the Iflmaiijsakas. The word ’or' may combine
two noun phrases to make a noun phrase, two verb phrases to make a
verb phrase, or two sentences to make a sentence. This fact requires
that ^ have three sorts of expectancy. In the grammar ^ is associ-
ated with three expressions of CS
,
each with the relevant expectancy.
Basic CS Expressions. In CS we find the categories of common
nouns, noun phrases, verl^ (intransitive and transitive), determiners,
adjectives, operators, relativizers
,
and binding operators. The
notation of the system of categories is based in an obvious way upon
that employed by :iontague in PTO. There are three basic types—
CN, VP, and S, the types of common noun phrases, verb phrases, and
sentences. Other category types are composed from these with the
use of slashes (as in PTQ, **A/B** is used to denote the category of
expressions which take things of type B to produce an expression
of type A.)
Common Noun expressions are ordered triples whose second and
third members are gender and case markings. The first member
contains a predicate followed by "(z)". For example, the Common
Noun expression correlated with raj as 'king' in nominative is
^raj a(z) ,?I,Nom'). Tlie "z" holds the place for an argument v;hich may
be inserted when the expression is combined with another.
Noun Phrases are members of category S/VP. They are ordered
triples v;hose second and third members are gender and case markings.
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Thetr first nsnher Is a constant or variable enclosed In parentheses
preceded by the letter "P". The noun phrase expression correlated
with Rimeaa 'rama' In Instrumental Is <P(Kama) ,M.Inst>, for example.
The "P" holds the place for a predicate expression which nay be
inserted v;hen this expression is combined with another.
Verbs are members of three categories, intransitive verbs
(category VP for verb phrase), 1-place transitive verbs (category
VP/NP), and 2-place transitive verbs (category (VP/NP)/NP), Verbs
are n-tuples whose first member is a predicate expression with
markers which specify the case each of its arguments must be in.
The other members are the cases of the arguments in reverse order
in which they are to be filled in. For example, correlated with
the verb ^aj:chati 'give' in active is the CS expression <^am Norn Acc Pat,
Nom,Acc ,Dat^. The first member is the predicate yam 'give' with
its three argument places marked v?ith names of the cases its argu-
ments must be in. The last three members show that the first argu-
ment to be taken will be in dative case, the second accusative case,
and the third nominative case.
Passive forms of verbs are treated as synonymous with active
forms. ^ The passive of yam
,
yamyate
.
is correlated with two CS
expressions, ^yam Inst Acc Non, Norn, Acc , Ins t^ (' was given a
by ') and <[yara Inst Nora Dat ,Nom,Dat , Inst^ (* was given to
by '). The result of combining any of these three versions of yam
with arguments will be an expression of the form yam a b c, where a
is the giver, b the gift, and c the recipient.
11
There are seme Interesting features of the treatment of the
verb 2^ ’sacrifice*. The sentence
Ramas gava narasimham yajati
which means
(14) Rama sacrifices a cow to a man-lion,
may be true even though no man-lions exist. This is not the case with
a sentence such as
(15) Ftamas gam narasimhaya yacchati
’Rama gives a cow to a man-lion’
which is never true when there are no man-lions. Put crudely,
it is Rama’s intention rather than the existence of man-lions
which counts in determining the truth value of (13). Hence ya.j
is a predicate which has an intenslonal third place. This fact is
represented in the fragment by correlating with yajati
.
the active
form of ^aj
,
the CS expression ^yaj Nom Inst *'Acc,Norn, Ins t,Acc^. The
symbol is an intension operator, after the style of Montague in
PTQ, It should be noted that it need not mean what it means in PTQ,
however. According to Montague’s interpretation it is the extension
of the expression which follows it, in all worlds and times. In a
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faithful rendering of Bhartrharl's theory. It would probably denote
some concept of the object of the aacrlflce which the sacrlflcer has
In mind, but I forego pronouncing on this point until a later chap-
ter.
The student of PTQ may notice that the intensional operator is
introduced as part of the verb expression rather than, as in PTQ,
as a built-in feature of the categorial combination process. This
point is elaborated in discussion of the rules of combination.
The category of determiners has three members, corresponding
to the definite description determiner (_^ man) , the existential
quantifier (a man), and the universal quantifier ( every man).
Determiners are ordered triples whose second and third members are
gender and case markers and whose first member is a quantified
expression containing an occurrence of to hold the place for
a common noun predicate x^hen the determiner and common noun are
combined. The determiner correlated with sarva 'every' in masculine
nominative, for example, is <(x2i) (C?T(x2i)-^P(x2^) ) ,M,Nom>, v;here i
is the number of sarva 's place in the SLS sequence. This expression
the CN" filled in by a common noun predicate and the "P"
filled in by a verb.
Binding operators are of the form VPBO^, CNBO^, and SBO^,
The first quantifies noun phrases into verb phrases, the second into
common noun phrases, and the third into sentences. The categories
of these operators are ^/P/(fTP,VP)
,
C?l/(!TP,C!0
,
and S/(?:P,S),
Adjectives are ordered triples v;hose first member is a stem
and whose second and third members are gender and case markers. The
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SLS adjective sa^
- good' lr> masculine nominative, for example,
is correlated with the CS expression <s-5dhu,K,Mom>. Adjectives
i .
are of category CN/CM.
Relatlvlrers are of the form <Relj,r,,c'>, where the first
member has as subscript the Integer which Is the subscript of the
la pronouns It will bind, and the second and third members are
gender and case markers. These expressions are of category
CN/(S,CN).
Category S/(S,S) contains the logical operators V, &, and-^.
Category S/S contains the logical operator
The category \T>/(VP,VP) contains the verb phrase disjunction
and conjunction— Vand?f.
The category NP/(NP,NP) contains the noun phrase disjunction V.
There are other members of the categories of CS in addition to
these basic ones just described. In order to explain their derivation
we consider the Correlation Rules and the Rules of Combination.
Correlation Rules. SLS words arc correlated with sequences
of CS expressions which reflect their expectancies. Tlie Correlation
Rules are as follows:
Each common noun is correlated with a set of sequences of CS
expressions which is the union of the following two sets (taken for
In feminine nominative, for example):
1. ^<n'arT,F,Non)^ X X (Det U
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The first menber of the first set is the expectancy of na£i
proper. The second represents the possible addition of the verb
IS 'be'. The third represents the possible addition of a deteminer.
The operator "X" is used to denote the Cartesian product of the sets
it flanks, with "r (the empty set) deleted. Thus the first set
includes J<P(narT),F.Mom>^ if ”r is the element in the product
selected from the second and third set.
-he second set is like
the first except that a pronoun and binding operator are added
with the determiner in order to allow for varying scope on the
quantifiers. As before, "1" is the number of n^’s place in its
SLS sequence. If n^ had not been in nominative case, the terms
containing £s twuld be deleted. (We recall that as ’be’ takes
nominative case arguments.)
I have stated the correlation rules in this way to make
perspicuous the source of each member of a correlated sequence.
It would have been less complicated but a more lengthy process to
have specified the set of correlated expressions one by one.
Instead I have opted for the empty set notation and modified Cartesian
Product operator, in the tradition of the Grammarians themselves,
to whom brevity in the statement of rules was a goal pursued with
cleverness.
The set of sequences of CS expressions correlated with a
proper noun is less complicated. For Fnna in nominative, it is
^^(Rama),M,Won^
^
^
^
•
The set of expressions correlated with in neuter genitive,
for example, is the union of these sets, where ta is the second
member of a SLS
15
sequence of length 3:
1. ^<P(ta2 ) ,N,Gen>, (ta^) ,N,Gen'>^
2- ^^P(ta^) ,N,Gen'^ X
3. ^<rel^,N.Gen>^
0 N
VPBO,
I
CNBOn
SBO^
J
had been in nominative case. sets 1 and 2 would have had
terra as"^ added to the product,)
the
The first set represents as a pronoun which nay be bound
by a binding operator Introduced somewhere else, or which may remain
unbound, referring to some antecedent outside the sentence. The
second represents the pronoun with Its own binding operators. The
third represents as a relativizer.
The pronoun in genitive neuter, as second member of a
three-member sequence, would have correlated with it this set:
^P(ya
2 ),M,Gen>, <P(ya^) ,’!,Gen>
,
<P(ya^) ,'I,Gen>]
.
Each pronoun serves as a marked noun phrase until a relativizer of
its subscript combines a sentence-category expression containing it
and a common noun to make a common noun.
The other combination procedures are straightforward, save that
for the word yada , ,
,
tada 'if,,, then’ a single expression is correlated.
This expression, is of a category S/(S^S), There are other
ways this expression could have been treated, Montague night have inserted
it syncategoremat ically
,
making if p then g directly from p and q
in PTQ, There are no syncategorematic words in this fragment, hut
we could have taken one of the two "words” (yada , for example) to
be of category (S/S)/S, and taken the other to be of category
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S/((S/e/^S). But there is no evidence I am aware of which suggests
that this is the way if.
..then sentences are hullt up in practice,
and in the absence of such evidence the simpler tack adopted here
was taken.
Given a sequence s of SLS words, the sets of expressions
correlated with each word of s are combined in all possible ways
to produce the set of disambiguated sequences for s. Members of
such sequences may combine to produce derived expressions of the
categories of CS by means of the Rules of Combination.
j l^es of Combination. There are several departures here from
the methods employed by Montague in PTQ. One is that most of the
Rules of Combination are partially, rather than totally, defined,
depending on factors such as agreement in gender and case in the
selection of appropriate arguments. This is not a necessary' feature
of the system. One could make the rules be totally defined and
preserve the relevant features of the system by adding a place to
each CS expression which is ’V* for basic expressions but which
changes to ”1” whenever an inappropriate sort of expression is
operated on to produce a combined expression. Then the definition
of a sentence would have the provision added that the second member
of the thing of type S produced by the interaction of the members
be "ir (well-formed) rather than "I" (ill-formed). I have not adop-
ted some such maneuver here because there are semantic reasons for
denying the total-function nature of categorial expressions (at
least, as they are employed in PTQ, where Montague allows vacuous
quantifying in and derives some spurious readings.) Also, the
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grammar of Chapter II Is an attempt to model a listener's or reader's
processing of Sanskrit. The listener or reader may try all sorts
of Interpretations of words In order to arrive at a sentence reading,
but a competent listener does not combine things which do not agree
in case or gender.
Some features of the Rules of Combination are the following:
Common nouns and determiner combine when gender and case
to produce a noun phrase.
Noun phrases and verb phrases combine when the noun phrase is
in nominative case to produce a sentence,
1-place transitive verbs combine with noun phrases in the
correct case to produce verb phrases.
2-place transitive verbs take noun phrases in the correct
case to produce 1-place transitive verbs.
Common nouns and adjectives combine if case and gender agree,
A noun phrase is quantified into a common noun phrase, verb
phrase, or sentence by a binding operator when the phrases quantified
into contain at least one pronoun with the same gender as the noun
phrase and the same subscript as the binding operator, and when all
such pronouns in the phrase quantified into have the same gender as
the noun phrase.
Relative clauses in Sanskrit are somewhat different in construc-
tion from their English counterparts. In Sanskrit the common noun
phrase to be relativized is marked x/ith the relativizer ta, which
agrees in gender and case. Correlated with is at least one
occurrence of in the relative clause, agreeing in gender, but
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marked with a case which depends on Us function In the relative
clause. The combination rule for relatlvlrers
,
sentences, and
common nouns, then, states that a common noun and sentence are
combined by a relatlvUer to make a relative clause when there
Is at least one occurrence of a ^a pronoun In the sentence with the
same subscript as the subscript of the telatlvizer, where every such
pronoun In the sentence Is of the sane gender as that of the common
noun phrase, and where the gender of such pronouns matches the
gender of the relativlzer and the common noun. For example. In
the SLS sentence
.I^mas gam tarn Crlya yamvate yas dhavatl 'Rama*, 'cow*,
’such that*, *by Cri*, * is given*, *it*,*runs*
*Rama is given a cow which runs by CrT*
.
iara *cow* is in accusative case in the main clause and is marked
by the relativizer tam in accusative case. The pronoun yas bound
to it is in the nominative case in its clause. The rule combines
j^, and the phrase yas dh~avati to produce a relativized common
noun-»-cow which runs.
The way in which first members of derived expressions are formed
is worth comment. In PTQ when an expression a and an expression b
are combined, the usual translation of the result is what is derived
from applying the translation of a to the intension of the trans-
lation of b. As a result Montague was forced to use Moaning Postulates
to yield equivalent extensional readings for those verbs which have
an extensional sense—-the majority of verbs. For some combinations
of elements
—
quantifying in and relative clause formation for example
—
lambda operators are used in order to yield expressions which may
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be transformed through rules of lambda conversion into predicate
calculus expressions which are the natural readings of the sentences.
It has not seemed to me that the intensional expressions and Meaning
Postulates needed to derive extensional readings for them are the
best way to represent the translations of natural language frag-
ments. For one thing, there is no feature of my language processing
which I am able to discover corresponding to the change from intensional
to extensional expressions with the aid of Meaning Postulates. For
another, the lambda notation in which the PTQ translation of English
expressions is given is, as far as I can discover, much more complicated
than my understanding of those expressions. For these reasons it
has seemed worth exploring ways to present the translation of CS
expressions in predicate calculus notation directly, with the inten-
sional operators built into the translation of the intensional
expressions (yaj
,
for example) and the effect of using lambda
notation and rules of conversion built into the Rules of Combination.
I believe the grammar in Chapter II to be the successful result of
such exploration. There a translation into
predicate calculus is the first member of every expression. Expres-
sions not of category S have markers to hold the place for expressions
with which they will combine. Such markers are ”z" for arguments
of common nouns, P" for properties, ”CN** for common noun predicates,
and the various case markers for verb argument places.
Let us consider an example. The compound noun phrase
Ramas (jins va of SLS ('Rama or Cri') has this CS expression
correlated with it:
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(17) <P(Ffana)v PCjrl) ,N,nom'>
The verb dKavati ’runs' Hac? rc jn s this CS expression correlated with it
(10) i^dhTav Nom,NoTn^,
RC2. the second Rule of Correlation, describes the expression derived
from the combination of these two as P^CPfirama)^ P(fr1).dhav Norn, Nom)
where Is a function which does what the niles of lambda conversion
do: It puts the predicate^ m the place of P m the expression
P(Kama) V Pf^rl)
,
while putting^ and jJrT In the place of
In the expression dhav Nom. The result of applying to the three
expressions above is
(19)
dh‘av(^na) V dh'avCjri)
This expression is naturally read as "RSma or ^rT runs".
This way of handling translations seeras to me to have advan-
tages beyond that of directness. The characterization of ak~Shksa
in (5) specified that a verb has expectancy for a word denoting
some object, and a nominative noun has expectancy for a verb. The
categorial notation accounts for the first statement but not the second
I believe it is an explication of the second that the translation of
a nominative noun phrase has a place held by "P" in which a predicate
is to be inserted. The translation shov;s that the expression
"expects" a verb in order to be complete.^
Examples of SLS sentences and the combination of their
disambiguation sequences to expressions of type 55 are found in
Appendix A, where it is demonstrated that the following sentences;
(20) gris grham pagyati.
(21) Sarvas naras nari snlhvati.
(22)
Ramas tarn gam griya yamyate yas dh'avati.
21have the translations, respectively,
(20 ) (^x^(grhan(x^) 6idr<j ^ri
There is a thing which is a house and (Jri sees it.'
(21*)
^^3)("^^^(^3)*^(Ex7)(nari(x7)&snih X3 xy))
For every man there is a woman whom he loves,'
and
(Ex^) (nari(xy)&(x3)(nara(x3)-^snih X3 xy))
’There is a woman who is such that every man loves her.'
(22') (Exy) ((go(xy)&dh"av(xy))&yam ffi &a Xy)
There is a thing which is a cow and runs and ^rT gives
it to R^ma,
'
Given these rules the definition of a SLS sentence follows
simply,
^ Sentence of SLS, Informally, an SLS
sentence is a sequence of SLS words which is susceptible to inter-
pretation so that its expectancy is satisfied. There is one
other provision; no occurrence of i^ust remain when expectancy
is satisfied, (This was not part of the Mimamsaka definition, I
believe, because their attention was not drawn to quantificational
phenomena.
)
More formally, the definition is this;
(23) A SLS sequence s is a SLS sentence if and only if there is
a member of the set of disambiguated sequences for s such
that some sequence of application of the Rules of Com-
bination to that member transforms it into a single CS
expression of type S which contains no expression of the
form ^ya^,G>.
It may seem that the grammar is deficient in one important
respect, in that it generates many more sequences to test in the
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set of disambiguated sequences for a SLS sequence than will end
up producing an expression of type S. The set of disambiguated
sequences correlated with (20). for example, contains 36 members,
only 6 of which may produce expressions of type S, and the trans-
lation of each of those 6 members is identical. For (21), there
are 1,296 members, most of which do not produce an expression of
type S. Hasn't the grammar overgenerated sequences?
In a sense, the answer to this question is "yes", for no
reasonably experienced reader of Sanskrit supplies as 'he' with a
nominative noun phrase when there is already a verb to take that
noun phrase as subject. Similarly, one doesn’t supply determiners
for a common noun if it has already got one. Moreover, one doesn't
worry about different binding operators with different scopes if
there is only one quantifier in the expression being translated.
The grammar in Chapter II represents the procedures used by a reader
of Sanskrit who has not yet learned some very obvious strategies
for cutting down the possibilities of interpretation. This fact
does not constitute a criticism of the grammar, however, for it
does correctly represent the brute force approach of an untutored
reader. Furthermore, it is a simple enough matter to formulate
interpretational strategies and work them into the Correlation Rules,
(The proviso that the term containing ^ is deleted from the products
in CRl and CR2 is such a strategy). There are many ways this might
be done and, as this topic doesn't bear directly on the concept of
akank^a
,
I have left the Correlation Rules for the most part in
their unsophisticated and unconstrained form.
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_2. Comments on the Fragment
There are several aspects of the Mlmmsaka theory which have
not been correctly modelled In the fragment found In Appendix A.
Some of them are the following.
Imperative form. In the ifli^msaka system (and in Vedic-
oriented philosophy of language in general) the paradigm form of a
sentence is that of an imperative, whereas in the fragment given
here there are only indicative sentences. There are three reasons
for this alteration in the theory. First, the syntactic character-
ization of sentences as sequences of words with expectancies which
are satisfied seems to apply as well to declarative sentences as
to commands. In this respect it doesn’t seem to matter what sort
of sentence one treats (many of the examples given in the disputes
between the Mimamsakas and Bhartrhari are indicative rather than
imperative.) Second, Bhartrhari deals as often with declarative
sentences as imperatives, and the Mimarasaka concentration on impera-
tives does not seem to be a fixation which Bhartrhari endorsed.
Third, much of my interest in modelling the Indian theories of language
in formal ways lies in examining the interaction between the
insights of Western analytical philosophical researchers and those
of the Indian semanticists
. V/estem philosophers have concentrated
most heavily on the form and truth conditions of the declarative
sentence, and their results are most fully worked out there. Hence
I treat declarative sentences with the Western formalism in order
to use the best Western technology. (Montague suggests, in a
footnote to PTQ, that "In connection with imperatives and interrogatives
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truth and entallment condltlona ara of course Inappropriate, and
would be replaced by fulfilment conditions and a characterisation
of the semantic content of a correct answer." (p. 248) MontaRue
did not carry out such a characterisation before his death, however,
and I know of no well-developed system which has done so.)
•Ikank^? as a Syntactic notion. In developing the notion of
atSlkg as a syntactic one, I have deliberately played up the
ayntactlc characterisations of akanksa by the MTm3t,sakas and
played down those characterisations which Involve semantic notions.
Here are some passages of the semantic sort:
(24) ...it is possible to assert that a substantive
, a declen-
-S^onal suffix
,
a radical stem, and a coni u?^ational stiffix —
all these are mutually expectant, having’ semantic inter-
’
ependence on each other for the communication of a particu-lar relational thought-unit... (Bhattacharya (1962), p. 138)
(25) Tl^ere (in the Katyayana.^rautasutra ) a sentence is described
as that which is nir'akahkpa
.
that is to say, something which
has no requirement or expectation of words outside itself to
complete its meaning. (Raja (1963), p. 154)
But the talk about semantic interdependence and meaning in these
passages seems to me to be derivative rather than primary. That is,
in (24) the syntactic features discussed are required in order for
the sequence of words to be capable of communicating a thought-
unit. Hence the necessary feature is a syntactic one, not a semantic
one. My reading of (25) and passages like it is similar. The
expectation Itself is given in examples as syntactic, although there
is a temptation for the commentators to describe the expectancy as
semantic. Some reasons for that tendency are discussed in a later
chapter.
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It is interesting to note that the syntactic characterization
is sufficient to determine the class of sentences of the fragment,
and that in fact no semantic features are used in the definition of
an SLS sentence. first member of each CS expression need not he
Its ’’translation”. The system would work just as well with any
way of forming first members which kept track of ^ and 3 for later
binding.) In this respect the lkiAk^ definition resembles the
characterization of sentences given by contemporary Transformational
Grammarians, whose goal is sometimes described as the specification
of the class of well-formed sentences using only syntactic notions.
In fact, the fragment in Chapter II is strongly equivalent to a
Transformational Grammar given in Chapter II. (This grammar was
suggested by the results in Cooper and Parsons ( ) .•) in making
the Mimaipsaka definition a syntactic one, then, I have at least put
them in respected company.
Other Phenomena. There are many other features of Sanskrit
S)mtax discussed by the Indian philosophers of language which would
have been a delight to treat here but which have been omitted
because they are not relevant to later sections of this work. Some
of these features are;
Compounds. There are three sorts of compounds in Sanskrit,
each interpreted differently, and each with its own grammatical
peculiarites. A good deal of disputation in India centered on the
nature of the process by which the meanings of words interact in
producing the meaning of a compound. An adequate model of compound
formation would throw light on those disputes (or vice versa).
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Tense and Nunher. Western theories of past and future tenses
nnd plural number are not as neatly worked out as are the theories
for sentences with singular number and present tense, hence I have
not treated these phenomena here, although there Is a wealth of
interesting data to treat.
Locative Absolute (and Genitive Absolute). There are Sanskrit
formations in which the subject and participle, as well as modifiers,
are in locative case. Such absolute constructions are used to des-
cribe actions which have already taken place. I do not know what
the best way to model such constructions would be (at the least,
a theory of tenses is required for such a model) but it would appear
to Involve substantial complications in the grammar. There is one
interesting feature of the genitive absolute, in that ‘a semantic
restriction on grammaticality is given for it by Uhitney in !^itney
( 1889 ):
(26) The genitive always indicates a living actor... (p. 101)
If this restriction is correctly described, the grammar could not
be strictly based on syntactic notions.
Further Noun Phrase Ambiguity. Noun phrases have more uses
than those given in the fragment. iramei:ia ’Pama’ in instrumental,
for instance, means with Rama* as well as *Rama* in a case which
may be taken by a verb. Such uses would be represented by additional
members of the sets of expressions correlated with common nouns and
noun phrases, but to add them here would complicate the model without
clarifying the issues to be discussed later on.
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Adverbs. Prepositions, and Particles. An adequate model for
linguistic theories of the Indians would include adverbs, preposition
and particles of various sorts, so that different theories about the
number of parts of speech might be illuminated. (In particular,
the dispute of some Grammarians over the classification of particles
Ji^™P^^avacanTvas as separate sorts of words in addition to
noun, verbs prepositions, and particles would be illuminated.
Bhartrhari has a theory about the special status of kamapravacanTvas
but to make it out more precisely would require a grammar with
various sorts of particles in it. as well as tensed expressions.
/fitness). We noted in the previous section that the
Mimamsaka definition of a sentence quoted in (3) involved three
factors, two of which were "al^nk?T and yogyata (fitness). Yogyafa
has not been a feature of the grammar in Chapter II. Why is this?
It is not a necessary feature of the model that it leave out
y_ogyata . but Bhartrhari and the Mimanjsakas of his time seem to have
given it up as a requirement which ought to be imposed on sentences,
and I believe their reasons are good ones. Let us discuss them in
detail.
The notion of yogyata is characterized in two passage which
we consider;
(27) Do the v;ords ’Fire is cold* constitute a proposition? It
must be admitted that there is the required syntactical
expectancy ,, .but is it in reality a valid proposition?
The answer from a purely commonsense point of view would be
in the negative. But why ., .Because there is no syntactical
possibility betv/een the constituent concepts, the inherence
of 'coldness* in ’fire* being physically impossible,
(Bhattacharya (1962), p, 140)
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(28) In the^sentencejHe wets it with water’ (payas'i sincatl^here is ^gyata or consistency of meaning/since wetting
notM^^^t
^ ^ liquid like water, and there ishing incompatible between the idea of wetting and thatof „at_er. ^But a sonteace like 'He wets It(^ntea_jMcatt) has no yogyata or conpatiblllty, since
flre^"^
"ettlng Is sonethlng Incongruous with that ofi e..
.Strictly speaking It Is the Inconceivability of the
that rendeL thewhole sentence nonsensical; It Is not the lack of correlationwith the actual facts, but the Impossibility of connectingthe «rd-n.eanlngs that stands In the way of verbal compre-hension. (Raja (1963), pp. 164-5).
The Idea expressed In (27) and (28) seems to be that "Fire Is
cold " and "He wets it with fire " are sequences of words which are
unfit to be ruled sentences. IHille they satisfy the requirement of
ahankqa
,
the condition of having proper fitness Is not satisfied by
them. There has been some Western concern over such sentences.
Noam Chomsky in his first book. The Syntactic Structure of Fngllsh
.
asserts that sentences such as
(29) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously,
are syntactically well-formed. In his Aspects of the Theory of
_Sjfntax Chomsky seems to have given up this position, adopting a
theory in which words have selectional restrictions on those words
with which they combine. An inanimate subject, for example, would
not be combined with a verb which requires animate subjects to pro>
duce a grammatical sentence in this theory. In Aspects
,
then,
Chomsky seems to uphold the requirement of yogy at*a on sentences,
Barbara Partee informs me that Chomsky may have reverted to his
earlier position at present, giving up this requirement. Most of
the Indian philosophers of language at the time Bhart^hari wrote
had done the same. There are various reasons for this. One is
that agreement on
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cases is hard to find. (Many people who are sym-
^ ^ ^ requirement on sentences would nonetheless
call "Fire is cold " a false sentence, since "Fire is hot " is true
and the idea seems to be that hot and cold have fitness for the same
sorts of things.) Another is that many people would declare both
sequences given as non-sentences in the passages we have quoted
to be fals^ which is something one can not do if the sequences
are not sentences.
Some Western semanticlsts hold a theory which seems similar
to the ^gyata theory. In Thomason (1972), Richmond Thomason gives
this as an example of a sentence which lacks truth-value:
(30) The theory of relativity is shiny.
The idea is that the theory of relativity is not the sort of thing
one may truly (or falsely) predicate shininess of, and a sentence
in which such a predication is made is one which lacks truth value.
\n\at (30) lacks is adequate presupposition, rather than fitness.
If we read "lacks truth value" or "has presuppositional
failure for lacks fitness", then we find a modem counterpart of
the Miraamsaka theory of yogyafa in the theory of presuppositional
failure, A formal model for such a theory has been hinted at by
Thomason in Thomason (1972) and worked out in detail by James Waldo
in Waldo (1977 ) • The difficulty with taking the yogyata theory in
this v;ay
,
however, is that to do so is to read sequences of words which
lack yogyata as sentences which lack truth value—that is, as senten-
ces.
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(Thomason gives a pouerful argument for ruling (30) a sentence
To deny sentencehood to (30) involves denying it to
(31) What Rama is thinking of is shiny.
when what Rama has In mind Is the Theory of Relativity, and allowing
it to (31) when what &a has In mind Is a gold ring. It seems
peculiar that the grammatlcallty of a sequence of words might vary
from moment to moment, whereas there Is nothing untoward about Its
truth value so varying.)
Saipildhl or Asattl (Contiguity). The third requirement contained
In the classical Mlmamsaka definition of a sentence Is samnldhl
(sometimes, as^)
,
that of
-contiguity'. There are two distinct
readings of this requirement In the literature. I do not believe
either should be part of a characterization of sentences of Sanskrit.
The first has to do with temporal contiguity.
(32) |amnidhi or Isatti is generally explained as the conditionthat the words in a sentence should be contiguous in time.
^or s uttered at long intervals cannot produce the know-
J.edge ^f any interrelation among them, even if there be
_akahksa or yogyafa
. (Raja (1963), p. 166)
But there are instances in which words separated by long intervals
are taken to be parts of a sentence. Messages shouted to someone
in an echo chamber, for example, might be given a word at a time,
with intervals to allow the previous echoes to die away. One
can imagine more bizarre cases—messages broadcast word by word from
behind erratically interfering asteroids, for example— in which the
intervals between words might be quite large, yet the words would be
taken to be constituents of a sentence. In fact, it seems that this
requirement is one on a person’s grasping of a sequence of words as
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a sentence, rather than on the sequence’s being a sentence, and should
properly be a part of a theory of language processing rather than a
theory of what language is,
other interpretation of sanmidhi has a good deal of comment,
both ancient and modem, surrounding it. First, the notion itself;
(33) If the words are separated by the Intervention of irrelevantwords, then also the connection of the meaning cannot beunderstood. (Raja (1963), p. 166)
(34) next item of contiguity ( asatti ) now comes up foriscussion. The intended relational cognition cannot arisefrom a group of words if the terms expressing concepts
expecting one another be separated by intervening words
not having any immediate syntactical expectancy with theformer... For example, when we say—"The mountain has eatenis fiery Devadatta
,
meaning thereby that "The mountain isfiery and that 'Devadatta has eaten", there is the absence
of contiguity inasmuch as there is temporal interventionbetween the interdependent concepts due to the utterance
of other words in between so that the emergence of theintended judgmental cognition is obfuscated.
(Rhattacharya (1962), pp. 153-4)
The reader may have noticed that the grammar given in Chapter
II allows for complete freedom of word order. That is, if some
sequence of SLS words is a sentence, then any permutation of the
members of that sequence is also a sentence. This feature of the
model denies the claim made in (33) and (34) that words separated
by words which do not combine with them fail to produce a sentence.
In fact, given the relevant additions to the lexicon of SLS and the
addition of and to the sequence in question so that the example is
one of two sentences conjoined, the sequence discussed in (34) would
be declared a sentence by the grammar of Chapter II. This feature of
the model also denies the claim made by many contemporary Western
linguists that certain sorts of phrases are inviolate— that tensed
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SMtenccs, for example, may not contain words from other phrases
in a grammatical sentence. This constraint Is typically taken to
be one which holds of all languages, Including Sanskrit.
But there Is evidence chat the contemporary Uestem grammarians
and the sam^im theoreticians are wrong. This conclusion has been
argued for by many Indian philosophers of language, and the contro-
versy has been summed up most neatly by J.F. Staal in Staal (1967):
3^trreeaS"r°""
/hat. even If there Is some uncertaintyi h r gard to word order in the utterances of the Veda theHImamsa philosophers agree unanimously that word order Inordinary language is free, (p, 47 )
(36) Suminarizing, we may conclude that Western Sanskritists
started to describe a traditional, habitual or merely
prepon(ierant fixed word order in Sanskrit, llhen theseinvestigations became more precise, more exceptions were
met with and various habitual arrangements of words for
various kinds of sentence were postulated. It was alsoincreasingly realized that word order has no grammatical
s gnificance or value. Rut most of the investigations byWestern Sanskritists were based upon a specifically selected
corpus of Sanskrit texts, (p, 59 )
(37) Summarizing, we may conclude that the Indian theorists
agreed almost unanimously that word order in Sanskrit is
free. (p, 49)
mat Staal is summarizing here is the later views of the Indian
philosophers of language, Himamsakas and Grammarians alike. They
seem to me to be correct.
Of course, assertions that word order is free in Sanskrit
do not prove the point, and it is a point which would be difficult
to prove conclusively. Instead, Staal cites counterexamples to
plausible candidates for word order principles of Sanskrit in Staal
(1967), Since the tensed sentence constraint is used by contemporary
linguists, it may be of interest to see what sort of ser
- Tce
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counterexamples It. The sequence of SLS words
(38) dhavaM
.
n_aras, frls. S3dhus
. ca, dhavatl
'runs' ’man' 'Crl'
-good' 'and' 'runs'
*The good man runs and frl runs
has the adjective sa^ 'good' In masculine nominative after the
feminine subject Sris of the second clause. Such usage might come
as the result of the author's Intention to keep the goodness of the
running man In the reader's mind while fri Is talked about. According
to Indira Shetterley (my referee for such judgments) this Is a poetic
device rather than the sort of construction one would find in good
Sanskrit prose. However, given the continuum between poetry and
prose In Sanskrit usage, perhaps Staal's decision to regard word
order as completely free is correct. If the tensed sentence constraint
Is indeed a constraint on acceptable prose sentences of Sanskrit,
one could Impose It on the grammar readily enough. In a fashion to
be discussed soon, I have assumed for the purposes of this
chapter that it is not.
According to Indira Shetterley, the sentence
(39) ^^mas karoti gan ghatam Govindas ca paevati
'l[ama' 'makes' 'cow' 'pot' 'Govinda' 'and' 'sees'
has as preferable reading 'T^ma makes a pot and Govinda sees a cow'—
a reading which would not be allowed by the tensed sentence constraint.
She says. If I saw this sentence in a poetical passage I would derive
a good deal of pleasure from untwisting it. If I saw it in prose,
I would become angry". The fragment, then, is a poetical one. To make it
proselike, one would only have to stipulate that trees for the Trans-
formational Grammar representation of such sentences not have lines
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from members of different constituent sentences which cross.
There are some principles of ordering which I have not found
to he violated in my reading:
Absolute constructions arc not in tadcd by words from the main
sentence, even in poetry.
Words followed hy the quotation operator are taken as a
block, and no intrusion is allowed.
£3 'and' and ^ 'or' occur anywhere to the right of the first
words of the second member of the two phrases they operate on. That
is, £a and ^ seem to move freely only to the right.
The first two principles involve what may he the construction
of wordlike fragments from words, and it may he possible to view
absolutes and quoted fragments as superwords of some sort. As for
the third, although I have not found it violated, I do not know whether
it can be violated and so have not imposed it on the fragment.
There are many respects in which the fragment falls to he
a natural rendering of some version of Sanskrit or other. I have
added words (the declined mi thy
a
.
for example) to the language and
altered the meanings of other slightly ('give' for yam instead of
check' or halt', the preferred readings). Nonetheless, the fragment
seems to me to be of interest in the same way that Montague's frag-
ment in PTQ is of interest: it is a start toward more sensitive
renderings of natural language, and it includes treatment of some
puzzles which must be solved if such renderings are to be formulated.
There are strained readings and infelicities, but the theory rather
than the weak applications is what interests me here.
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Rules and exceptions. Rhartrharl’s characterization of the
sentence differs from Che MrnSmsaka characterization In the respect
that his treatment of rules and exceptions to them requires a
different analysis of the algnksS of exceptions. Consider this
passage
:
(43) It is considered by some that a rule and an exceptionform one sentence (statement) even if they have several
verbs. Only, they appear to be different sentences.
Thus a restriction or prohibition forms part of the generalinjunction;... ^
(Here the upholder of the doctrine that such sentences
are really distinct intervenes):
—
\-7hen the sentences have no expectancy (for anythin®
outside) and are at rest so to speak, they are independent
of one another. Tnerefore, since there is the absence
of a relation of one being for the sake of the other, how
can they together form one sentence?
(The upholder of the view that the two form one sentence
replies) :
—
A special rule causes the remaining part of a sentence
(i.e., the prohibitory sentence here) to be inferred
because it (the special rule) needs such inference.
Hierefore, there is in the object to be prohibited as
much expectancy as there is in the object of the special
(VP II 348-351, Pillai)
Although the proponents of these two points of view are not identified
in the Vakyapadiya
,
Pillai attributes the view that a rule and its
exception form a single sentence to Bhartrhari and he attributes the
other view, that the two are distinct sentences, to the Mimamsakas.
This difference of opinion is not treated in the fragment of Chapter
II because I do not know what the best way to formalize Bhartrhari ’s
"specia], rule" would be, although I believe there are good reasons
for holding his position on thi.s matter. Consider these two sentences
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(44) Everyone raay come to the wedding.
(45) Warriors are the only exception to (44).
If we take (44) and (45) to be distinct sentences, it seems that
they must also be taken to yield a contradiction, tor the meanlns
of (44) is that all Individuals are Invited to the wedding, and
(45) means that warriors are not. Surely this is not the correct
way to treat them. A person who gives a rule followed hy an excep-
tion often knows that the exception is to follow the rule; there
is no sense of self-contradiction in this knowledge.
The problem of exceptions is not confined to injunctions, as
these sentences demonstrate;
(46) Everyone entered by the front door.
(47) The sole exceptions x^ere tradesmen.
Barbara Hall Partee has pointed out that the problem arises within
single sentences as well. For example, in
(48) Everyone shot arrov;s except Govinda,
a compositional semantics would yield a sentence reading for
Everyone shot arrows". That reading would seem to be contradicted
by the phrase "except Govinda",
It is tempting to want to take the phrase "except Govinda"
as a modifier of the sentence "Everyone shot arroi;s", but to do so
would not yield the natural predicate calculus reading of (48)
on a compositional semantics, and I have not thought out how such
a reading might be attained. At any rate, to make "except Govinda"
a sentence modifier is to subscribe to Bhartrhari’s theory of a
"special rule", for it would then be natural to take (45) as a
modifier of (44)
.
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It should be noted that, even allowing Bhart^harl's position
to be correct, the akadk^a definition of sentences has not been
shown to be wrong, since the category of an exception expression
will be S/S rather than S, as the Mlm'^msaka theorist of (A3)
supposes. At worst it will be the Mimamsaka application of the
—
which is discarded rather than the ~hkahksa notion
itself.
The effects of contex
_t^ The fragment in Chapter II is intended
to be a model of Bhartphari’s theory of sequences of words, but
there are aspects of that theory which it does not model. Bhartrhari
had several things to say about the effects of context on the
meaning of sequences of words. He cites two traditional lists of
contextual factors in this passage;
(A9) (The factors which help to determine the meaning of a
word are now discussed)
The meanings of v/ords are determined from (their)
syntactical connection (in the sentence), situation-
context, the meaning of another word, propriety, place,
and time, and not from their mere form.
(Another list): (Constant) association (of two things),
(their) dissociation, company, and hostility, the meaning
(of another word), situation-context, evidence from another
sentence, and the proximity of another word.
Words, which, according to their application in one way
or another are either nouns or verbs though of identical
form, do not have the meaning which they are to convey
understood from their form alone (but also from context
etc.) (VP II 314-15, 317 Plllai)
Some of these factors seem to me to represent evidence which a compet-
ent listener or reader would use to select the correct reading of a
sentence from the set of possibilities. Examples are "the meaning
of another word, propriety, place, and time" and "the proximity
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of another word". Such factors might he Incorporated Into a prag-
matic operator or a set of such operators which select from the set
of possible readings of a SLS sentence the most pragmatically
appropriate meaning or meanings. The specification of such operators
would be difficult and would go beyond the texts since, aside from
giving some examples, Bhartpharl does not discuss them In any detail.
It seems enough to have shown how the set of possible readings
could be generated here, and to leave the selection of appropriate
readings from that set for future research.
There are two other effects of context discussed by Bhartrhari
%
however which must be noted. One is that in some situations a
sequence of words which has expectancy may express a complete meaning.
The words "The door", when uttered by a king to courtiers in a
drafty room, may mean what these sentences mean: "The door is
open" and "Close the door". The courtiers derive the complete
meaning from the expectant sequence with the aid of context.
Bhartrhari says that in such situations in which a connection with
other meaning is derived from the expectant sequence so that a
complete meaning is derived, the words with which the listener
began are a sentence:
(50) VJhen a mere statement of a thing is made (in a sentence)
and there is something connected with it, (even then) the
sentence is complete verbally without that (something)
being stated. (VP II 446, Pillai)
To add this theory to the fragment would involve making the
property of being a sentence a two-place relation between sequences
of words and situations. Such a definition would complicate the
grammar without illuminating the other points to be discussed.
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There Is another effect of context mentioned by Bhartrharl
which I have not treated. Sometimes the context In which a sentence
is uttered Is such that the meaning conveyed Is not a member of the
set of meanings which the grammar of Chapter II assigns to It.
Consider this passage:
(51)
*We must go now. Look at the sun*—when time isindicated by implication in this way the idea 'know thetime IS conveyed through its means.
A boy who is instructed to protect clarified butter from
crows does not prevent himself from protecting it from dogsand the like, the (instructing) sentence having the
significance of protecting (the clarified butter) in
general. (VP II 310 and 312, Filial)
That the effect of context may make the meaning of a sentence
quite different from its literal meaning is also not treated here.
What the grammar in Chapter II is intended to model is the process
of deriving what Bhartrhari calls primary meanings- from sequences of
words. The distinction between primary and secondary meanings is
described by Bhartrhari as follows:
(52)
When on merely listening, one understands the word as
having a (certain) meaning, that meaning is considered
to be principal, and the meaning is secondary where it
has to be explained. (VP II 278, Pillai)
Although contextual factors may lead to the derivation of secondary
meanings for words, Bhartrhari believes the process to depend on the
derivation of primary meanings:
(53)
When a word (in conveying a secondary meaning) depends
on itself as functioning in its ovm meaning (i.e. the
principal meaning)
,
then the principal meaning acts as
the basis (for the secondary meaning) and the secondary
meaning is based on it. (VP II 267, Pillai)
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My goal In working out the grarmar In chapter II has been to
provide a model for the processing of primary meaning. A model
deriving secondary meanings will require something along the lines
of the grammar I have given. If (53) Is correct, and I believe
the grammar of Chapter II to be well fitted to ground extensions
which treat secondary meaning.
FOOTTJOTES
1
The gra«ar described In this chapter and formalized in the
next was Inspired hy talks with the linguist Rick Saenz. It was our
conjecture that English could be treated as a language In which Inflec-
tion is determined by position, so that Instead of "transformations"
of a basic word order there are alternate ways to Inflect positionally.
The grammar for Sanskrit was first attempted to determine what sorts
of formal machinery would be necessary to work this Idea out.
A group of University of Massachusetts linguists (and the
philosopher James Waldo) are presently Investigating this Idea.
In developing this system 1 have been aided and stimulated
greatly by talks with Barbara Partee, Terence Parsons, Rick Saenz,
James Waldo, Emmon Bach, and other linguists and philosophers at the
University of Massachusetts,
2 Note that, since SLS words do not undergo sandhi, the
nominative singular of Rama is Ramas rather than Ramah
.
and so forth.
3 In PTQ Montague refers to the categorial grammar of Ajdukiewicz
^ i Poznanie (Language and Knoi^rledge ) as providing some basis
for the categorial grammar he devises.
4 For a clear and careful exposition of PTQ, the interested
reader is referred to Partee (197^.
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5 The synonymy of active and passive formulations is part
of the theory of Ica^ relations discussed by Panini and elaborated
In Book III of the ^yapadYva. Staal discusses this theory in
Staal ( 196^ in a readable way. To explain how the karaka theory
is formalized by the notation of the predicate calculus is an
attractive enterprise which goes beyond the scope of this work. For
the reader who believes active and passive formulations are not
synonymous, it is possible to correlate a different predicate with
each form of the verb, perhaps relating the two with Meaning
Postulates.
6 This way of representing expectancy corresponds in some
respects to Frege's theory that sentences are "saturated" and are
built up from expressions which are "unsaturated". One respect in
which the notion of unsaturatedness of Frege does not correspond to
the notion of expectancy of the ifTmamsakas is that Frege believed
names to be saturated, while in the Mimamsaka theory names have
expectancy.
CHAPTER II
A FORMAL TREATMENT OF XkaNKSA
1» Surface Level Sanskrit
This chapter contains a characterization of those sequences of San-
skrit words which lack lk^_k^a (expectancy). The fragment of
Sanskrit for which the characterization is given is called Surface
Level Sanskrit (hereafter, '’SIS"). SLS is an idealized version of
written Sanskrit in that sequences of SLS words do not undergo the
sandhi changes which modify (sometimes drastically) sequences of words
in natural Sanskrit. To treat the ambiguities which arise when words
are taken out of sandhi relationships would complicate the grammar
without adding features of relevance to the topics discussed in this
work.
SLS is a fragment of Sanskrit which is like that encountered
by a student early on in the study of Sanskrit. The lexicon,
grammatical principles, and rules of agreement are deceptively simple;
the difficulty lies in interpreting a sequence of words somehow or
other so that their meaning is understood. In developing this gram-
mar, curiously enough, my being an inexperienced reader of Sanskrit
may have been of some aid in that my translation processes are slow
enough to be observed and studied, whereas those of an experienced
reader would not be so.
The lexicon of SLS consists of the following sets of words:
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A4
—^
°n
="™on nouns ^ 'cow', 'nan'.^
'wean', 'pof,^ .house', ^ 'sentence-.
Jltl 'universal', drn:^^ 'substance', artha 'leaning', naraslnha
man-llon'. and h^havln 'being' In nominative, accusative. Instrumental,
dative, genitive, and locative cases are members of the set of
conmion nouns
,
Example: Included in this set are the following forms of
(nom.), (acc.), j^av^ (inst.), gave (dat.), (gen.),
and gavi (loc.)
,
proper Nouns. The proper nouns Rama
, Govinda
. LaksmT
.
_£rT,
and Brahman in the six cases listed above are the members of the set
of proper nouns.
Example: In this set are the following forms of CrT:
Cris (nom.), Criyan (acc.), Criya (inst.), Criye (dat.), Grivas
(gen.), and Criyi (loc.).
Pronom^. The set of pronouns includes
_ta and va in all three
genders and six cases.
Example: In this set are the six case forms of in neuter:
^ad, ve^, yasyai
,
yasya
.
yasmin
.
(The first two forms will
occur only once in the set. They are listed here to maintain
the fom-case correlation.)
Intransitive Verbs
. The verbs 'die', dhl^v 'run', sthJT
stand or exist
,
and bhu 'exist' in third person singular present,
active and passive, (except no passive for bhu ) are the members of
this set.
Example: Included are ti^ t;hatl 'he stands' and sthTyate
' it is stood by
' .
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l::glace Transitive Verbs
. This set Includes s^ 'love',
drj, see',
'express', and m 'he' In third person singular
present, active and passive, except that ^ occurs only In active.
Example: Included are the active and passive forms of
snlh-~ snlhyati and snlhyate
izElace Transitive Verbs. Included In this set are^
•sacrifice' and^ 'give' 1„ third person singular present, active
and passive.
Example: The set includes the active and passive forms of
yarn yacchati and yamyate
.
Gctives
. The adjectives sadhu
'good c*aru ’beautiful',
'real', mi^ ’false’, and ^ithya ’true’ in all six cases
and all three genders are the members of this set.
Example: sadhu in neuter contributes the forms
sa^, sa^, iadhun-a , sadhune, sadhunas
.
sadhunl
. (Since the nom
and acc. case forms are the same, there are only five members of
the set which are neuter forms of s~adhu ) .
.Conjunctions. The set includes the three conjunctions
£a ’and’, ’or', and yada
.
. .
tada 'if... then'.
Nojt. This set contains na 'not'.
Ever^. This set contains sarva 'every' in the three genders
and six cases.
Any sequence of words from the SLS lexicon is an SLS sequence
.
Our task is to determine which SLS sequences are sentences of SLS.
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2 , Categorial Sanskrif
expressions of SI.S „tU be correlated „Uh
.e*ers o,
a categorlal language, Categorlal Sanskrit C'CS"). Tl.e expectan-
cies of the SIS words are coded In the CS categories. In general,
a word of category A/B or A/(B.C) has expectancy for a word of
type B or words of types B and C In order to produce an expression
of type A. Words of CS are In general n-tuples, with members which
represent the gender and case of the SLS words with which they are
correlated.
The description of CS which follows Is Intentionally parallel
to Montague's exposition in PTO.
?.atej;orlea
.
Let CT, VP, and S be three objects which are non-
identlcal and are not ordered n-tuples. Then the set of categories
of CS Is the smallest set X such that (1) CN, VP, and A are In X,
and (2) whenever A. B, and C are In X, then A/B and A/(B,C) are In X
We take CN to be the Index of the category of common noun
expressions, VP to he the Index of the category of verb phrases, and
s to be the index of the category of sentences.
The following categories of CS will concern us here:
in*, or the category of noun phrases, is S/VP.
ITV, or the category of one-place transitive verbs, is VP/NP.
2TV, or the category of two-place transitive verbs, is
(VP/:iP)/MP.
Det, or the category of common noun determiners
,
is ^^p/C^T,
Adj , or the category of adjectives, is CM/CN.
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VPBO. or the category of verb phrase scope binding operators,
is VP/(NP,VP).
SBO, or the category of sentence scope binding operators,
is S/(NP,S).
CNBO, or the category of comon noun scope binding operators,
is CN/(MP,CN).
Rel, or the category of relative clause coordinators, is
CN/(S,CN)
.
Neg, or the category of sentence modifiers, is S/S.
The category of sentence conjunctions and disjunctions is S/(S/S).
The category of verb phrase conjunctions and disjunctions is
VP/(VP,VP)
.
The category of noun phrase disjunctions is JIP/(NP,MP),
Basic Expressions
, In order to succinctly specify the set of basic
expressions of each category, we use some conventions, B^ is to
refer to the set of basic expressions of category A. An expression
containing G is to stand for the three expressions obtained by
substituting the gender markers "M", ”F", and "N” for“Gl' An
expression containing "C” is to stand for the six expressions
obtained by substituting the six case markers "Norn”, "Acc", "Inst”,
Dat
,
Gen
,
and "Loc" for "C", An expression containing "i" is to
stand for the expressions obtained by substituting every Integer for
"i".
Example: \go(z) ,M,cy abbreviates "<go(z) ,M,Nom>, <go(z) ,M,Acc>,
<go(z) ,M,Inst>, <go(z) ,M,Dat>, <go(z) ,M,Gen>
,
<go(z) ,M,Loc>''.
The basic expressions of each category are the following.
A8
t<So(z).M,C>, <nara(z),>!.C>, VarKz) .F,*, <shata(z)
.n.r-),
<grham(z),N,C>, <;pada(z) <vakya(z)
.ft.cX
<jatl(z),P,C>, <dravya(z),N,C>, <artha(z)
^arasiinha(z)
^havin(z)
,0,0^.
®NP “ ,M,C>, <P(Govinda) <P(Laksini) ,F,C>,
^P(Cri) ^(ta^) <P(ya^)
.
^VP Nora,Nom>, <dhav Nom, Nom>, <^stha Nom.Nom^,
^bhu Nom, Nora'?}.
®1TV = ^<snih Nom Loc,Nom,Loc>, <snlh Nom Gen , Nom , Gen>
,
<snih Inst Nora,Nom, Inst>
,
<drj Nom Acc,Nora,Acc>,
<dv<^ Inst Nora,Nom, Ins t>, <Nom = Nora,Nora,Nom>}.
®2TV ~ Acc ,Nom,Acc ,Acc^,
^aj Inst Nom ^Acc ,Nom, Acc , Inst?
,
^yaj Inst Acc ^Mom,Nom, Acc,Inst'^,
^ara Nora Acc Dat, Nora, Acc, Pat>
,
<yam Inst Acc Nora, Nom, Acc , Inst'),
<yam Inst Nom Dat ,Nora,Dat , Inst)>}.
®Det ° l«>'iHCf(xp-»P(xi)),G,C>, <(Exj)(CM(xp(iP(Xj)),G.C>,
<^(Exj) (yi)((CN(y^)=xi=yi)iP(Xi)).G,C>}.
®VPB0
“
®SB0
“
-IsBOiV
BCNBO =>
®Adj <raithya,G,C>, <c~ru,G,C>, <satya,G,C>,
^aml thy'a
,
G
,
c'?}.
^Rel =
^Neg “H-
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®s/(s.s)
®VP/ (VP, VP)
®NP/(NP,IJP)
There are other expressions in the categories of CS which are
built up from the basic expressions. They are described in the next
section.
Correlation Rules, The following rules correlate each word of ST.S
with a set of sequences of basic CS expressions. Each sequence In
the set contains CS expressions whose expectancies are those which
a reader of the SIS word might associate with It in reading an SIS
sentence. For brevity's sake, several conventions are employed.
For any SLS word w of an SLS sequence s,
C(w) denotes the set of sequences of CS expressions correlated
with w.
G is "M" if w is masculine, ”F" if w is feminine, "N" if w
is neuter,
C is "Norn" if w is in nominative case, "Acc" if in accusative,
"Inst" if in instrumental, "Dat" if in dative, "Gen" if in genitive,
and "Loc" if in locative,
i is the number of w's place in the sequence s,
j is the number of SLS words in s,
net Is [<(Ex2j^p(CM(x,j^jSP(x2^^.p),G,C>,
<(i:x2i+i)(y2i+l)((ra(y2i+i) = X2i+i=y2i+i)SP(x2i+i>) ,C.C>},
as is ^Nom= Norn, Norn,NoraY j , t , tx
'* (Note; is the verb ’to be’)
A^X.a.XAj^ is the Cartesian Product of A]^...Aj^—the set of all
ordered n-tuples such that
...
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Ai X ... X Is the Cartesian Produtt
... modified
In the following way: each member of the Cartesian Product has
every ocurrence of "0" deleted from it.
0 denotes the empty set.
A U B Is the union of A and B-the set which has as members
all and only those members of A or B.
Examples of the set operators;
i\i<i Um X \^,2i = ^3. A} X {0,2^ <3.2>, ^4^
. <4,2>].
"SCem"ls to be the stem of w and "R" Is to be the root of w.
When a SI.S word Is ambiguous between several forms, the set of
expressions correlated with It Is to he the expressions correlated
with each of its forms taken as a union.
_CR1 Conuyn Nouns. If w is a common noun consisting of a stem
with gender and case markings^ C(w) is the union of these two sets:
1. ^<^stem(?.) ,G,c'> 5 X ^3-S^ X (Dct U 0 )
C SBO
2. |<stem(z),G.C»X C0^X Det X l<ta
2
^.G,C^ X hn-goU
(vPB02i)
(Note; if C^^Nora, the term containing ^ is deleted from the
product)
.
The first member of each product represents the expectancy of
the common noun itself. The second represents the possible insertion
of _as 'be' when the common noun is in nominative case. The third
represents the possible insertion of a determiner. The fourth and
fifth members of set (2) are the pronoun and binding operator
required to give the quantifier varying scope.
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—
- SI-S P-P- noun or pronoun consists of
a stem with gender and ease marking. For each proper noun. C(w) is
^<P(stem) ,G,C>^
~
^
*
If w is ^ in a gender and case, C(w) is
KP(ya2).G,C>.
... <P(ya2.),G,C>] X
.
If w is in a gender and case, C(w) is the union of these sets:
1. ^<P(ta2),G,c)
... <fP(ta2i_2).G,C>, <P(ta2i+2) ,G,C>.
.
.
<P(ta2j),G,c7^ X
^0^
3. ^^rel2j. ,G,c'^^
(Note: if C?«Nom, the term containing as is deleted from the
product.)
The first set of expressions correlated with ^ represents
the appearance of as a pronoun to be bound by another binding
operator. The second represents with its own binding operator as
well as (when "0" is chosen rather than a binding operator) the
possibility of a deictic use of the pronoun. The third represents
the possibility that may be a relativizing word rather than a
pronoun.
CR3 Intransitive Verbs. If w is an intransitive verb with
root R,
if w is active, C(w) is^R Nom,Noin>^.
if w is passive, C(w) is^<^R Inst,Inst'>j
.
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CRA One-place Transitive Vprh<? if _veros. It w is a one-place transitive
verb and R is the root of w,
if w is active,
w is sn ihyati and C(w) is ((snih Nom Gen,Non,Gen'>,
^snih Nom Loc,Nom,Loc7^, or
W is £ac^ or vacati and C(w) is^<R Nom Acc,Nom.Acc'>^
.
or
W is asti and C(w) is ^<Nom = Nora,Nora,Nom>]
.
if w is passive, C(w) is ^<R Inst Nom,Nom,Inst>^
.
TVo-place transitive Verbs. If w is a two-place transitive
verb
,
If w is yajati C(w) is ^<yaj Nom Acc '^Acc ,Nom, Acc, Acc>]
.
if w is C(w) is Inst Nom 'Vcc,Nom,Acc,Inst>
,
^yaj Inst Acc ^Nom,Nom, Acc,Inst'^,
if w is yacchati C(w) is ‘^yam Non Acc Dat ,Nom,Acc,Dat)5
.
If w is yamyate C(w) is ^<yara Inst Acc Nom, Nora, Acc. Inst>
,
<yara Inst Nom Dat ,Nom,Dat
,
Inst>}
.
CR6 Adjectives. If w is an adjective with stem and gender and
case markings, C(w) is ^<[stem,G,C>3.
CR7 Conj unctions, Disjunctions. Implications. If w is ca
then C(w) is where the two &’s are members of and
®VP/(VP,VP)* Z2. ihen C(w) is ^v, where the three N's
are members of
,
and
/ (^yp ,VP) * ^
yada,..tada then C(w) is
CR8. C(na) is H-
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CEi, If „ is in n gender and case. C(„) Is the union of
the following sets;
2
.
l<(='21+lHCN(x2 i+i)->P(x2^^P ,G,C>} X K'a21 *®>c':^ i
'he sequences of CS expressions associated
with a sequence of SLS expressions, „e use the operator "U", defined
as follows;
Ai U ... U is the set of tuples whose first members are
the members of a member of A;j^, whose next members are the members
of a member of A2
, ... v?hose last members are the members of a
member of A
.
n
Example:
^< 3 .A>. ^23] u(<2,4>] = <2,2,4>}.
The set of disambiguated sequences correlated with any SLS
sequence of the form <w^
... w^> is C(wj^) U C(w2) U
... U C(wj^).
Examples of sets of disambiguated sequences are found in the last
section.
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Comblnlufi CS expressions to expression, nf
to detemln. which disambiguated sequences of CS expressions yield
expressions of type S when expectancy Is satisfied, rules are given
for combining CS expressions in a categorial way.
A CS expression of type A and a CS expression of type R/A
combine to produce a CS expression of type B. CS expressions of
types A,B, and C/(A,B) combine to produce a CS expression of type
C. The following rules describe the CS expressions which are the
result of such combinations, given the following conventions.
•’CE(a,b)" and ”CE(a,b,c)- is read as "the result of combining
expressions a and b" and "the result of combining expressions a. b.
and c".
The following functions are used in several of the rules;
Fl(p,q,r) is p with every expression of the form P(m) in p
replaced by q*, where q* is q with the first occurrence of r in q
replaced by m.
Example: Fl(P(RSha)
,
Norn = Norn, Norn) is Rama = Norn.
F2(p,q,r) is p with every expression of the form P(m) in p
replaced by q', where q' is q with every occurrence of r in q
replaced by m.
Example: F2(P(Ram^ & dhav Cri, dhav Norn, Norn) is
dhav Rama & dhav Cri. (q' is dhav Rama).
Let G be the gender associated with p. Then
F3(p,q,r) is p with every expression in p of the form P(m)
replaced by q*, where q* is q with the first occurrence of r in
q replaced by r<ftaj^,Q>) if p is
P(ya^)
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F4(p,q,r) Is p with every expression In p of the form P(m)
replaced by q , where q' Is q with every occurrence of r In q
replaced by C<ta^.G>^ If p is «P(ta.)\)
.
(;<y«l.G>) KP(yai)>)
Example; Suppose ta^ has gender N. Then
FA(P(ta4 ), dh3v Norn & mr Norn, Norn) is dh'Sv <ta^,N> & mr <ta^,N>.
The rules of combination are as follows.
RCl. If aiCat CN, b^Cat NP/CN. a is of the form <s,Ga,Ca>.
b is of the form <^et,Gb,Cb>. Ga=Gb, and Ca=Cb, then CE(a.b) is
<det’.Ga,Ca>. where det ’ Is det with every expression of the form
CN(Xj^) In det replaced by s’, where s’ Is s with every occurrence
of "z" in s replaced by x^.
If a£Cat MP, blCat VP, a is of the form <R,G,Ga) and
b is of the form <V, Cb> and Ca=Cb, then CE(a,b) is F2(R,V,Ca)
unless R is of the form PCta^) or P(ya^). Then CE(a,b) is F4(R,V,Ca).
Ml* If a€Cat NP, b£Cat ^7P/NP, a is of the form <R,Ga,Ca>,
b is of the form <V,Cb]^,Cb
2 >, Ca=Cb2, then CE(a,b) is
<Fl(R,V,Cb
2 ) ,Cb]^> unless R is of the form P(ta^) or P(ya^). Then
CE(a,b) is CF3(R,V,Cb2) ,Cb
2^>.
Ml* If aiCat NP, bfCat (VP/hT)ATP, a is of the form <R,Ga,Ca>,
b is of the form <V,Cb^,Cb
2
,Cb
3 >,
Ca=Cb
3 , then CE(a,b) is
^FlCR.V.Cb^) ,Cb
2
^,Cb
2> unless R is of the form PCta^) or PCya^).
Then CE(a,b) is <F3(R,V,Cb3) ,Cb^ ,Cb,>
.
Ml* If atCat Q:, bCCat CI/CI, a is of the form <Ra,Ga,Ca>,
b is of the form <Rb,Gb,Cb>, Ga=Gb, and Ca=Cb, then GE(a,b) is
^Ra*,Ga,Ca^, where Pa* is Ra with the first expression of the form
stem(z) in Ra replaced by an expression of the form Rb(stem)(z).
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RC6. If aECat W, bfCat VP. c CattVP/(NP,VP)
,
a Is of the form
-^R.ca.ca>. R is not a pronoun, b is of the fort, <V.Cb>, c Is of the
fort, V contains at least one occurrence of <taj,Ga>. and for
every occurrence of an expression of the for™ <ta^,Ga> 1„ V Gb=Ga.
then CE(a.h.c) is F2 (R,V, <tai,Ga» ,Cb
.
If atCat MP, btCat S. ccCat S/CtlP.X), a Is of the form
<R.Ca.Ca>, c Is of the form SBOj. b contains at least one occurrence
of an expression of the form <taj,Ga>, R Is not a pronoun, and every
occurrence of an expression of the form <ta^,Gh> in h has
Ga=Ga, then CE(a,h,c) is F2 (R,h, (ta^,Ga>)
.
RC8. If aeCat MP, b£Cat CN, ctCat CN/Otp.CN), a is of the form
<Ra.Ga,Ca>. b is of the form <Rb,Gb,Cb>. c is of the form CNBO^, Ra
is not a pronoun, Ga=Gb, Ca-Cb. Rb contains at least one occurrence
of an expression of the form <rta^.Ga>. and for every occurrence of an
expression of the form <ta^,Gc> in Rb Ga=Gc, then CE(a,b,c) is
<F2(Ra,Rb,<taj^,Gi^ ,Gb,Cb>.
If acCat S, bcGat Cl. ctCat CN/(S.CJ), b is of the form
<R,Gb,Cb>, c is of the form <rel^,Gc,Gc'>, Gb=Gc, Cb=Cc, there is at
least one occurrence of an expression of the form <ya^,Gb> in a.
and for each occurrence of an expression of the form <ya^,Ga> in
a Ga=Gb, then CE(a,b,c) is ^b&a* ,Gb ,Gb^, where a’ is a with every
expression of the form <ya^,Ga> in a replaced by "(z)”.
RC^. If aeCat S and btGat Neg, GE(a,b) is b(a).
RCn. If atGat S, bCCat S, c^Cat S/(S,S) then CE(a,b,c) is
(a)c(b).
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RC12. If atCat VP, btCat VP. c^Cat VP/(VP,VP), a Is of the
form <Va.Ca>, b Is of the form <Vb.Cb>, and Ca=a. then CE<a,b,c) Is
<(Va)c(Vh),Ca>.
^13. If atCat NP, b£Cat MP. ctCat !TP/OtP,NP), a ig of the
form <Ra,Ga.Ca>. b is of the form <Rb.nb,Cb>, and Ca=Cb, then
CE(a.b.c) is <f(Ra)c(Rh),G^Ca>. where G* is Ga if Ga=Gh and
G* is N if Ga^Gh. (This is a slight simplification of the actual
Sanskrit conditions of subject-predicate case agreement.)
Now we may precisely characterize the sentences of SLS,
A SLS sequence s is a SLS sentence if and only if there is a member
m of the set of disambiguated sequences for s such that some sequence
of application of the Rules of Combination to m transforms m to a
single CS expression of type S which contains no expression of the
form <ya^,G>.
3. Examples
The following examples illustrate the process through which
it is determined v;hether a SLS sequence is a sentence; that is, in
these examples we follow the correlation and combination process
through to the derivation of an expression of type S,
Example 1 (Common Noun Risamhigu-ition)
,
s = ^^rls
,
gpham
,
pagyati
^ nominative, g^ham ’house’ in neuter nominative or
accusative, dr^ ’see’ in active).
Possible translations: ’Jri sees a house’ and ’fri sees the
house’
,
Correlated expressions:
3y CR2, C(£ris)= rT]^F,Nom>, <<'P(Cri) , F,'Iom>
,
as>}
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By CRl, C (£^£ham) is the union of these sets;
1. [<grhan(z) ,N,Nom)>^ X (Detlj(?^
2. {<Orhan(z),H,Nom>] X S «' i X Det X (<ta,VUNor,^ X jVm'
/SRO.
C CMRO^']
3. ^<^gvhan(z),N,Acc)J X (Det u{0))
4. ^^grhan(a),M,Acc>^ X Det X^<P(ta^)
.N.AccJ^ X
^
VPBO
(The first two are correlated with as nominative and the^econd
two with grham as accusative.)
By CR4 CCpa^yati ) = Mon Acc ,Nom, Acc)^
The set of disambiguated sequences correlated with s contains
these representative members;
(1) ^^P(^ri) ,F,Nom^, ^Nom = Norn, Norn, Nom^, <(grhan(z) ,N,Mom'>,
<dry Nom Acc ,Nom, Acc^^
,
(This is the only sequence we consider in which is supplied. The
others will fail to yield a sentence for the same reason.)
(2) <^<J’(9ri) ,F,Mom)>, <[grham(z) ,N,Hom>, <clrj Nom Acc ,Nom, Acc")*^
(This is the only other sequence we consider in which grham is in
nominative case. The others will fail to yield a sentence for the
same reason.)
(3) F,hom'^, ^fbara(z) ,N, Acc^, Nom Ac c, Nom, Ac c'^'^
(This is the only sequence we consider in which grham is in
accusative and has no determiner. The others will fail to yield
a sentence for the same reason.)
(A) ^<^ri^F,Nom), <grham,N, Acc'>, < 1(^X5 ) (C?I(x5 ) &P(x 5 ) ) ,N,Acc>,
Cfdr^ Nom Acc ,Nom, Acc^^.
(Sequences with the other determiner will produce
a parallel way)
.
a sentence in
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(5)
<,<P(yr-l),F,Mom>, <grhan,N.Acc>, (CN(x
5
)SP(x
5» ,n.Acc>,
<P(ta^) ,N,Acc>, sno^, <dr^ Mora Acc,Nom,Acc>^.
(Sequences with the other binding operators and the other determiner
Will produce a sentence in a parallel way.)
Sequence (1) fails to produce an expression of type S through
combination of its members because after the one-place transitive
verb Nom = Norn combines with qrl to produce the intransitive verb
(JrT = Nom, there is no other nominative phrase to satisfy the expeo
tancy of this verb.
Sequence (2) fails to produce an expression of type S because
the verb dr<j Mom Acc requires an accusative noun phrase and there is
none.
Sequence (3) fails to produce an expression of type S for the
same reason.
Sequence (4) combines to produce an expression of type S in
these steps:
(6) «P(5r'I) ,F,Nom>, <(Ex 5 ) (grham(x5 ) SPCx^) ) ,N,Acc> ,
^dr<j Nom Acc ,Nom,Acc'^^ by RCl
(7) ^^(fri) ,F,Nom), ^(Fx 5 ) (grham(x5 ) &drf X5 ,Nom)k^ by RC3
(7a) (Ex^) (grham(x
5 )&dr^ fri x^) by RC2
We may read (7a) as ’there is a thing which is a house and ^rT sees it,’
Sequence (5) combines to produce an expression of type S in
this way:
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SBO
4 *
(8) <^rl4F,Noni>, <,(Exj) (grhan(x5> SP(x5) ) ,m,Acc>,
<dr9 Non <ta4.N»
^^3
(9) «(EX5)(grhan(x3)«,P(x5)),N,Acc>. drj <;rT<;ta,.N>! SBO^
by RC2
(10) (EX
5)(grhan(x5)S,dr^ JrT Xj) by RC7
Wa see that (10) Is Identical to (7). In this case, addition of
binding operators for scope has not changed the reading of the
sentence.
Example 2 (Quantification
,
s =<sar^. nar^, nari
. snihvatlS
('every' In masculine nominative, 'man' In masculine nominative,
'woman' In feminine locative, 'love' In active)
Intended readings: 'Every man loves a woman', with two scopes
for 'a woman'. (The process Is parallel for readings of 'Every man
loves the woman.')
By CR9
,
C(_s_arvas)
=
[<(x3) (ai(x3)->.p(x3) ,M,Nom>;^ U
^<(x3)(aT(x3)->P(x3) ,H,Nom>}
,Mora>^ X iNPRoj)
/sROo" \
By CRl, C(T^ras)
=
^^nara(z) ,M,Nom> X (j)’) X (Pet U [0})] IT
l^^^nara(z) ,M,Nom7^ X
^
2i C
^
SBO:
By CRl, C (nari )
=
^^<narl(z) ,F,Loc')] X (Det TJ {0^)3 U
. CTIPBO
£<nari(z),F,Loc)^ X Det X l^(ta^) ,F,LocV X 1 VPBoJ
IsB04 )
By CR4, C( snihyati ) = ^^snih Norn Gen, Norn, Gen'), ^nih Norn Loc ,Non,Loc)^
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The set of disambiguated sequences associated with s contains
1,296 members, including these two;
ai) «(x 3)(CI(x3)->P(x3 )).M,Non>. <P(ta2> ,M,Nom>, SBO^
,
<nara(z),H.Nom>, <nari(z) ,F,Loc>, <(1^X7) ((CN(x7)&P(x7))
,F,Loc>.
^P(tae) ,F,LocX <snih Non Loc ,Nom,Loc'>'^
( 12 ) «(x3)((CJI(x3)^P(x3)),M,Nom>, <P(ta2) ,M,Nom>, SBO^
,
<nara(z),H,Nom>, <narl(z) ,F,Loc>, <(Ex
7 ) (Cn(x7)&P(x2)) ,F.Loc>,
^(ta^) ,F,Loc^, SBOg, <snih Non Loc,Non,Loc>^
The members of ( 11 ) combine in these steps to produce an
expression of type S;
(13) «(x3)(nara(x3)-).p(x3)),M,Non>, <P(ta2\M,Kom>, SBOj,
<(EX7HnarT(x7)&P(x2)),F.Loc>, <P(ta^),F,Loc>, VPROj,
^snih Norn Loc,Nom,Loc^ by RCl
(lA) (nara(x3)-^P(x3))
,H,Nom>,<J^a^,M,Nom>, SBO
2 ,
<(Ex
7)(nari(x 7 ) 6P(x 7 )),F.Ix)c>. VPBOg. <snih Norn <ta6 ,F>.Nom»
by RC3
(15)
^<((x3) (nara(x3>-^P(x3 )) ,M,Nom'>, <P(ta2 ) ,M,Nom>, SBO2 ,
<JEx 7 ) (nari(x 2 )&snih Norn Xy^Nom^'^ by RC6
(16) <(X3) (nara(x
3
)-^P(x
3 )) ,M,Nom>, SBO2 ,
^(Ex^) (nari(xy) 6snih <ta2 »M^ by RC2
(17) (X
3 )
(nara(x
3 )—^(Exy) (n“ari(x2 ) &snih ^3 ^7 ^^
We may read (17) as 'For every man there is a woman v;hom he loves.'
The members of (12) combine with RCl, RC3 and RC2 to produce
this sequence:
(18) </<^(x3)(nara(x3>^P(x3)),M,Nom>, SBO2, ^Ex^) (narT(xy) &P(x2)),F,Loc>,
SBOg, snih <ta
2
,M><ta^,F'>^
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The hindleg operators in (18) nay he applied in either order to
yield an expression of type S. It sgo, is applied before SBO^, (17)
is derived. I, SBO, is applied before S80,. this expression is derived:
(19) (KX7)(narl(x7)S(x3)(nara(xj)->snlh Xj xy)) by RC7
We may read (19) as 'There is a woman who is such that every man
loves her,
'
Exanple 3 (Relative Clauses)
,
s = ^apas , friya
,
yanyate
.
yas
, dhlvat 1^
(*Rama’ in masculine nominative, 'such that’ in masculine accusative,
’cow’ in masculine nominative,
’fri’ in feminine instrumental,
give in passive, which in masculine nominative, ’run’ in active.)
Literal reading* ’Rama is given a cow by frl which runs’.
Intended reading:
’
frT gives Rama a cow which runs’.
The relevant members of the sets of correlated expressions are
these;
By CR2, C (Ramas ) includes <P(Rama) ,M,Nom'>.
By CR2, C( tam ) Includes ^rel^ ,H, Acc^.
By CRl, C(_g^) includes <^<8o(z) ,M,Acc>, <(Hx7) (CN(x^) SPCxy)) ,M, Acc>,
<P(ta^),M.Acc>, SBOg>.
By CR2, C( griy^ includes (P
( frT) , F , Ins t)
.
By CR5, C(yamyate ) includes ^yam Inst Acc Hom,Nom, Acc ,Inst^
,
By CR2, C(yas ) includes <,P(ya^) ,M,Nomy
By CR3, C( dh~av) includes ^dh'av Mom, Norn).
\‘Jhen we apply the first steps of combination to these members we obtain
(20) <J(frel^,M,Acc>, <(go(z) ,M, Acc)
,
<(Ex^) (CTUx^) &P(xy) ) ,M,Acc),
SB0(^, yam ^rT <ta^,M) Rama, dhav<Va^,M)) by RC4,RC3 and RC2
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(21) «goCz)4dhav(^),M.Acc>. <(RX
7 ) (CN(x,) SPCx^)) ,m,Acc>, SRO^
yam <rta^,>(,R-a,a>
(22) «(EX7)((go(x7)(,dhav(x7))4P(x^)),H,Acc>, SBO,;,
yam JrT Ran> RCl
(23) (Ex7)((go(x^)Mhav(x^))4yam frl x, Ran^
Ue may read (23) as
-mere Is a thing „hlch Is a cov, and
Jri gives it to R^ma'.
by RC2
runs and
A. A SLS Transformational Grannar
.
The following Transformational Grammar is strongly equivalent
to the categorial grammar for SLS.
Phrase Structure Rules.
PSl NP->^Det, CN^
PS 2 VP^
PS 3 VP-^^TV, NT^
PSA lTV-y^2TV, !TT^
PS 5 CN-^^dj, Cn"^
PS6 VP-^^KP, \^B0, VP]
PS 7 s -^{np, SBO, s]
PS8 CN-^^NP, CNRO, CN^
PS9 CN->(CN, Rel, s]
PS 10 S-^peg, s]
PS 11 S->(s, SConj, s}
PS12 VP->^^/P, VPConj, ^/p}
NPConj, NP]PS13
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Tree Construction.
A ^tnictural tree Is a tree t such that
(1) the topmost node of t Is S,
(2) for any node n of t which Immediately dominates nodes
there Is a PS rule of the form
.
,m„T^
.
and
(3) no terminal node of t is S,
From the set of structural trees we derive those trees which
are correlated with SI.S sentences In this way:
For each structural tree t form the set of all sentence trees
-
‘ a node n' below each terminal node n of t
such that
(1) if n is of the form X,
(2) if n is the ith terminal node of t and n is of the form
Rel, SBO, CNBO, or NPRO, then the subscript of the first
member of n’ is 2i,
(3) if n’ Is of the form <tajl,G,r> or and there are
k terminal nodes on t, then j<2k, and
(4) if n is Det and n is the ith terminal node of t then the
first member of n is (xj^) (CN(x2 t)-»P(xjj^)) or (Fxji) (CN(x, j)SP(x,j) )
,
or (Ex,i) (y^p ( (CN(y2p =x,i=y 2p SPCXjj)) .
Not all sentence trees based on t will represent ShS sentences,
because not all will have constituents which are properly bound and
agree in gender and case. Hence we apply the following procedure
to each sentence tree t’ based on a structural tree t to determine
whether t' is a grammatical sentence tree;
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( 1 ) For each terminal node n of t’,
if nenf,^j,
^Adj* \el» the gender and
case of n to the right of the node which immediately
dominates n.
if or write the last member of n to
the right of n’, the node which immediately dominates n.
if or B2^^, write the next-to-last member of n
to the right of the node which immediately dominates n'.
if n£B2Tv» write the second member of n to the right of
the lowest VP node which dominates n.
( 2 ) Each nonterminal node of t' except the highest is sister to
one or two nodes formed by a Phrase Structure rule from a node which
immediately dominates them. Beginning with the lowest nonterminal
nodes and working up, add symbols to t' and test for grammaticality
by applying these rules to each node (where "T>S(n, m3^...mj)" means
"m2...mj were derived from n through PS^")
:
i. if PSl(n, m]^, m2) or PS 5 (n,
,
m2), the gender and case of
mj^ and m2 must be the same. If so, write them to the right
of n.
ii. if PS 2 (n, mi, m2) or PS 3 (n, m^^, m2) or PS 4 (n, m2), the
case marking on m^ and m2 must he the same.
ff
^^^^n,ra^,m2 ,^3) PS 7 (n, mi, m2, m^) or PS8(n, mi, m2, m
the gender and case of mi must be identical to the gender
and case of some terminal node dominated by m^ of the form
^ta^, G, C^, where i is the subscript of the node dominated
by m2, and every such node must have the same gender as mi.
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If so and if n is V?,
to the right of n.
write the case to the right of m3
iv. if PS 9 (n, mi, m2, m3) the gender of m^ must agree with the
gender of some terminal node of the fort, dominated
by m3, where 1 1., the subacrlpt of the node dominated by
mj, and It must agree with the gender of every such terminal
node. If so, write the gender and case of m^ to the right
of n.
V. if PS 13 (n, mi, m2, m3), write the gender of m2 and m3 to the
right of n if they are the same. Othen^ise, write ”N" to the
right of n.
Vi. if PS6(n, mi, m2, m3) or PS 7 (n, mi, m2, m3) or PSP(n, mi,
ni2, m3), write "B" (for "Bound") to the right of every
terminal node dominated hy m3 of the form <$:a^,G,C>, where
i is the subscript of the node dominated hv mo.
vii. if PS 9 (n, mi, m2, m3), write "B" to the right of every terminal
node dominated hy m3 of the form ^a^,G,C>, where i is the
subscript of the node dominated hy m2.
If each nonterminal node of t' satisfied these conditions and
every pronoun of the form <^^aJ,G, C> has "B" to its right when the
process is finished, then t' is a grammatical sentence tree
.
There is one optional transformation:
Scrambling.
W X Y Z
SD 1234
SG 1324
Condition: 3 and 2 are terminal nodes or tad* or vad^.
(Probably the best
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way to represent structure after appUcatlon of
this transformation is to maintain the lines of dominance, although
they may cross If It Is widely applied.)
ST.S sentences are derived from srammatlcal sentence trees by
the application of this procedure:
1. apply the transformation as many times as desired to Che
trees,
11. process the terminal nodes of the trees from left to right
in this way:
a. if the nodes are binding operators or relativizers
,
write nothing;
b. if the nodes are the existential or definite deter-
miners, do not write them;
c. If the nodes are of any other category, write the
member of the SLS lexicon associated with them
(that is, for ^taj^,M,Acc^ write tarn; for
<yam Norn Acc Hat ,Nom, Acc ,hat^ write vacchatl.
Exception: ^'lom = Nom,Nom,Nom'^ i.s written optionally;
d. For every occurrence of a binding operator with
subscript i, one pronoun of the form ^ta^,G,c'^ is
not written.
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I have aeaerted without proof that the trarsfo-at'o
-,,1d.* xo^.uaL j.onal grammar
and the categorlal grar„,ar are strongly equivalent. I shall not
prove that result here, producing Instead the trees for the
example sentences of the previous section and comparing the. to
trees of the categorlal gramnar constructed 1„ the following way:
Each sequence of SIS words which Is a sentence has a ne.her n
of Its set of disambiguated sequences wh fch combines to produce an
expression of type S with all
_ya pronouns bound. Create a tree t
for each such m In this way:
i. each member of m is a terminal node of t.
11. each terminal node n of t Is Immediately dominated by a
node of the form X, X:7here
iii. where two or three expressions were combined by a Pule of
Combination to produce an expression of category write
X as the node which immediately dominates the indices of
their categories on t.
Any SLS sequence s which is a sentence according to either
system has a tree in both systems which is identical except
(possibly) for subscripts on its variables, binding operators,
and relativizers. This result was suggested by the material in
Cooper and Parsons (L976 ), and some of the techniques used there
have been employed here.
Let us consider some examples.
Example 1 s = ^(j!rTs
,
grham, pa^yatl^
.
The sentence tree for s is
69
?rp
This Is a sramatlcal sentence tree. When processed. It looks like
this;
Except for differing subscripts, the tree for example 1 of the
previous section is identical to this one.
Example 2 (as in the previous section) s = <sarvas, naras, nari,
snihyati^
,
With process markings, the sentence tree for s is the following;
70
Identical to this one without its process markings, except for
variations in the subscripts.
— ' (RSas, frlvT
.
vanvate
.
yas
. dh-yati>.
The tree for Exanple 3 of the last section, reading (23), when
rewritten. Is identical to this tree except that It h
in the subscripts.
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as variations
CHAPTER I I I
THE SPHOTA THEORY
1. Introduction
The doctrine of the
. Grammarians which Is best kno™ In the
history of Indian philosophy of language Is the theory of sphota
.
a theory which Bhartrharl Is generally acknowledged to have
originated In Its classical form.
-Xe to a combination of factors,
however, scholars are not agreed on the nature of sphota In Bhartr-
harl s theory. In this chapter reasons for their disagreement are
discussed and the currently accepted view Is considered. The frag-
ment developed In Chapter II Is used to support the claim that the
currently accepted view is incorrect.
2. Grounds for disagreement
That the sphota theory was influential in the history of Indian
philosophy of language is denied by nobody. In fact, Chakravarti
writes,
(1) Though It [the theory of snhota
~l embodies, so to speak the
crowning achievement of all grammatical speculations..!
(Chakravarti (1030), p. Ill)
That It is Bhartrhari's version which constitutes the classical
formulation of the sphota theory is denied by very few. For example.
Raja writes
(2) The theory of sphota is one of the most Important contribu-
tions of India to the central problem of semantics in general
linguistics.
.. .This sphota theory was fully developed and
systematized by^the great grammarian-philosopher Bhartrharl
In his Vakyanadiya
... (Raja (l^h3), pp. 07-98)
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Despite this agreement on the theory's Importance, there Is an
astonishing range of disagreement on the nature of the sj^^ theory
Itself. It is best to document this disagreement by quoting some
texts which illustrate it,^
S£hoJa as hypostatization of sound. A. Berriedale Keith
writes, in A History of Sanskrit Literature
.
(3) the S£hofa is a mysterious entity, a sort of hvpostatizationsound, of which action sounds are manifestations.
(P. 387.)
S£ho^ as sound of word as a whole. S. K. Pe writes in
Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics
.
(4) The s£hoU...may be explained as the sound of a word as
as conveying a meaning apart from its componentletters (vajrgas)
. The sphoja does not contain exactlv the
sounds of the word in the order peculiar to the letters, butthe sounds or something corresponding to them are blendedindistinguishably into a uniform whole. (p. 180, vol. ii)
_
Sj)ho^a as eternal sound. Cowell translates sphota as "sound"
of an eternal sort:
(5)
And... (say the wise in these matters)
... this sphofa is an
eternal sound distinct from the letters and revealed by them
which causes the cognition of the meaning. (translation by
*
E. B. Cowell and Gough of the 8arvadar4ana-
sai?graha, p. 211)
Sanskrit-Engllsh Dictionaimr
. Monier-Williams defines the
-P.ho^a as "Sound (considered as eternal. Indivisible and creative)"
(p. 1270).
Sphota as meaning. In the Heyapaksa of Yopa
.
P. Pathak
writes
(6)
One can go to the length of identifying the sphota with the
meaning of the word. (p. 84)
Later he writes.
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(7) The sphota theory,
of a psychological
at its worst, is only a
process of perception.
hypostatlzatlon
S£ho£a as meaning-bearer. The view which Is held by the
most recent commentators on the Hrammarlans (and the most careful)
is that the S£h0ia la an entity which expresses the meaning.
Raja writes
s:.*?."'-
light ?^e Idea ofrtelhl^nt!^ (Sjf (I
S£hota as Brahman. Rhattacharya writes
‘"t^e
1° Ihe Grammarians Is Sahda-h sjd^^ excellence ... (BhattacharyaTT962)
P. 14)
My Intention In displaying this diversity of opinion Is
to demonstrate that the topic Is one concerning which a great
deal of confusion exists. The fault, however, does not lie with
the scholars quoted. Rather, It lies primarily with the texts
having to do with sphofa. Let us note two difficulties which
afflict the scholar of the sphotia doctrine.
Variations in the theory. There were many sphota-theorists
.
and they did not agree. In Patanjali's Mahabhasva the theory was
this
:
(10) Ttius it is clear that for Patahjali the sphota is a unit
of sound as an isolated letter, or a series of letters
which can be analysed as a succession of sound-units; it
has a normal and fixed size, and is entirely different from
the sj^ho^a of the later grammarians, which has no size or
parts. (Raja (1963), p. 102)
Bhartrhari wrote a commentary on the Hahiabhasya
.
and he was familiar
with this theory of sphota as well as several ethers xjhich are men-
tioned in VakyapadTya I, 81, 102, and 106.
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Bhartrharl's successors also proposed their versions of the
lEhola theory, „any of which differed fro. the one I will attribute
to him.
The lack of consistency among the scholars reflects, then, the
lack of consistency among the writers In the sphota tradition.
A writer who takes one form of the theory as^ theory of sphota
will disagree with a writer who uses another form as the paradigm.
There are problems enough In explicating the version found In the
Here the goal Is simply to do that, and leave the
connections to other versions for later work.
Terminology. Another problem which hinders the commentator
on Bhartrhari's theory is the fact that the theory is rarely
stated with the use of the word s^ho ca. Most of the passages which
are taken to describe ^hoU use the word gabda or the word
and it is a matter of interpretation when such uses are to be taken
to apply to £Ehotas . If one takes a hard line here, it is possible
to hold that Bhartrhari never stated the classical sphota theory.
Such a hard line is described by Iyer in this passage:
(11) Dome commentators] go further and say that even Bhartrhari
who came much later than Patanjali, did not call the *
meaning-bearing unit sphot;a
. Here is what Dr. S. D. Joshi
says
—
(1) Bhartrhari has nowhere clearly stated in his ^Takyapadlva
that spho;;a is over and above the sounds, it is indivisible,
and without any inner sequence and it is a meaning-bearing
unit of language... ( Sphopanirnava of Kaunda Bhatta
. p. 2^)
(3) All this confusion has arisen in the mind of later
gr^marians because they identify Patanjali 's conception
of ^abda with the concept of sphopa
. (p. 39)
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(A) In the context of mennlngful speech-unit, Bhartrharlhas never used the term sphota ," (p. 4o)
(Iyer (1969), p. 57)
The fascinating thing about Joshi's Interpretation Is that the data
en which it is based seems to me to be correct. The interesting
Characteristics of spho^s In the theory are read In from passages
which use 'ssbiB. or to denote the entities which have those
characteristics. Thus, although Bhartrharl is recognized as the
first Grammarian to develop the sphota theory In an Interesting way,
it is a matter of interpretation just what that theory was, and its
ultimate form depends on which passages one reads as passages in
which spho a^ and Sa^ or s£hoia and vSkva are synonymous. That
there Is some synonymy between them is argued persuasively by
Iyer in passages such as this one:
(12)
For Instance Vak. 1.77 says that after the manifestation
o the word (Sabda) the secondary sounds cause differencein the speed of utterance, but the essence of the snhota
IS not affec:ted by them. Here, obviously, sabda and
^
stand for the sane thing and if "sabda is the
meaning-bearing unit, the spho^a is automatically so.
(Iyer (1969, p. 159)
On the basis of such texts, Iyer asserts
(13) While it is true that the meaning-bearing unit is usually
referred to as ^abda in the ''/^cyanad Tva
. it is also true
that the words A^bda and sphoi;a are used as synonyms, some-
times in the sane stanza. (Iyer (1969), p, 159)
A point Iyer does not bring up (and which vitiates his argument, although
not fatally) is that there are also passages in which sabda and
clearly used non-synonymously
. The follov;ing is an example:
(14) Whether the speech-sound ( $abda ) is short or long, the
measure of the Word ( spho^a ) does not change.
(VP I 103, Pillai's translation).
(Filial also translates VP I 77 as a passage In whleh ial^ and
=Eh£ta contrast In leaning, bnt 1 do not believe be neant to do
it.)
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I have puzzled over these texts and difficulties for sot.e
time and finally came to the following conclusion. It makes no
difference whether we follow Joshl and take a hard line or not.
for following Josh! we derive a S£t^ theory under another name;
probably It should be termed the sa^ theory of Bhartrharl.
To follow the tradition of the commentators and the most modern
thought on the matter Is to derive a similar theory through a
wide assumption that ^a^ and s£h^ are synonymous-a theory more
properly called the ^hota theory. Since It Is the theory 1 am
Interested In and not its correct title, 1 shall b«t to tradition
and term the theory to be given here the sphota theory, although
it seems to me that Joshi's point is well taken.
Unclear texts. Allowing synonymy between ^abda and sphota
at appropriate points resolves some of the difficulties of inter-
pretation, but one major problem remains. In the act of communica-
tion through speech, there are sounds, there are words, and there
are word-meanings. Uhat is the relationship between words and
word meanings? In particular, is the relationship one of identity
or is it some other very intimate relation? These two theories
are contrasted in the Vakyapadiya in the following passages:
Grammarians consider that there are two ’word—entities
’
(i.e., tv;o elements) in functional v;ords; one (i.e.,
the sphoifa) is the cause of the (production) of words
and the other (the speech-sound) is used in connection
with meanings.
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other hand) sneak of
these two. Others (on the
various, through a dlfle^::::
(VP I 44-45^ Parenthesized words Pillai’s),
Ide^Urbn'n^th^rS'
-aulns expressed
,
that there Is no such Identity. (VP ulsAllll)-"*
The difficulty is that Bhartfhari never states which of the two
theories-an identity theory of words and neanings and a non-identity
thoery of words and meanings—he prefers, although he writes
(17) Speech and meaning being the two halves of one factare not distinct and separable. (VP II 31b, Pillai.’)
This passage is not ultimately satisfying, since the two halves of
an object are not identical, whereas things which are not distinct
a^ Identical. Tims both theories have support in this text.
The confusion on the part of commentators, then, is amply
abetted by Bhartrhari’s method of citing theories without always
stating which ones he held. In this case he cites both theories,
fails to declare himself in favor of either, and writes in different
passages as though he held each.
The view which is carefully set forth by Brough, supported
by Raja, and endorsed by Iyer, is that sounds express sphofas.
which express meanings. Raja's statement of this theory is
quoted in (8). Iyer's is as follows
(18) Bhartfhari's chief point is that what is called ^ahda
is not the sounds uttered and heard in a sequence but an
entity over and above them and it is that and that alone
which can convey the meaning. (Iyer (1969), p. 160)
In this view spho^as function as meaning-bearers and are, therefore
not identical to the meanings they bear.
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It is a characteristic featur
word-sphotas are held in mind after
meanings are in mind when language
e of the non-identity theory that
sounds are heard and before
is processed. Similarly, sentence-
SEhoias cone to mlod between words end sentence-neanlnss. W,Ue this
theory accounts adequately for the data It Is Intended to account for,
I do not believe It accounts for the way all people process languaee.
In order to make this point clearly, let us Introduce two new grammars.
In one, the grammar VS (for varna-sphofa 'letter-spholja')
,
entitles
which play the part of word-sphojas In the non-ldentlty theory
come between letters and word-meanings.^ In the other, the grammar VS’,
no such entitles are employed. I believe both grammars model the way
language Is processed. (In what follows, I substitute letters or
syllable characters for sounds In modelling the Identity and non-
ldentlty theories. It is simpler to write about characters than'
sounds In a paper of this sort. The principle Is the same for either
sort of example.)
T^VS Grammar. The grammar of has a simple syntax and a
more complicated semantics. The syntax is as follows.
Any syllable of the Devanagari system of characters is a
character of VS, the space " ” is a character of Vf5, and nothing else is.
Any sequence of VS characters 5s a VS sequence
.
The semantics of VS is as follows. Correlated with each charac-
ter of VS is a function subject to the following constraints?
(19) a. The name of each function is the Vnglish transliteration
of the Devanagari character.
b. No function is a word or a word-meaning,
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c. the result of applying a function with name a to a
thr^esuirof a nane which Isne r lt o concatenating a and h, and
space^is^'^
applying a function with name a to the
^ ^ member of the SLS lexiconKXX) a if a is a member of the SLS lexicon.
Examples: Correlated with ^ (pronounced "na") Is the function named
na. Correlated with tT (pronounced"r3") Is the function named
When the function ^ takes the function « as argument, the result
is the function named nar^.
For convenience, let us denote the function correlated with
the space as Then we use the following convention. The partition
of a sequence of functions Is the set of smallest suhsequences such
that each subsequence terminates In "d" (exception: the last sub-
sequence need not so terminate.)
Example: the sequence <^a,me,na,/<,dha> is partitioned into
<ra,me,na,^/> and [dha^
.
A VS word is a VS sequence which contains a single /' in final
position and which yields a non-empty result when the first member
of the sequence is applied to the second and the result is applied
to the third and so on until the result is applied to the space.
Example; The sequence <rT,mc,na, is a VS word because the result
of applying
_ra to (rame ) applied to na (ramepa ) applied to "/V'
(the SLS word Rameqa ) is not the empty set, but the word Rama in
instrumental case.
A VS sentence is a VS sequence composed of VS words which have
a set of associated sequences which may interact as in the grammar in
Chapter II to produce an expression of type S.
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The point of introducing this model is to show that there is a
way to process language beginning with letters such chat the meaning
of the sentence is built up from the meaning of the letters and so
that the words are built up out of letters in a way parallel to the
way sentences are built up out of words. This model seems to me to
correspond to the way people process language when they read with
the verbal accompaniment "ra.
. .me.
.
.na.
.
. ramenaj ” First the sounds
(or characters) are processed, then they are concatenated to form a
word when a word-boundary is reached, then the meaning is attached
to the word.
VThile such a model fits this way of processing langauge,
it is incorrect as a theory of the way
_all language processing taVes
place. To see this, let us construct the grammar vg' which begins
with letter meanings as before and derives sentence meanings without
going through the intermediate step of deriving word-symbols which
express X7ord-meanings
.
VS* is like VS except for the following modification. The
last requirement on the functions associated with VS* characters is
(20) d. the result of applying a function with name a to the
space is
(i) if a is not a member of the SLS lexicon
(li) C(a) if a is a member of the SLS lexicon
In VS* the meaning of a VS word is the set of word-meanings associated
with its SLS counterpart rather than the SLS word Itself, '^hese
word-meanings interact to produce a sentence-meaning as in ^^S and
the result is identical. The only difference is that the process
is one step shorter.
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It Is. then, fomally possible to ellnlnate the word-sphota
fto„ one's nodel o, language processing. Is there evidence to the
effect that this formalisn, portrays the processing accurately?
1 believe there Is. The VS'
.odel seens to fit the way of reading
which often has this sort of verbal acconpanin,ent
: "Ra.
. .™as.
. .dhi.
.
.
va...tl...Rama runs'" No Impression of the word as a whole need
come to nlnd when one Is an experienced reader because one Is conditioned
to correlate meanings directly with sequences of syllables. For
this reason among others It seems to me chat the non-ldentlty theory
Is Incorrect as a model of t^e wsv allrn ay al_l language-proce.ssing goes on,
although It Is correct as a model of some processlng-that of a
beginner who Is slow and easily observed. (It Is, of course, open
to a non-ldentlty theorist to claim that word
-sphotas are called to
mind by people who read in Che VS' way. although no verbalization
corresponding to their appearance Is produced, imile It 1s possible
to claim this, I believe there Is no evidence that the claim is
correct.)
There is another class of examples of language processing In
which it appears that no word
-sphotas (in the sense of the non-
identity theory) are used. A skilled reader often takes In language
in segments comprised of several words. A reader who reads In phrases
rather than words is such a processor. The sentence "Nary gave a
ball to Rill", for example, might be read as composed of these parts;
*
gave a ball", and "to bill". To read it in such a way is
to short-circuit the process of deriving sentence-meanings from
sentences in a different way from that of a VS' reader, for such a
reader seens to
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associate the meaning of "gave a ball
word phrase directly, rather than building It up word
letter by letter). The words "gave a ball" function
with the three—
hy word (or
as a single name
for the meaning when read In this way, and there Is therefore no
occurrence of the word-^otas correlated with "gave", "a", and "ball
In the mind of the phrasal reader, (of course, it is open to a non-
Identlty theorist to claim that the word
-sphotas are called to mind
but they are overlooked In the speed with which the reader processes
Although one can claim this, I cannot think of any evidence that the
claim is true.)
An extreme example of this sort of phenomenon is one which
I know of directly. I was trained in French with a method which relied
heavily on the memorization of dialogues which were recited and acted
out. Later, when I spoke and understood French without great pro-
ficiency, I was involved in a conversation in which the question
Voulez-vous allez chez moi?" v;as asked. I responded immediatelv
without thought, for this very sentence had occurred in a dialogue
I had memorized and acted out months before. My response was based
on knowing the meaning of the sentence, and it was not the response
of the dialogue, so I had not given an answer which I was conditioned
to give. If even a single word of the sentence had been changed (as
I discovered upon observing other instances of my processing of French)
the sentence would have been as slow and difficult to understand as
the others in the conversation, for I did not process T^rench rapidly
enough to derive the meaning of the sentence from its words as quickly
as I did. My conclusion is that the sounds functioned as a unit
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which called the sentence meaning to mind directly, without the Inter
vention of words and word meanings.
If I have described what happened correctly, the ncn-ldentlty
theory of language processing Is Incorrect as a description of what
always occurs when speech is understood, for no sphotas seem to have
come to mind when I understood the French sentence. The Identity
theory does provide a correct account of the processing, however,
for to understand sounds Is to derive their meanings and (on this
theory) their meanings are sphotas
.
Examples of the sort just described seem to be the rule rather
than the exception in language processing, but it is primarily in
the experienced processor's comprehension of speech that they occur.
In such cases the stages in processing are so rapid that they are not
easily observed, and it is tempting to think that they must be the
same stages v-^hich an inexperienced processor goes through. In my
case I was fortunate to be inexperienced enough to process slowly,
except for the sentences which I had been conditioned to process
quickly in another way,
Tlie non-identity theory is incorrect, then, as far as the
evidence goes. It seems to have been accepted by trough, Raja, and
Iyer for two reasons: They thought it was correct, and later Gram-
marians explicitly held it, Relieving it to be incorrect, I have
been fascinated by the fact that Rhartrhari does not explicitly
state it, and have searched for indirect evidence that it is the
identity view instead which Bhartrhari had in mind. There are
two sources of such evidence.
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In (15) Bhart^harl says that Granmarlans consider there to be
two "word-entities" In functional words, although he does not say
what they are. One causes words to be produced and the other Is
connected with meanings. Iyer reads this passage as asserting that
npMn nnd leaning together make up the Integrated word. Read In
this way the passage supports the Identity theory. Filial,
on the other hand, reads It In another way. Pis parenthetical Inser-
tions Identify the first element with the sphota and the second with
speech-sounds. Read in this way the passage Is compatible with either
theory, for It has no bearing on the question whether sphota and
meaning are the sane. Read in this way It Is not problematic whether
or not Bhartrharl held the Identity theory, for It Is stated often
enough elsewhere that he thought sphotas and speech-sounds were
different.
In (16) a similar difference in readings follows. If we take
’’that which expresses a meaning’* to be speech-sounds, it is clear that
Bhartfhari holds the non- identity theory, and the older authorities
he refers to are Grammarians like Patanjali, who held that sphotas
have duration and other properties of sounds.
Read in this way, neither of the two passages concerns the
controversy over the identity and non- identity theory as it has been
stated here. Furthermore, Given Iyer’s reading in which the passages
concern this controversy, it is a puzzle why Bhartrhari never
declared himself for either of the two. Given the reading which
Pillai endorses for (15) and the reading I prefer for (16), there
is no puzzle. Bhartrhari has said often enough in other sections
that the meaning of a word or a sentence (as sounds) is different
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from the sounds then.selves. Given an Identity reading of the passages
(15) and (16), then, Bhartrharl Is made to look less coy with respect
to a topic on which he should have keen gulck to pronounce judgment.
A second sort of evidence that Bhartrharl held the Identity
theory of spl^ and meaning concerns his description of the derivation
of sentence-meanings from words. According to the non-identity theory,
word-meanings (expressed by word
-sphotas ) would Interact to produce
a sentence-s£hola, which would then express a sentence-meaning.
This description Is not that given by Bhartpharl. In a celebrated
passage, Bhartrharl writes;
(21) the word-meanings in a sentence are detached (from outf the sentence) and (thus) understood, a different fla.sh
of insight is produced (out of it). That (flash of insicht)presented by the word-meanings is described as the meaning
of the sentence, “
It is by no means describable to others in such terms asit^is like this". Having been formed from the function of
one s inner self, its nature is not known even to the person
It effects the fusion of the (individual^) v/ord
-meanings
without itself being logically thought out, and it is
comprehended as seemingly taking the form of the collection(of the word-meanings). (VP II 143-5, Pillai)
The important feature of this description is that no sphotas are
described in it to bear the sentence-meaning. The sentence-meaning
arises directly from word-meaning;^ as the word-meanings arise from
letter-meanings in the VS’ grammar. It is possible that Bhartrharl
might have omitted to mention a sentence
-sphota in this description,
but it does not seem likely. My conclusion is that Bhartrharl held
what I have called the identity theory of spho^a and meaning, that
there is textual evidence in this passage to that effect, and that
the reading of other texts is less problematic if we ascribe the
identity theory to him.
It remains to explain the attraction of the non-ldentlty theory
to Bhartrharl's successors and commentators. Their view seems to
arise from a concentration on the facts of languaRe-processlng at
the word level, without comparable attention paid to such facts at
the sentence level. A word-meaning considered In Isolation has a
name~the concatenation of the English transliteration. In VS.
It Is common when reading a word (especially a word In Isolation)
to have the name come to mind when the word Is understood, and It
Is possible to take this name to he expressive of a word-form, so
that one might take sounds or Inscriptions, forms, and meanings
to be Involved In the processing of a word. This way of understanding
what happens is wrong If the identity theory Is correct. According
to the Identity theory, one reads Inscriptions, has a meaning In mind,
and a subvocal name of the meaning comes to mind, at the same tine
as the meaning or just after. The subvocal name is a series of
sounds in form, and it expresses the word meaning, but it appears
to be a new form which is used in the processing of language.
Hence one might be tempted to believe that a word
-sphota comes to
mind before word meaning does.
This temptation disappears when sentence meanings are considered,
for we do not have names for sentence meanings which are so obviously
linked to them, Uhat we use to name sentence meanings are sequences
of words. But sequences of words are taken to be related first to
word-meanings and only derivatively to sentence meanings.
Concerning fact that sentences do not have names in the way that
words have names t Bhartrhari writes;
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^
^ T thG real nature of that (here theord-neaning) which (obviously) has a fom of its oxm ItIS only when a thing (here, the meaning of the sentence)does not have such a form that we seek for its essentialnature. (vp II 416 Pillai)
To realize that sentence-meanings are entertained in the mind without
uncompound sentence-names to act as their "forms" is to lose the
temptation to suppose that there must be sentence
-sphotgs in addition
to sentence-meanings when speech is processed.
The moral is that commentators have concentrated on the sort
of sphoja which we describe best, word-meanings, attention is
paid to passages such as that quoted in (21), the temptation to
think that there must be a form mediating between word-meanings and
sentence-meanings disappears. Bhartrhari saw deeply into the relation
between sounds and meanings, so deeply that he realized the identity
theory to be true. I believe his successors and many of his commentators
to have lost the depth of his vision.
A. Comments on the Spho^a Theory
Bhartrhari 's theory of sphota contained several important insights.
One, that there is a difference in kind bet\7een speech sounds and
meanings, has been discussed. Some of the others deserve mention,
although they will not be treated in detail here.
Meanings do not have parts. One feature of spho^as which
Bhartphari mentions again and again is that they are noncomposite
entities. Some passages in which this point is made are;
(23) Just as there are no parts in letters (simllarlv) there are
no letters in the word. Nor is there any reality in abstract-
ing the word from the sentence. (\T I 73, Pillai)
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( 24 )
this the meaning ^hlj, if Iff \ ’»«= to
to the mind as If It consisted
('"P II 27, Pillai)
Although the entitles which express a meaning may he many. It Is
continually stressed that the meaning expressed Is a single entity.
This view, in contrast to a view of the
-ttnamsahas that the meaning
Is made up of the concatenation of word-meanings, represents a great
insight,
S^tences do not have parts.
.
The sense of
-sentence" (vakya)
in (24) differs from that in Chapter I. There a sentence was taken
to be a sequence of words, an entity which is eminently divisible.
Here it is taken to be the sentence meaning. This theory constitutes
Bhartrhari s official definition of a sentence. That it is is
stated in passages such as (24). The theory (as I interpret it) is
that sentences are not really sounds or inscriptions, although we
talk as if they were for simplicity’s sake, khat they are really
is what the sounds or inscriptions express-meanings. There are some
interesting consequences of this theory. One is that when syntacticians
discuss the syntactic behavior of words they are not really talking
about entities idiich are divorced from semantics, since what words
name is meanings. In the VS' grammar, the only entitles which are
nonsemantic are the inscriptions with which the grammar begins, ^he
rest is meaning, although words are used to talk about what the meanings
are like.
Another consequence of this theory is that one may have sentences
in mind even when one is not capable of using language. This is the
explanation of the apparently puzzlins pasaase:
by speech.
‘ knowledge shines as permeated
SnLlm^snesrca^^ beings,
preceded by speech. (vP ri^rinl 12^ p1JL\)'
The relation between speech and consciousness In bhartrharl*s thought
deserves a separate volume of its own.
The act of understanding neanlng Is unknowaMo one provocatl^e
feature of the s^t^ theory Is the renark puoted In (11) to the effect
that the flash of Insight which Is the act of understanding a sentence
meaning Is not know^ by us. We know that it occurs and we have nanes
for the meanings grasped In such acts but we seem to have no Insight
Into the nature of the acts themselves:
"Having been 'formed from the
function of one's Inner self. Its nature Is not knotm to the person."
A discussion and Investigation of this doctrine (with Its relation to
remarks of Western philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Putnam that
meanings are not mental entitles) Is a fertile subject for research.
The relative reality of words and sentences. A theme which
Bharcrhari takes up again and again In Book II of the 'Jakvanadlva
Is the claim that sentences are real rrhlle words are not. Consider
this passage:
(26 ) 111036 who consider the sentence as an indivisible unit
consider (the recognition of) v;ords (in it) as pragmatic
and as subsequent to indivisibilitv (in the order of
reality). (\rp u 57^ Pillai).
This theory is based on the claim that sentence-meanings are the
primary units of thought. Since there are, strictly speaking, no
words in the sentence, there are no words in thought. The claim
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is made in various ways and seems to take on
of Rook II is takpn nr\ «-Li> Ke up with arguments
various forms,
for Bhartrhari'
A good
s theory
that worda arc not real, and by conalderatlon of connterargu.ents
advanced by the fflo,at,sakas to the effect that words are ultimately
real and sentences are not. These
in need of clarification, comprise
disputes, extremely involved and
another subject for future work.
FOOTNOTES
1 Host of the passages quoted here were gleaned fror, similar
discussions in Raja (1963), pp. 140-45 and Brough (1951), pp. 405-411.
2 That Bhartrharl would agree to a grammar similar to V5
as one formalizing the concept of letter
-sphotas is not clear.
Often it seems that he dentes that letters have any meaning, but 1
take It that he does so for the same reason he often denies that
words have any meaning-on his theory only sentences have real
meaning. The VS grammar is Intended to model a Grammarian view
that letters have sphotas associated with them, imether it is
related to a text of the Vakyapadiya 1 am not certain, although
there are discussions of the way letters form words which might be
Illuminated If referred to a grammar like the VS grammar.
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chapter I V
BHART^RI A.ND THE LIAR PARADOX^
in chapters I-III so.e Indian concepts have been rendered In
Western fornalls.. m this chapter I shall hold the position that
another sort of Hestem fornalls™. that usually employed to represent
positions like Bhartrharl's. Is not needed. The sort of fonnalls.
I have in find Is the apparatus of language hierarchies custofarlly
used In forfal sen,antlcs. I shall argue that to use such apparatus
is to rob Bhartrharl-s remarks of their Import, and shall present
an alternative system within which the views Bhartrharl held may
be expressed as he meant them.
1. Tarski’s Proof and TarsklVs Solution ^
The theory of languages and metalanguages constitutes the
response of the Western logician Alfred Tarski to a problem raised
by a result he discovered. The result (hereafter, ’’Tarski’s Proof”)
was based on these t.^ assumptions; The truth predicate is bivalent
(that is. every sentence is either true or false), and Convention T—
for any constant
_a of a language L which names a sentence q such that
p is the translation of q into L, the biconditional of the following
form is true in L: a is true if and only if p.
Using these assumptions, Tarski proved that any language which
contains the usual logical operators, names of its sentences, and a
truth predicate will contain sentences the assignment of truth values
to which will lead to contradiction, (For a language with names of
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It. o™ sentence., the translation of each sentenoe v,iu he Itself).
Such sentences are cormonly called Liar sentences. A notorious exan-
pie is the Liar, "This sentence is false".
Tarski's Solution to this problen. as It is often Informally
stated. Is to require that no lanquage „e employ contain Its own truth
predicate. More precisely, this solution Is often stated as the
requirement that we employ only chose languages wJdch form metalanguage
hierarchies. (As we see shortly, these two ways of putting matters are
not equivalent.) A full specification of what a language hierarchy
Is, however. Is not given us hy Tarski, and In order to make some points
clearly later on, such a specification Is proposed here.
First of all, some assumptions. It is assumed that the lan-
guages under discussion contain sentences made up of qUeantifiers
logical operators, constants, and predicates, although none of the
languages is required to contain expressions from all these categories.
To make proofs simpler, the quantifier is assumed to be the existential
quantifier and the logical operators are assumed to be "v" and
It is assumed further that the well-formedness conditions on sentences
make an n-place predicate of a language followed by any n constants
of that language a sentence. It is assumed that the complex sentences
are built up from the quantifier and logica] operators in the usual
way. It is assumed that the languages under discussion are interpreted.
That is, each language has associated with it an ordered pair
where D is a sot comprising the domain of interpretation and v is a
function assigning to each constant of the language a member of D, and
assigning to each n—place predicate of the language a subset of the
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n-tem Cartesian Product of n. It Is assumed that
which foms a langua.e hierarchy will not he a set
tlons nade In Tarski's Proof lead to contradiction.
any set of languages
In which tlie assunp—
("niis assump-
tlon justifies sote of the requlrenents to be nade on language
hierarchies.) The definition of a language hierarchy follcn,s.
( 1 ) A lanj,uage hlera^ H Is any ordered pair such that k
ts a set of languages and M Is a relation fron I, to L such that
for any and Lj
,
members of L,
(a) the domain of interpretation of contains some
sentence of and contains a truth predicate
if and onlv if
1 J’
(h) if then there is a sequence of languages of L
such that or or ItLoLi,
...
‘^^- 1^ or ""od or
(c) all sentences in the union of the domains of interpreta-
tion of the members of L are sentences of some member
of L,
(d) there is no sequence of members of L such that
M1w]^L2, •••
’^"ri-l^n trivially, M is
irreflexive)
,
(e) there i.s no infinite sequence of members of L 1-1...!^^
such that, for each in the sequence,
Lot us read
•"l-'iLj" as ”L^ is meta on l'j"» It may be surprising
that the conditions in (la) for one language to be meta on another are
so weak. One does not encounter languages in Tarksi’s v;ork or in the
literature in which a language meta on another contains a nam.e of no
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sentence of the eecond. Thece Is a teason for this. Tarshi writes In
terns of the metalanguage relation, perhaps hellevlng that It was
the only relation which satisfied his Intuition that no language
should contain its own truth predicatP in e. The metalanguage relation
is more restrictive than the u 4•a cn relation of being meta on. As Tarski
characterizes it.
(2) hi Is a metalanguage for I,j = Lj^ contains a name of every
sentence of Lj and contains a truth predicate.
The context in which language hierarchies are most frequently
encountered is that in which a semantics for an object language is
being given in a metalanguage. Tarski believed that, in order to
state a semantics, it is necessary to give a sentence of the form
(3) a is true if and only if p
for each sentence of the object language. Hence each object language
sentence must have a name in the metalanguage. I have adopted this
requirement on the semantics to be given later, although I think it is
overly restrictive. A semantics, in the sense of a complete specification
of the truth conditions for the sentences of an object language, can
be given in a language which has no names for the object language
sentences. For example, I believe the truth conditions on propositional
calculus sentences are stated accurately in this way;
(4)
(x) (x is true iff the last column of a truth table for x
contains "T" on every line)
Provided the domain of interpretation of the language (4) is a sentence
of contains each sentence of the propositional calculus, (4) gives the
truth conditions for those sentences correctly. It is not required
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for ade,„.cy that th. language (4, la found In contain na.es for those
sentences as well.
If the metalanguage relation Is substituted for the relation of
being meta on In (la)
,
the resultant structures have the characteristics
which are discussed with respect to language hierarchies. However,
It seems Interesting to point out that the two Intuitions spoken of
as Tarskl-s Solution differ In practice. The language hierarchy
definition Is Intended to be a formalization of the Intuition that
no language contain Its own truth predicate, and the resultant struc-
tures have the set of metalanguage hierarchies as a subset.
The characterization of H In (la) Is not a syntactic one because
not all Uar paradoxes arise from syntactic self-reference. The sen-
tence
(5) (Ex)(Px&'^x)
may be an instance of the Existentially Quantified Liar, if T is the
truth predicate and P is a predicate satisfied only by (5). There is
no syntactic hint that this is the case; only the interpretation of
the language containing (5) determines whether a Llarllke sentence
is in question.
Requirement (lb), that M connect all the members of a language
hierarchy, is not essential to the results to he discussed here, but
without it any set of languages would constitute a language hierarchy,
given only that each lacked a truth predicate, and this seems contrary
to the connotation of "hierarchy".
Requirement (Ic) ensures that there will not be reference to
sentences outside a language hierarchy. Otherwise, Inference rules
98for the truth predicate could lead to paradox in the Llarllke way.
Requirement (Id) rules out Uarllke situations of the following
sort
:
( 6 ) Ta^ (sentence of language
(7) Ta
2 (sentence of language L^)
( 8
)
'^^33 (sentence of language L^)
where a^ names (7). a^ names (8), and a
3 names (6). The assumptions
of Tarski's proof win produce a contradlcltlon If these sentences are
members of a language hierarchy.
Requirement (Id) ensures also that no language of a language
hierarchy contain its own truth predicate. A consequence of (Id)
which Saul Krlpke disparages in Krlpke (1975) is that syntactic self-
reference is prohibited as semantic self-reference is prohibited,
through the joint effect of (la) and (Id). However, given Tarski's
requirement that languages not contain their own truth predicates
and the assumption that any n-place predicate of a language followed
by n constants of that language is a sentence of that language,
this result follows. Krlpke's interpretation of Tarski's Solution
differs from mine on this point, but I cannot specify precisely
the way in which we differ, because Kripke doesn't give his version
in Kripke (1975)
,
due to limitations of space.
Requirement (le) ensures that the hierarchies will be grounded.
This requirement is not a feature of the system given later, but it
seems necessary if Tarski's system is to preserve bivalence.
One could require that each hierarchy contain at least two mem-
bers, but this does not seem to be essential to the notion of a
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hierarchy. A single, truth-predleateleas language which discusses cows
aeens acceptable as a degenerate hierarchy. (Nothing to cone seens to
depend on this decision.)
Now It may be demonstrated that Tarski's Solution works In this
form. Let the s^ndard semantic^ for each sentence „ of a langu «e
of a language hierarchy H be as follows (where is the second membel
of the Interpretation of L^)
:
(9) if w is of the form w is true if and only if
... Vi(a^)>£,Vi(pn).
(10) if w is of the form 'vp, ^ is true if and only if p ig not
true.
(11) If w Is of the form pyq, „ is true if and only If p Is true
or q is true,
(12) if w is of the form Ta^^, w is true if and only if V^Ca^^)
is true,
(13) if w is of the form (Ex)({)x), w is true if and only if
some member satisfies 0.
(14) any sentence p is true if and only if p is not false.
By applying (9)— (14) to the sentences in the lowest members cf any
language hierarchy and working upwards in the hierarchy, each sentence
of each language receives a truth value.
Contradictions do not result from applying the assumptions of
Tarski's Proof to any language hierarchy, if there was no contra-
diction derivable in the languages of the hierarchy through usual
rules of deduction. The proof of this statement is as follows.
Let us assume a set of deduction rules which apply to the sentences of
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.ach language In a language hierarchy H. Ut u, assume that the rules
are conslstent-that Is, using the rules with true sentences of any
language of H as premises yields no contradiction In L^. Tarski's
Proof uses this additional premise having to do with relations
between languages In H:
(15) For any constant a^ and sentence q, where "Ta_^" Is a sentence
of and Vj(a^) Is q and p Is a translation of q Into 4 .
if and only if p.
This premise (Convention T) left to right yields no additional premises
for the deduction rules to use, for if Ta^ is a truth of L^. q is a
truth of some other language lower in the hierarchy. By hypothesis,
P is the translation of q into L^. A condition of adequacy on trans-
lations is that the translations have the same truth conditions as the
original sentence. (Tarski supposes the translations of object lan-
guage sentences into metalanguages to be themselves. I am not certain
that his description is the best one, but the point about translations
is demonstrated by it.) Ihe truth of q, then, implies the truth of p.
Convention T right to left also yields nothing new. Suppose
p is true in L^. Then, by the conditions on translations, q is true
In Lj. By the conditions on the standard semantics, Ta^^ is true in
L^. Hence no new truths are added to the sentences of a language by
Convention T, and no contradiction is derivable in a language of H if
no contradiction was derivable in that language without the use of
Convention T.
Tarski’s Solution works. Placing the truth-predicate for each
language in a language meta on it and Imposing requirements (la)-(le)
101
on the relation M ellnlnates the posslhlllty of contradictions helny,
derived from the assumptions of Tarski's Proof, given a standard
semantics and a consistent set of deduction rules.
This Is the comforting feature of Tarski’s Solution. It has.
however, some uncomfortahle features for philosophers of language In
general and for Bhartrharl In particular. Let us consider them.
Some Drawbacks to Tarski’s Solution
Tarski’s Proof convinced Tarski that English (as well as San-
skrit and every natural language with names for sentences, a truth
predicate, and a negation operator) is inconsistent. For this reason
he gave up the use of natural languages, preferring to use only formal
languages in whose consistency he had more confidence. There are some
difficulties with this move on his part, however. In stating the fact
that English is Inconsistent Tarski used English. If his theory is
correct, the sentence "English in inconsistent" is a consequence of his
reasoning, but the sentence "English is consistent" follows from it as
well, as does the negation of each of his statements about his solution^
(This is a trivial consequence of the fact that any sentence is implied
by a contradiction. Given that Tarski has demonstrated a contradiction
in English, he has demonstrated that every sentence is a consequence of
the "truths" of English.)
A natural reply is that Tarski was using a metalanguage for
English (call it "L") in carrying out his proof, so that the inconsistency
in English would not Infect his results. It is open to us. then, to
wonder where L comes from, and how Tarski came to speak it. L cannot
102have been created by thoughts In English for Polish.x n (.o ; assume one natural
language to be In question) of the sort
-Ut there be a language b such
that In L sentences of the for. P.Q are true if and only If p is true
and Q is true." If this were the case. English would be .eta on L
(by (la)) and Tarski could not use L as a
.etalan guage for English
without violating the Irreflexlvlty conditions on the relation M.
How Is L to be learned by an English speaker so that It may be a
metalanguage for English? The answer Is not clear.
Suppose, however, there to be a language hierarchy containing
some constrained version of English which has a truth predicate-
call It "T-Engllsh". There are other difficulties. For example,
the sentence
(16) This sentence is in T-English.
cannot be a sentence of T-English. (To allow it would be to make
T-Engllsh meta on itself and violate condition (Id) on relation M)
.
Another drawback is that the T-English sentence
(17) Any sentence which is a conjunction of two true conjuncts is
true, and any sentence which is a conjunction of two false
conjuncts is false.
applies to sentences of languages T-English is meta on, but (17)
cannot apply to (17) Itself, for the sentences of T-English cannot
be in the domain of quantification of T-English. Thus Tarski’s
Solution rules out discussion of the nature of all languages if the
nature discussed is semantic. (There is some support here for the
thesis sometimes held by linguists that the semantic and syntactic
components of language may be described independently. If Tarski's
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Solution is correct, the syntax of a language „ay be dlscusse<i In that
language, but the semantics must be discussed In another language.)
Another drawback is illustrated by this sentence;
(18)
is able to state the semantics for T-English in theformal languages one learns in logic classes.
Given Tarski’s Solution this sentence is false, for the reasons just
discussed, ^^at Tarskian semanticists view themselves to be doing
with the formal languages learned (in English) in logic classes
is carrying out a program based on a more restricted view of English;
(19)
What we call English is actually a series of metalanguages
which appear to be the same language. We are able to des-l^guages in some of these metalanguages and usethe languages described to do semantics for others of these
metalanguages lower in the hierarchy.
Several difficulties afflict this vle»7 of things. First, on this vleu
It Is often the case that users of English do not know what language
they are speaking. For example, the statement
(20)
Some sentence in the New York Times today is false,
is required to be in a language at least one level higher in the hier-
archy than the level of the highest-level language which has a
sentence in today’s Mew York Times
. A person could (and often does)
assert (20) without knowing the level of the sentences discussed.
Another difficulty would seem to lie in acquiring the languages
of the hierarchy. There must be infinitely many languages making up
the set of languages which are English as characterized in (19)
,
and
the miracle of learning one language is multiplied beyond comprehension
if (19) is correct. Furthermore, (19) does not seem to fit the facts.
The sentence
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(21) The next numbered
is a sentence of English,
tence
;
sentence in this chapter is true.
Suppose this to be the next numbered sea
(22) The previous numbered sentence In this chapter Is false.
To suppose these sentences part of a language hierarchy Is to violate
the requirements on M. If English Is a series of languages of a
hierarchy, then (21) and (22) are not sentences of English. The most
telling difficulty, however. Is that the language hierarchy solution
in general as well as this Instance of It leads to the partitioning
of our utterances Into langauges on the basis of the way we use the
truth predicate. Such partitioning has no basis, as far as I can
determine. In the way we think. When we go through a process of
converting the thoughts expressed by (16), (17), and (18) into sen-
tences we follow the same set of rules. It would be possible to follow
a different set of rules and arrive at French or Sanskrit sentences
expressing our thoughts, and if we d id so we would say that we were
using a different language, or that the results were in a different
language from that in which (16), (17), and (18) are stated. But
(16), (17), and (18) contain words drawn from the same lexicon, they
obey the same syntactic rules, and our obvious inclination is to say
that they are in the same language—English. Nothing in the procedure
of getting from meanings to words gives us a basis for putting them in
different languages. The Solution advocated by Tarski requires that we
jettison a good many of our beliefs about thought and language, with
no basis for the jettisoning other than the results in Tarksl's Proof.
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Given all this. one might wonder why the language hierarchy
npparatua Is used In Western semantics. The answer has two parts.
First, no better way to avoid the paradoxes discussed In Tarski's
Proof has been known until recently. Second, some attempts have
been made to weaken Tarski's assumptions and allow for languages
to contain their own truth predicates without contradiction. I„
the next section some of these attempts are discussed.
There are several features of Bhartrharl's theory of language
vhlch are metalinguistic. In the sense that a Tarsklan semantlclst
would use language hierarchies to formalize them. In the last chapter
Bhartrharl s theory of ^,ho;as was discussed. On a Tarsklan view, to
propose a theory about the meaning of a sentence Is to discuss the
conditions under which the sentence Is true. Bhartphari's theory was
one which had to do with
_aU. sentences of Sanskrit and their meanings.
(Perhaps^ sentences of every language as well, but no text beats
on this point.) It follows that a Tarsklan rendering of his remarks
would place them In a language meta on Sanskrit. (If the view In
(19) is adopted, then the solution would be to place them In a language
meta on the languages of the Sanskrit hierarchy). This solution will
not do. however, for Bhartrharl's remarks were In Sanskrit and the
point he intended to convey applied to the sentences In which Che theory
was expressed as well as the other sentences of Sanskrit. A translation
of his theory which falls to make It applicable to the theory Itself
is not an adequate translation.
There are passages in which Bhartrhari discusses other semantic
systems. These passages are considered in the next chapter at greater
length. Here „e examine one example of the metalinguistic sort.
(^e school of Indian philosophers, the HySya-Valleslkas. gave
e series of categories Into which all existing things were to fall.
<h.e such category was the category of ,„lversals. The HySya-Val'seslhas
claimed that unlversals are what are In common In similar objects. They
also argued that unlversals themselves do not have unlversals. since
to allow this would be to allow an infinite regress of unlversals. and
It was a tenet of the Nylya-ValJeslka system that there Is no Infinite
regress of existents?
Bhart^hari’s view of unlversals was that they occur In Individuals
and that they cause our cognitions of similar things to be similar. A
part of the theory which was held to be central was that whenever we
cognize things as similar, we do it because there is a universal
in those things which causes the cognitions. Bhartrharl noted that
we cognize unlversals as similar (this Is the basis for grouping them
In the same category) and concluded that there must be a universal of
unlversals. and a universal of the unlversals of unlversals. and so on.
This conclusion contradicted the Nyaya-ValSeslka claim that there are
no unlversals of unlversals. One tenet of the Grammarian school in
Bhartrharl 's time was that the Grammarian philosophy should be common
to all the known philosophical schools. Ttils contradiction, then,
required discussion.
First of all, Bhartrharl attempted to resolve it by distinguishing
two senses of "universal”—word-universals and real unlversals. I do
not understand how this solution was intended to work. The discussion
of it is found on pp, 10-14 of Iyer’s translation of Book III of the
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^^^yapadiya
. An example follows:
in the word
-sahdajati ( Vord!enltrrsa5^'”'''"“^^
(VP III 1.10, Iyer. Parenthetical remarks mine.)
HelSraJa'a eommentary on this passage, as sunmarlzed by Iyer, Is as
follows
:
^L“th^r"^a “''J''’ “hlch is different
^ilevp IS ; ’* Because, one does notexieve in a universal over a universal . -i ,
which ex-fsrQ ^r, a the universal
snih = , , does the vork of
SablitM vhleh exists in the word
Jhe a^
same category as the universal whichexists In t word gaulj ('cow') or asvah (horse).
^ 1.10, Helaraja’s commentary, Iyer.)
What this attempt to achieve compatibility with the Myaya-'/al^ejlkas
amounts to, I am not certain. Uhat Is certain Is that Bhartrharl Is
not ultimately In sympathy with it. Having struggled as we have seen
to make the positions compatible, Bhartrharl proposes another account
of the incompatibility:
(25) ...the alternative is to say that words denote the universals
o the object, pure and simple. Even then, one will have to
maintain that all words do so..,. Here one has to meet theVai§esika objection that if the word jSti [universalj also
stands for a universal, it must be a universal existing in
other universals. And that is not possible. If there is
universal \sicl in universals, where would one stop? But
Grammarians have a different point of view. Their’ chief concern
is to find out the nature of meanings conveyed by words.
^/hat they find is that in all universals as conveyed by words,
there is a common point or characteristic which can be looked*
upon as another universal and can be called by the name jati....
Grammarians go by what the words convey. They are not really
concerned with things as they really are, but with things as
conveyed by words. If a quality is conveyed by words as a
common characteristic, it becomes a universal for them. In
such matters, grammarians are more anxious to follow worldly
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thought^'^o^thlmrarrtf
wey and all words ’c'ST^ the unlvLs
matter of fact. In reality
because that Is a
conveys may or may nore^s^
through Its function called khldha a"
question.
So that Is the meaning of the word.
^
(Summary of Helaraja's commentary on VP III i.ij^ Iyer.)
Uese points have to do with the correct assignment of meaning to
the word Jatl (universal). Again, It seems that Bhartrharl-s remarks
formulated In a metalanguage for Sanskrit, The Myaya-Valse^lka
theory Includes a list of categories which Include the denotations of
all words. According to the theory the sentence "The pot Is red" means
something like this: "Redness Inheres In the pot-substance". There
are similar translations for other sentences. Therefore the Ny-gya-
ValSeslka system Is a semantics for Sanskrit, given the assumption
that to specify meanings Is to specify truth-conditions. Bhartpharl.
in discussing the truth of the Myaya-Vals'eslka theory. Is discussing’
the meaning of a term which must be In a metalanguage for Sanskrit.
His position, that If we take to refer to what words present to
our minds then the Hyaya-Valseslka theory Is false and If we take jatl
to refer to something In reality Chen perhaps it Is true, must be In a
language meta on the metalanguage for Sanskrit In a Tarsklan Inter-
pretatlon. This treatment again does not adequately formalize the
theory, for the Nyaya-Vaiseslkas
' remarks are intended to apply to
the sentences in which Bhartrharl states his theory of universals.
As we have seen, t .re is no way for a Tarskian account to allow for
sentences which refer to each other in a language hierarchy.
There is another reason Bhartrharl 's remarks would not be rendered
in a way which he would have approved of if they were formulated in a
language other than Sanahtlt. Bhatttharl held that the only language
worth speaking In was Sanskrit. Although other languages have been
devised and meanings are conveyed In them, their use does not lead
to spiritual advancement. If there Is a way to represent Bhartrharl's
views, then, so that they turn out to be couched In Sanskrit and so
that the paradoxes of Tarksfs Proof are evaded. It would be preferabl
to that of a Tarsklan semantlclst. In the remainder of this chapter
such a way is proposed and discussed.
3. How to Creat e the Meta-effect
Without Meta—Apparatus
Some Western logicians have weakened the assumptions of Tarksi’s
Proof in order to devise langauges which contain their own truth
predicates without contradiction. One such system has recently been
proposed by Saul Kripke in Kripe (1975). There Kripke constructs a
consistent semantics for a language which contains its own truth
predicate by denying Tarski’s assumption that every sentence is either
true or false. As we have seen in the discussion of yogyata
. this
assumption has been denied by some logicians on other grounds, and
Kripke’s solution has some intuitive appeal. There is difficulty with
it, however. The system is described in a metalanguage containing
predicates which the semantics does not treat (the predicate "undeter-
mined in truth value", for Instance). IThatever its merits, it is
unsatisfactory that the system is couched in metalinguistic terms which
the semantics cannot treat. Further, given that the metalanguage
apparatus is used by Kripke, the problem of identifying the languages
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which he uses and their relation to ordinary English Is as difficult
for his system as it is for Tarski’s.
The difficulty with the Tarski system and Kripke’s as well is
that they are based on Convention T. In Kripke (1975) Kripke writes,
(26) We may say that we are entitled to assert (or deny) of any
whenT^
^ is true precisely under the circumstanceshen we can assert (or deny) the sentence itself, (p. 701)
Convention T is actually two theories about truth. One is that
"a is true” entails p, where p is the translation of the sentence a
names; this part of the theory is the disappearance theory of truth.
The other part is that, for any sentence p, where p is the transla-
tion of the sentence a names, p entails "a is true”. This theory
is the appearance theory of truth. If one accepts both these theories
it follov/s that no statement of the standard semantics of a language
containing the logical operators already described is true if formulated
in the language it is a semantics of.
In order to prove this statement, suppose it false. Then the
semantic statement s for a language L is a sentence of L. The semantics
includes the following clause; All sentences of L are true if and only
___
(some formula or other fills in the blank). According to the
standard semantics, the truth value of a quantified sentence depends
on the satisfaction of the formula by each member of the domain. One
such member is s. The truth value of s, then, depends on the truth
value of
(27) s’; s is true if and only if
.
But s’ is true if and only if the sentence ”s is true” agrees in truth
value with the sentence on the right of the equivalence sign. We must.
Ill
therefore, know the truth value of
-a Is true" In order to know the
truth value of s'. But that can't be obtained without determining
the truth value of s. We are Involved In an Infinite regress and
our assumption is false.
Given that Bhartrharl takes his theory to be discussing semantic
theories of Sanskrit and that he takes It to be given In Sanskrit,
no theory which places his remarks In another language will seem
adequate to formalize his theory.
It seems, then, that a different approach is needed here. Such
an approach will be given in the remainder of this chapter. The
basis for the approach is that the contradictions derived from Tarski»s
assumptions constitute a reductio ad absurdum of those assumptions,
rather than a proof of the intrinsic inconsistency of natural language.
If Convention T entails the inability of natural language speakers to
do semantics in their natural languages, then Convention T is suspect.
The theory to be given constitutes a formalization of a different
view of the truth predicate, one which allows us to say the things about
language which we do say, in the languages we say them in.
The semantics is given with respect to a language called "SR”
(for self-referential*’) The language and the semantics have these
features
;
Sentences of SR have names in SR,
SR has a truth predicate,
SR has the predicate ’’Undetermined'*,
The semantics for SR assigns a unique truth value to every
sentence of SR,
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Any language hierarchy may be translated Into SR so that each
sentence preserves Its truth value and all Inferences In the hierarchy
based on Convention T are preserved.
One may correctly assert the SR semantics.
The SR semantics is formulated in SR,
Convention T is not true of the SR semantics, and
The theory of truth upon which the semantics is based is that
a sentence is true if the interpretation of SR guarantees its truth,
false if the interpretation guarantees its falsehood, and undetermined
otherwise.
This view of truth may be characterized as a groundedness theory
of truth, as opposed to a Tarskian theory of truth. According to
a groundedness theory
,
to be true a sentence must be grounded in
atomic sentences which guarantee its truth value on the interpretation.
Kripke*s theory is a groundedness theory as well as a Tarskian theory
because it does not contain the predicate undetermined
. Given a lan-
guage without this predicate, the two sorts of semantic systems behave
alike. With the predicate their behavior diverges, as we shall see.
There are four features of the system which are not generally
used. First, the evaluation process employs trees constructed of
nodes. Each node contains five members: a sentence of SR, a Semantic
Domain, the index T, F, or U, a valuation function, and an Integer to
distinguish occurrences of nodes with identical first four members.
A node on a tree with sentence w. Semantic Domain SD, truth value 'HJ,
and function V as first four members directly dominates those nodes
with sentences, Semantic Domains, truth values, and functions required
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to guarantee TV for « over SD under the Interpretation function V.
Trees are enployed rather than the more common clause-by-clause
evaluation procedure because, for cases In vhlch a sentence does not
have a truth value guaranteed by the Interpretation, certain highest
nodes become acceptable which are not acceptable on the Interpreta-
tion. The tree notation Is necessary In order to determine the
highest such nodes.
The second respect in which this system differs from the more
commonly used semantic systems is that the semantic predicates T, F,
and U are two-place predicates rather than one-place predicates.
This is a formalization of Tarski's insight that employing the predi-
cate ^ue requires separating sentences into groups—those which may
be referred to semantically and those which may not. The sentence
"Tab" is to be read as "a is true over Semantic Domain b". This means
that in the evaluation of a, a's truth value may not be established by
reference to sentences whicli semantically discuss sentences not in b.
Restriction of the domain of the semantic predicates by means of an
argument place rather than by partitioning sentences into language
results in the creation of the metalanguage effect without the employ-
ment of language hierarchies. (Note; in this paper I interpret the
ordinary language truth predicate "x is true" as "TxW", where N is the
set of all sentences in the domain of interpretation.)
A third difference is that the evaluation process assigns a
Semantic Domain to each sentence at each stage of the evaluation.
Formally, this is accomplished by including the Semantic Domain as the
second member of each node of a tree. The Semantic Domain of any
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sentence w of a node n is the same as that of the sentences in the
nodes which n directly dominates unless w is an atomic semantic
sentence-that is, w is of the form Tab, Fab, or Uab. Then the
Semantic Domain of the nodes n directly dominates is b less the set of
sentences containing semantic discussion of the sentence a names,
sentences which have those sentences as constituents, sentences
semantically discussing any sentences in this set, and so on. Formally
this new Semantic Domain is represented as b>a*. The effect of removing
a* from b is that all sentences which would, in the Tarskian view, be
required to be in languages meta on the language containing Tab, Fab,
or Uab are made inaccessible to semantic predication as a is evaluated.
This is the SR analogue to moving to a lower language in the Tarski
hierarchy, but again the effect is achieved as a part of the evaluation
process rather than by a prior partitioning of sentences into languages.
! The fourth respect in which the SR semantics differs is that
the nodes of trees receive acceptability labelling. A tree which
establishes the truth value of a sentence of SR over a given Semantic
, Domain must have the features listed above, and it must be acceptable.
That is, it must assign to non-semantic atomics truth values based on
the Interpretation of SR so that the topmost node assigns a truth
value compatible with the Interpretation. Acceptability is determined
I
by labelling terminal nodes according to the interpretation, and then
labelling upward if possible. It is necessary to use acceptability
,
labelling because some subtrees used in the semantics are trial trees.
I
For example, a node n of the form <Uab ,SD,T,V, i) directly dominates
I
;
two nodes of the form <V(a) ,b-a*,T,V, j') and ^V(a) ,b-a*, F,V,k>
.
I
i
I
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If one of those nodes Is Ubelled acceptable
, then n Is labelled not
acceptahle
,
for the Interpretation establishes a truth value for a.
If both nodes directly dominated by n receive no label then n Is
labelled acceptable
,
for the Interpretation has failed to determine a
truth value for a.
Here are two examples of the way the semantics works.
Let s be "Rama is a man or Rama is not a man." Let s be sym-
bolized in SR as "nara RSmaV-nara Rama". Then an acceptable semantic
tree for s is the following (where nodes are labelled n^ for reference,
W is the set of all SR sentences, and the relation of direct dominance
is represented by a line downwards from the dominating to the dominated
node) :
^
^2^) ni <TsW,W,T,V,l>
U2 ^ara Ramav'^nara Rama,U-s*,T,V,2'>
n 3 ^ara Rama,’l-s*,T,V,2'> n^ <<vnara Rana,W-s*,T,'%5^
n^ ^nara Rama,W-s*,T,V,4'^
Nodes n 3 and n 5 of (28) contain sentences which are atomic. If they
are interpreted in the intended way, n 3 will be an acceptable node
(since it is true that Rama is a man)
. This establishes that t\2 is
acceptable, and this establishes that nj^ is acceptable. The fact that
the semantic domain has changed makes no difference, since s involves
no semantic predication. The labelling would be the same for "s is in
SR or s is not in SR".
Let s name the Liar sentence "'''TsN" and let U be the predicate
undetermined
. An acceptable semantic tree for s is the following:
(29)
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ni <nsW,U.T.V.3>
<-TsT7,U-s*,T,V,2> <'^TsU,U-s*,F.V,16>
113
<JsW,W-s*,F,V, 2> <TsU,U-s*,T,V,4> n5
In ni It is asserted that s is undetermined. The nodes n^ and n
3
are attempts to establish a truth-value for s— the trial trees for s.
If they are not acceptable, n^ will be labelled acceptable. The Sem-
antic Domain in n
2 and n 3 has shrunk in moving down from nj^, and in
this case it makes a difference, for n^ and n 5 are terminal nodes.
The nodes they would naturally dominate are of the form
<-TsU.Vf-s*.F,V.i> and <-Tsl7.U-s*,T.v, j>. but the first members of
these nodes are not in the Semantic Domain of and n
3 . For this
reason the tree terminates at nodes n^ and n
5 , which receive no
labels. Hence nodes n
2 and n 3 receive no acceptability labels and
^1 JLS, acceptable. In SR the Liar sentence is undetermined in truth
value.
A. The Syntax and Semantics of SR
This section is rather formal. The reader who wishes to skip
it and take the preceding remarks on faith may wish to go directly
to section 5.
Syntax of SR.
Symbols : ^
1 predicates of the form and p!} .m m^ i
2 constants of the form a^ and a^ where every sentence of
SR is named by some constant (perhaps through Godel num-
bering)
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3 variables x^,
...
A logical symbols )j
^
- T, F, and U (atomic semantic predicates)
Well-formed Formulas of SR ("wf fs") : The wffs of SR are the
members of the smallest set S such that
1 for any predicate and constants a^^,
... a^,
P^aj^a2 ...a^ is a member of S (Let P^ stand for either
form of the predicate and the a^ stand for either form of the
constants.
)
2 if p and q are members of S, 'vpj'f’and (pvq) are members of S
3 if p is a member of S, (Fx^) (jlix^) is a member of S. where
0Xj^ is the result of replacing at least one constant of p
with and where did not occur in f),
A Tab, Fab, and Uab are members of S, where a and b are any
constants of SR.
It is assumed that SR is interpreted. That is, there is an
ordered pair ^,v'> such that, for every constant a of SR, v(a)tP
and for every predicate P*' of SR, V(P^)
t
PxD.
.
.xD
,
and such that
n times
every wff of SR is in D. Then the following definitions are used in
the semantics of SR:
^ ^ ordered 5-tuple whose members are: a wff of SR,
a set of wffs of SR, ”T*', "F", or ”U"
,
a valuation function, and an
integer.
AA^ is an ordered pair <M,DD>. where N Is a set at nodes and
DD is a relation from N to N, such that
(i) N is not empty,
(ii) for every n and m, distinct members of N, there is a sequence
of members of N n,nj^. ,.n^,m such that DDnnj^ or DDn^n,
DDnj^n2 l>Dn 2 » ••• or DDmn^,
(iii) there is no sequence of members of N n^...n^ such that nPnin2,
...DDnjL.j^n^ and DDn^n^ (hence, trivially, T)D is irref lexive)
,
(iv) there is a node niN such that for every node m^N distinct from
n, there is a sequence of nodes n,nj^,...m such that every
member of the sequence directly dominates the next.
(Trees are commonly represented as in the preceding section, where the
relation of direct dominance is shmm by placing line segments between
nodes such that, if DDn^Uj
,
n^ appears below n^ on the tree and there
is a line segment from n^ to nj
. This notation makes the relationships
of direct dominance easier to grasp at the expense of formal precision.
Hence the more abstract notation is employed in the definitions given
here and the display notation is employed in examples.)
If DDn^n, then n. directly dominates n,.
^ J
If there is a sequence of members of H n^^...nj such that each
member directly dominates the next and such that every node which dir-
ectly dominates another node of 'I has a successor in the sequence,
then n^...nj is a dominance path from and n^ dominates each member
of the sequence.
That node of a tree which satisfies condition (iv) above is
the topmost node of the tree.
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Any node of a tree which dominates no other node is a terminal
node
.
A subtree of a tree t is a tree t’ such that (i) the first mem-
ber of t* is a subset of the first member of t. and (ii) the set of
dominance paths from the topmost node of t’ is identical to the set of
dominance paths from that node in t.
If a is a constant naming a wff of SR then ^ is the smallest
set S of wffs of SR such that
(i) for all b such that V(b)=V(a) and all constants c, Tbc, Fbc,
and Ubc are in S,
(ii) if V(b)tS then for all constants c, Tbc, Fbc, and Ubc are in
^ contains a member of S as an atomic constituent, then
is in S
,
and
(iv) if V(b)€S and V(b)£V(c) then for all constants d, Tdc, Fdc,
and Udc are in S,
Let "SD” range over g^ts of of SR and let "V” range over
valuation functions and let '*!’*, and '*k” range over integers.
Then a semantic tree for SR under an interpretation is a tree t
such that the nodes of t and the relation DD of t satisfy these con-
ditions :
SRI Every node of the form <PJJa;j^. . .a^,SD,T,V,i') or , .a^,SD,F,V,i>
or dominates no other nodes.
SR2 A node of the form on the left directly dominates a node or
nodes of the form shown on the right:
<-p.sn.T,v,i>
^-p,SD,F,V,l>
<P,SD,F,V,J>
<p,SD,T,V,j>
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<Sp»SD,T,V,i>
<PfSD,F,V,j> and
^P ,Sn,U,V,k')
<:iP»SP,F,V,i> <PtSD,T,V,j^
Any node of the form <-iP.SD,u;v,l> is a terminal node.
SR3 A node of the form on the left directly dominates nodes of
the form on the right:
<pvq,SD,T,V,i>
<pvq,SD,F,V,i>
<pvq,SD,U.V.i>
<P»SD,T,V.j> <q,SD,T,V,k>
<P»SD,F,V,j> <q,SD.F,V.k>
<p,SD,T,V.l><p,SD,F.V,j <p.SD,U,V,k'>
<q,SD,T,V,i><q,SD,F,F,m <p ,Sn,U,V,n;>
SRA If n is of the form <(Ex)0x,SD,T,V,i> then n directly
dominates the largest set of nodes of the form t<by such that
(i) the subscript on b is the same for each node of the set,
(il) b|^ occurs in no wff of a node which dominates n,
(ill) k is the loijest subscript consistent with (ii)
,
(iv) there are no two nodes directly dominated by n differing
only in the fifth member,
(v) each V’ is like V except that V* assigns a member of T) to b|^,
(vi) for any V*, if V'(b^) is a wff of SR and 0b^ contains an
atomic constituent of the form Tb^^c, Fb^c, or then
there is a wff w SD of the form Tac such that V (a)=V (b, )
,
tC
-.and
(vii) for any V*
,
if V* (b^) is a set of wffs of SR and ^b^ contains
an atomic constituent of the form Tab.
,
^ab,
,
or T^ab,
,
then
for every such constituent, V*(bp.)iSP,
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If n Is of the form <(Ex)0x.SD.F,V,l> then n directly dominates
the largest set of nodes of the form <(ib^,SD,F.V
,J>, where the members
Of the set satisfy conditions (i)-(vii) above.
If n is of the form <(Ex) then n directly dominates
the largest set of nodes of the form <f5h^,SD.T.V*
,j> or V
.m^
or <0bj^,ST),U,V',n>j where the members of the set satisfy conditions
(l)-(vii) above,
(Several sets may satisfy these conditions; ^ largest set is
to be the one with the lowest integers as last members of its members.)
SR5 Where V(a) is not a wff of SR or where V(a) is not a member
of SD or where V(b)'^D, nodes of the form <Tab ,SD,T,V,i>
,
<Tab ,SD,F,V,i>
,
<Tab,SD,U,V,i>, <Fab , SD ,T, V, {> , <^ab »SD,F,V,i>, <Fab ,SD ,U,V, i>,
<Uab,SD,T.V,i>, <Uab,SD,F.V,i>, and <Uab ,SD,U,V,1> dominate no other
nodes
,
VThere V(a) is a member of SD and V(b)CSD, a node of the form on
the left directly dominates a node or nodes of the form on the right;
<Tab.SD,T,V,i> <V^(a),b-a*,T,V,j>
<rab,SD,F,V,l> <V(a).b-a*,F.V,j>
<Tab,SD,TT,V,i> <V(a) ,b-a*,T,V,j>, <^(a) ,b-a*,F,V,k>
<Fab,SD,T,V,i> <V(a),b-a*.F,V,j>
<Fab,SD,F,V,i> </(a),b-a*,T,VJ>
<Fah,SD,U,V,i> <V(a) ,b-a*,T,V,j>, <V(a) ,b-a*,F/\k>
<Uab,SD,T,V,l> <V(a) ,b-a*,T,v j> <v(a) ,b-a*,F,v,k>
<Uab,SD,F,V,i> <V(a) ,b-a*,T,VJ> <V(a) ,b-a*,F,V,k>
<Uab,SD,U,V,i> dominates no other node.
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SR6 No node relationships except those specified hy SR1-SR5
are allov;ed in t,
A tree t is an acceptable semantic t ree under an internretat^ on
<n,v> 1£ and only If t Is a semantic tree under <D,V> and the topmost
node of t Is labelled a at some finite stage of Procedure 1 or Pro-
cedure 2 below:
Procedure 1. The topmost node n of t may receive a label in
th is way
;
A1 If n is of the form <PSai. ..a^,SD,T,V,i> label n a if
^V(aj^).
. ,V(a^)Xv(PjJ) and label n na if ^V(aj^.
. .
V(aj^)>^/(pn)
,
If n is of the form
. .a^,SD,F,V,i> then label n a if
, ,V(a^)>^V(p{^) and label n na if ^P(aj^)
. , . V(a^)Xv(P”)
,
If n is of the form ^^ai. . .a^ ,SD,U,v,i> then label n na.
If n is of the form <Tab.SD,F,V,i> or <Fab ,SD,T.V,1> or
<Uab,SD,F,V,i> and V(a) is not a wff of SR or V(b) is not a set of wffs
of SR then label n na.
If n has as first member a wff of the form Tab, Fab, or T’ab and
V(a) is a wff of SR which is not a member of the Semantic Domain of n
or V(b) is not a subset of the Semantic Domain of n, then n receives
no label.
If n is of the form <^,SD,U,V,i> or n is of the form <TIab,SD,U,V,
then label n na.
Next step: if n has received no label through application of
Al, consider each terminal node on a dominance path of length 2 from
n. Label each such node according to Al, Then use A2-Ab to label the
nodes v/hlch dominate the nodes just labelled. For each such dominating
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node m,
A2 If m Is of the fora <Tlp,SD,T,y,i> label t, a If sons node m
directly dominates Is labelled a. Label m na If both nodes ra directly
dominates are labelled n^.
If n is of the form <hp ,SD.F,V,i> label m a if the node m
directly dominates is labelled a_. Label ra na if the node m directly
dominates is labelled na.
If m is of the form <-p,SD,T,V, i> or <-p ,SD,F,V. i> or
<rp,SD,U,V,i> then label m _a if the node m directly dominates is labelled
£. Label m na if the node m directly dominates is labelled na.
A3 If m is of the form <(pVq) ,ST),T,V,i> and m directly dominates
a node labelled
_a, label m _a. If both nodes directly dominated by m
are labelled label m na.
If m is of the form ^(p''^q) ,SD,F,V,i^ and both nodes directly
dominated by m are labelled a, label m a. If either node directly
dominated by m is labelled r^, label m na
.
If ra is of the form ^(p'^q) ,SD, U ,V, i^ and both nodes directly
dominated by m with third member U are labelled £, or if one such
node with third member U and one such node v/ith third member F are
labelled _a, label m If one such node with third member T is labelled
_a, or if both such nodes with third member F are labelled a, or if both
such nodes with third member U are labelled label m na
.
AA If m is of the form ^(Fx)0x,SD,T,V,i^ then label m
^
if some
node directly dominated by m is labelled If all nodes directly
dominated by m are labelled label m na
.
If m is of the form ^(Fx)?ix,Sh,F,V,i^ and all nodes directly
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dominated by m are labelled a, label r, a. If some node directly
dominated by m is labelled na, label m
If m is of the form <(Ex) ^x.SD.U.V, i> and one node of each
pair of nodes directly dominated by m of the form <0b^^,SD.U,V»4>
and<0b^,SD,F,v;r> is labelled a and there is at least one such node
of the form <0b^,SD.U.v;s> labelled a. then label m a. If some such
node of the form <0bj^.SD,T,V
.p> is labelled a, or all such nodes of
the form<^bj^,SD,F,V» ,v> are labelled a (where
^
need not be the same
for each node), or some pair of such nodes of the form <?^b,^,sn,F,V ,c>
and <0b^^,SD,TT,v’ ,d> are labelled n£, label m i^.
A5 If m is of the form <Tab ,SD,T,V, or <Tab ,SD,F,V, i> or
<Fab,SD,T,V,i'> or <Fab,SD,F,V,i>, n is not terminal, and the node
directly dominated by m is labelled a, then label m a. If these con-
ditions hold and the node directly dominated by m is labelled na,
label m na
.
If m is of the form <Tab ,SD,tt, v, i> or ^F^b ,SD,U, V, i> or
^Uab ,SD,T,V,1^, m is not terminal, and both nodes directly dominated
by m are labelled n^, then label m If these conditions hold and
either node directly dominated by m is labelled a, label m
If m is of the form ^^ab ,5>n,F,V,i^, n is not terminal, and some
node directly dominated by m is labelled
_a, label m a. If these
conditions hold and both nodes directly dominated by m are labelled
na
,
label m na.
A6 Don’t label nodes in any other way.
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Next steps: If A2-A6 fail to produce a label for the topmost
node of t, label all terminal nodes on dominance paths of length one
greater than those just labelled in the previous step. Then label
upwards with A2-A5. If no label is produced for the topmost node of
t, repreat the process with nodes on dominance paths one greater in
length than the paths in the step just completed. Keep doing this.
(It may be that this procedure will involve an Infinite number of steps.)
Procedure 1 could x^ell fail to produce a label for the topmost
node of t. In such a case there is another procedure to apply:
Procedure 2. If Procedure 1 failed to label the topmost node of
t by labelling nodes at some finite length d from the topmost node of
t and labelling upwards, go through Procedure 1 again with the following
change
:
Any node of the form ^Jab ,SD,T,V,i> or <Tab ,SD,T!,V, i> or
^Fab ,SD,U,V,i^ which failed to receive a label at some finite stage in
Procedure 1 is labelled
_a and the nodes it dominates are not labelled
in any subsequent step.
Any node of the form <Tab ,SD,T, V,i> or ^ab ,SD,F,V,i)> or
<Fab,SD,T,V,i> or <Fab ,SD,F,V,i> or <Fab ,SD,F,V,i> which failed to
receive a label at some finite stage in Procedure 1 is labelled na
and the nodes it dominates are not labelled in any successive step.
Before specifying the semantics for SR by means of these
definitions, it is well to relate them to the Intuitions discussed
earlier. A semantic tree is a display of the wffs and assignments
to them which may be required in order to establish a semantic
assignment to the wff in the topmost node. Not all nodes of every
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semantic tree are necessary to establish a semantic assignment to
the topmost node, and not every interpretation agrees with the semantic
assignments to wffs in the terminal nodes of a semantic tree. To
determine whether a semantic tree is acceptable on a given inter-
pretation, two labelling processes are specified which check the
semantic assignments to terminal nodes against the interpretation.
In Procedure 1 wffs are checked for groundedness. If they are grounded
they are labelled and a label a shows that the interpretation guarantees
the semantic assignment to that node. If the label is na (for "not
acceptable") the interpretation guarantees that the wff does not
receive that semantic assignment. Nodes which are terminal because the
Semantic Domain has shrunk are not labelled (they are ungrounded and
cannot be used to establish truth value.) IThen a terminal node is
labelled, its labelling may permit the labelling of a node which
directly dominates it. All upward labelling of this sort is carried
out in a natural way. A semantic tree with topmost node labelled a
at some finite stage is an acceptable semantic tree, grounded in those
terminal nodes which contributed to the labelling of the topmost node.
Procedure 1 may fall to produce a label for the topmost node
of a semantic tree and if so. Procedure 2 is used. In Procedure 2
nodes which failed to receive a label through Procedtire 1 and which
have semantic wffs as first members are no^7 labelled and the nodes
below them are disregarded. A wff with first member of the form
Uab and third member T, for Instance, would be labelled
_a by the
second procedure, if the first procedure had left it unlabelled and
(therefore) established that it was ungrounded. A node with first
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member of the form Tab and third member T would be labelled by
Procedure 2 if Procedure 1 had left it unlabelled, since the first
procedure has demonstrated that Tab is ungrounded and that it cannot,
therefore, be true.
The Semantics of SR. If W is the set of wffs of SR, <D,V> is
en interpretation, and i is an integer,
if and only if there is an acceptable
derivation tree under ^D,V^ with topmost node of the form ) Tab ,w|T|v)i|.
,
(Uab.wiTlviii
*
where V(a) is w,
(Note: p if and only if q must be read here as '^('“(“jpvq)v '*’(-,qvp) ) ,
)
This semantics assigns each wff of SR a unique truth value
(or the value undetermined). The proof is as follows.
Lemma 1. Removing the topmost node n of a semantic tree labelled
by Procedure 1 does not alter the labels given by Procedure 1 to the
subtree(s) directly dominated by n.
Proof: Follows from inspection of Procedure 1. Labelling pro-
ceeds upward from terminal nodes. Removing the topmost node of a properly
labelled tree can have no effect on the labels of the nodes it dominates.
Lemma 2. There cannot be semantic trees t^^ and t^ such that
t;]L=t2 and the topmost nodes of t^^ and t 2 are labelled _a and na .
Proof: Follov/s immediately from Inspection of the labelling
procedure. Identical nodes receive the same labels.
Theorem 1: Of any three semantic trees with topmost nodes of the
follov;ing form, at most one is labelled a^ on an Interpretation ^,V^:
(l)<Tab,SD,T,V,i> (2) <Fab .SP.T.V. i> (3) <nab ,SD,T,V, i>
’false *\
w is true (
undetermined)
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Proof: It cannot be the case that the third node is labelled a
and one of the two others is labelled a. (If so the labelling pro-
cedure has labelled the tree directly dominated by the first or second
node a. But trees identical to this appear under the third node and
the labelling procedure would have labelled it a by Procedure 1 and
lemma 1. This would force the third node to be labelled by
Procedure 1.)
It remains to prove that there are no two acceptable trees with
topmost nodes of the form of (1) and (2). Assume not. -Then there
are acceptable trees tj^ and t
2 with topmost nodes of the form of (1)
and (2) which are labelled a at some finite stage of Procedure 1 or
Procedure 2. We show that this is impossible by giving a procedure
for tracing parallel paths downward on tj^ and t
2
such that the nodes
traced to on each path have identical first and second members and
different third members. The procedure is as follows (where a T-node,
F-node, or U-node is a node with T, F, or U as third member, respec-
tively.)
1 For a terminal node, stop tracing,
2 For a node with first member of the form
-^p, trace to the node
directly dominated.
For a T-node and an F-node v/ith first member of the form
-]p,
trace to an acceptable node directly dominated by the T-node (by A2
there is one) and trace to the similar node directly dominated by the
F-node. ('lo I^-node appears on one of the trees with a T-node or an
F-node on the other, for reasons advanced in the first paragraph of
this proof.)
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3 For a T-node and an F-node with first mombers of tho form p-,,.
trace to an acceptable node directly dominated by the T-node (there Is
one by A3) and trace to the similar node directly dominated by the
F-node,
For a T-node and a I!-node of this form, trace to an acceptable
node directly dominated by the T-node and trace to the similar node
directly dominated by the Tl-node.
For an F-node and a U-node of this form, trace to an acceptable
U-node directly dominated by the U-node (there Is one by A3) and trace
to the similar node directly dominated by the F-node.
4 For a T-node and F-node with first members of the form (Ex)?5x,
trace to an acceptable node directly dominated by the T-node and trace
to the similar node directly dominated by the F-node,
For a T-node and U-node of this form, some node directly dominated
by the T-node is acceptable by A4, Some node with the same first and
second members and F or U as third member directly dominated by the
U-node is acceptable. Trace to it.
For an F-node and a U-node of this form, trace to an acceptable
U-node directly dominated by the U-node (there is one, by A4.) Trace
to the similar node directly dominated by the F-node.
5 For T-nodes
,
F-nodes, and U-nodes with first member of the farm
Tab, Fab, ‘or Uab, a must name a wff of SR which is a member of the
Semantic Domain. Otherwise the nodes are terminal, but this cannot
occur because the labelling conditions allow no two terminal nodes
with identical first and second members and different third members to
be labelled a.
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If the nodes traced to are of these forms, trace to the nodes
directly dominated;
<Tab,SD.T,v,i> <Tah,Sr>,F,V,l>; <rab,SD,T.y,i> <Fab,Sn,r.v.l>
.
There are no pairs of nodes traced to of the form
<Tab,SD,T,V,i> <Tab,SD,U,V.i>; <Tab ,S0,F.V,i> <Tab,SB.U,V,
;
<Fab,SD,T,V,i> <Fab ,SD
,!!, v, i> ; <Fab ,SD,F,V, i> <Fab ,SD,U,V, i>
.
The reason is that the first member of each such pair must directly
dominate a semantic tree labelled
_a by Procedure 1. By A5 and SR5
the same semantic tree appears under the second member of each such
pair, with label na
. By Lemma 2 this cannot happen.
There cannot be a pair of nodes traced to of the form
^Uab ,SD,T,V,i')> and ^Pab ,SD ,F, V, i) since one of the two subtrees
directly dominated by the F-node is labelled a by A5. By A5 and SR5
the same subtree is labelled under the T-node. By Lemma 2, this
cannot happen.
The rules just given show how to trace a path from the topmost
nodes of and t2 do’^ward. The paths are such that the ith member
of each path has identical first and second members, a third member
different from that on the path on the other tree, and label a.
There are two cases to consider. Either the paths are of finite length
n or less and have a terminal node as last member, or they do not
terminate.--
The first case is ruled out by inspection of the acceptability
rules for terminal nodes. No t^;o such nodes will be labelled a on
the same Interpretation,
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The second case is ruled out because Procedures 1 and 2 terminate
at some finite stage in the labelling process, by assumption. The
labelling process labels upward from terminal nodes only. Since the
tracing procedure traces only to labelled nodes, it must terminate
before the nth stage is reached. (There are no labelled nodes at
lower stages to trace to).
The assumption that there are such trees tj^ and is false
and the theorem is proved.
Theorem 2: Every wff of SR is true, false, or undetermined.
Proof: Suppose not. Then there is a wff p with name a such
that Procedures 1 and 2 do not label any tree with topmost nodes of
these forms a:
(1) <raT7,W.T.V.l> (2) (FaW.W.'T’^v.i) (3) ^^aW.W.T. V. i>
Node (3) must be labelled by Procedure 1. (If It received no
labelling by Procedure 1. Procedure 2 would label it _a.) Pence one
of the two subtrees directly dominated by node (3) is labelled a by
Procedure 1. Rut this tree is Identical to that directly dominated
by node (1) or node (2). Hence node (1) or node (2) is labelled £ by
Procedure 1. which contradicts the assumption. The theorem is proved.
5. Interesting Features of the SR Semantics
In s-ectlon 3 it was demonstrated that the Liar sentence "This
sentence is false" is undetermined in SR. The Deferred Liar sentences
("aj^ is true" and "a
2
is false", where a^ names the first sentence and
a-^ names the second) are also undetermined, as the following semantic
tree for a^^ demonstrates:
(30)
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<Ta2W,W-a^*,T,V,2'> <Fa^W,W-aj^* ,T,V, o)>
The two terminal nodes are unlabelled by Procedure 1 since a^ names
a wff in a^*. Procedure 2 then labels the topmost node of (30) a.
The Strengthened Liar ("This sentence lacks truth value") is
undetermined in SR, as the following acceptable semantic tree demon-
strates (assume V(a^) is "Ua^^W")
:
<Ta^W,W-aj^*, T, V, 3> <Fa^W, W-a^^*, T,V, 12>
The labelling is carried out as it was for (30).
These results appear desirable. Now let us consider some x^hich
seem at first blush to be less so.
VJe cannot say of the three Liar X'/ffs have considered (the
Liar, the Referred Liar, and the Strengthened Liar) that it is true
that they are xmdetermined. To see this, let a^ name anv of these
sentences and let a<> name "Ua^^". TTien the relevant semantic trees
are these:
<Ua^W ,W-a
2 * ,
T
,
V
,
A> Ua^W
,
J-a
2 * ,
T
,
V
,
3>
etc. etc.
The topmost node of (32b) is not labelled by Procedure 1 and Pro-
cedure 2 labels it na
.
The topmost node of (32a) is similarly
unlabelled by Procedure 1 but Procedure 2 labels it _a. Thus, in the
SR semantics, "'The Liar is undetermined" is undetermined in truth
value. The appearance theory of truth, that where a names p, p
implies Ta— is not true of the SR semantics. This fact has a conse-
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quence which appears quite strange: the semantics Itself is unde-
(For simplicity, the logical equivalent for"'^(^p v-q) "is "p&q". The
node intermediate between n 2 and n 3 has been omitted. V’ (b^) is the
Liar and V'(b 2 ) is W-s*.)
Node n 3 is not labelled by Procedure 1 since the left-hand side
of each equivalence is not labelled by Procedure 1. TTence n-, and n^^
are unlabelled by Procedure 1 and n^ is labelled a by Procedure 2.
The semantics rules Itself undetermined.
That the theory is undetermined v/ould be a fatal consequence if
it were a Tarskian theory of truth, for according to the Tarskian
theory (as Kripke explains it in Kripke (1975)) we are entitled to
assert a sentence exactly in those circumstances in which it is true.
The semantics of SR is non-true and, according to a theory based on
Convention T, it should not be asserted.
Within a groundedness theory of truth, however, this consequence
termined! The relevant semantic tree is this (where s names the wff
1^2 (y) (Txy=TTxy&Fxy=FTxy&Uxy=lTTxy) ,VJ-s*, T,V,2>
”3 ^l^2^'^ib2&Fb^b2iFTb^b2&Ubj^b2=nTbj^b,,W-s*,T,V,3>
etc.
(that the theory is undetermined in truth value) is acceptable, for
to be true a sentence must be grounded by Procedure 1 in wffs which
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make it true. To be undetermined it must receive no truth value by
Procedure 1. The semantics does not receive a truth value by Procedure
1 because it discusses the semantic assignment to wffs which do not
themselves receive assignments by Procedure 1. Hence it is correct,
according to a groundedness theory
, that the semantics is undetermined.
However, one can (and ought to) assert the semantics for SR. In
fact, the semantics is a special case of a rule for introducing lines
of SR proofs:
(34) SR line introduction rule: If there is an acceptable semantic
tree with topmost node of the form <p,SD,T,V,l> and sd names
SD, then the follox^ing is an acceptable line of a SR proof:
sd p.
This rule allows one to assert the semantics over any Semantic Domain.
The relevant semantic trees will have topmost nodes of this form:
(35) <T(x)(y) (TxysTTxy&Fxy-^FTxy&Hxy^UTxy) ,W,T,V,j>
^2 <'^it>2=TTb^b2&Fb2^b2=FTb^b2&Hb^b^UTbj,bo,H,T,V’ ,k>
(one node is omitted as before, for simplicity.)
Consider no, the result of any instantiation to x and y. Each conjunct
of n
2
has on the left a wff which dominates a semantic tree of the
sort syntactically described by the wff on the right. Procedure 2
labels every node of the form of n2 (The reader may verify this
by writing the wffs out and working out the trees.) Thus n^ is
labelled
^
by Procedure 2 and the semantics is legitimately asserted.
It may appear that this rule leads to contradiction. T,et us
discuss this point with reference to the Fniversally Quantified Liar
("All sentences t^hich have the property of being the Universally
Quantified Liar are not true"). Let UQ be a predicate satisfied only
by the wff (x) (UQx-^'-TxH) and let u name this wff. Then the Ihiiversally
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Quantified Liar is vacuously true in SR. The relevant semantic tree
is this:
(36) n, <TuW,U,T,3>
I
1^2 ^(x) (T’Qx-.,'^xU) ,U-a*,T,2>
etc.
Every node directly dominated by n 2 is labelled a by Procedure 1 because
no allowable instantiation satisfies UO. Hence is labelled a.
One would think that the following contradiction was derivable
from this fact: (Let "(x)0x" abbreviate "-^(Ex)'-0x” in this discussion):
' (37) TuW (assumption)
(38) (x) (UQx'^*'TxW) (from 30 and Convention T)
r
(39) UQU'^'TuU (instantiation to u)
i (AO) UQu (definition of UQ)
I
(Al) (from (39) and (AO))
!
According to this proof, (37) contradicts (Al). However, proofs in
SR are not to be carried out with the unrestricted rules of Convention
^
T, In particular, these deduction rules are the counterparts of the
I
two Implications of Convention T:®
I
I (A2) a. Where V(y)cV(SD), SD Tay
ST) V(a)=p
I y-a* p
j
.
b. T>There V(a*)cV(SD) SD-a* p
I
SD~a* ^^(a)°p
I
SD TaSD
I
‘ The counterpart of the disappearance theory of truth is found in (A2a).
I
i In SR, when p is inferred the Semantic Domain is shrunk so that members
i
I
J
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of a* are removed from it. The SR version of the appearance theory
is found in (42b). In SR, if a names p and there is a semantic tree
with topmost node of the form <p ,SD-a*,T,V, £> which is labelled a
by Procedure 1, then we may conclude TaSP. (As we have seen, not
every semantic tree is labelled by Procedure 1. For those of the
correct form which are so labelled, (42b) allows the inference
allowed by the appearance theory.)
The fact that lines of proofs consist of the name of a Semantic
Domain as well as a wff requires a reformulation of the rules of
quantification. In particular, the rule of Universal Instantiation is
(43) I’Jhere 0a SD and a is a constant of SR, SD (x)0x
SD 0a
Now let us examine the reasoning in (37)-(41) as it would be
carried out in SR.
(44) W TuW (by line introduction)
(45) U-u* (x)(UQx4'^xW) (from (44) by (42a))
The instantiation to u cannot now be carried out, for the SR instantiation
rule allows no instantiation which creates a wff not in the Semantic
Domain. As we have seen, every allowable instantiation produces a
wff assertable over W-u*. Hence the contradiction does not arise.
It is worth considering what advantages are gained by accepting
the groundedness account of truth as opposed to Tarski's account.
There are four advantages which should be mentioned. First, the
groundedness theory eliminates the need for the cumbersome machinery
of language hierarchies—counterintuitive machinery whose appeal
is based solely on the need to avoid contradiction at any cost.
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Second, the grounded ness theory gives some content to the truth
predicate, whereas a theory based on Tonvention T does not. According
to the disappearance theory of truth, the truth predicate is dispensable,
having no more content than the sentence the predicate holds for.
Perhaps it is to be viewed as a syntactic variant of sentence assertion
which is to be employed in the interests of brevity or stylistic
variation. Surely there is more to truth than this.' In the grounded-
ness theory the truth predicate does have content. It asserts of
sentences over Semantic Domains that they are grounded. The notion
of the groundedness and of the Semantic Domain are content which is
not provided by a mere as^ions of sentences themselves. Third, the
semantics is formulable in the theory and is assertable in the theory.
This, I believe, is the strongest argument for it. The intuition
which prompted the investigation resulting in the SR semantics was
we talk about the semantics of English in English, and we are
entitled to do so
. In this respect, the SR semantics is preferable to
a semantics based on an obj ectlanguage-metalanguage distinction.
Fourth, everything which could be said in the Tarski language hier-
archies can be said in SR, and all inference and truth values which
held in the Tarski language hierarchies under Convention T hold for
the SR translations of the language hierarchy wffs as well, (The
proof of this statement is highly formal and not directly relevant
to Bhartrhari’s work. It is found in the Appendix.)
The SR semantics uses the great insight of Tarski— that discourse
about truth requires restrictions on the sentences talked about—
without the drawbacks of Tarski’s Solution, Furthermore, it provides
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a franework in which to formalize the theories of Bhartrhari as he
intended them to be formulated. For these reasons it has been
specified here in some detail,
6. The Compatibility of the V^yapadTva
and the SR Semantics
The SR semantics is not intended to be a formal representation
of a theory of truth which Bhartrhari held. Rather, it is a system
within which Bhartrhari ’s theories may be presented as he intended
them to be, given what later investigation has determined about the
dangers of semantic discourse. Let us consider some respects in which
the SR semantics and the VakyapadTya are related.
Discussion of Liar Paradoxes. Bhartrhari gives an example which
appears to be an instance of the Universally Quantified Liar in this
passage
;
(A6) The sentence 'all that I am saying is v^rong' is not literally
meant. If what it says is wrong, the point in question would
not be conveyed, (VP III 3.25, Iyer)
In order to be a Liar sentence, the sentence discussed in (46) must
satisfy two conditions. It must be the case that the other things
the speaker has said are indeed false, and it must be the case that
the sentence itself is one of the sentences under consideration.
Bhartrhari 's remarks imply that the sentence does not imply quantifica-
tion over itself. Pragmatically, we must remove it from the domain of
the discourse because if we do not an unintended result will arise.
Bhartrhari does not say what that result is; if he had, we might have
had a discussion of Liar phenomena in the I'akyaparfiya.
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There Is no other text I find which discusses liarlike phenomena.
Thus, while the solution to the paradoxes has no textual base in the
^yapadiya^ there is also no passage which weighs against it.
Truth Value Gaps. When discussing sentences in the informal
way, Rhartrhari sometimes used the definition of the irimamsakas, referr-
ing to fitness as a feature which might be taken into consideration
in evaluating a sentence. As we have seen in Chapter I, some philo-
sophers of the West have treated sequences of words which have expec-
tancy satisfied but which lack fitness as sentences without truth
value. By ascribing this theory to Bhartrhari, one might then argue
that the step to assigning no truth value to ungrounded sentences is a
small one. However, there is no discussion of semantics truth value
gapping in the V^yapadiya
.
and I am not sympathetic to the argument
that sentences which lack fitness lack truth value. So I have no basis
for using such a theory as a representation of Bhartrhari’s thought.
On the other hand, there seems to be no text which militates against
using truth value gaps in this way either.
The Use of Metalanguages, As Tarski's Solution dominates
Western semantics at present, it is reasonable that researchers
attempting to reinterpret the philosophers they are studying should
search for evidence that his theory was foreshadowed in the work of
the Indian philosophers. This line of investigation has been pushed
furthest by Hartmut Scharfe in Scharfe (1971), a work entitled
Panini's ^Metalanguage. Scharfe describes the purpose of the book in
the following way:
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Tfie following pages arc intended as a grammar of the meta-language used in PTInini’s grammar, the AgtiadhyTTyT
. . . . It is
evident at first sight that the metalanguage has been modelled
after the object language (Sanskrit); even in its perfected
state it has not severed all ties with the object language
(p. 5)
What Scharfe fails to do in the hook is to svipport his claim that
Panlnl's language wa s_ a metalanguage for Sanskrit. In fact his work
shows more or less clearly that what he calls a metalanguage for
Sanskrit is really an abbreviated version of Sanskrit which is
adequate tc discuss its own syntax. This point is touched on by
Scharfe himself;
(48) There are some rules, in which Panini avoids the ’shorthand'
expression of the metalanguage and describes the facts Instead
in the manner of the object language. (p. 46)
As we have seen earlier, for one language to be a metalanguage
for a second according to Tarski (the originator of the term) it must
contain a name of every expression of the second and it must contain
a truth-predicate. There is no indication that the language P^Tnlni
used to state his grammatical rules contained a truth predicate. In
fact, Mlsra in Misra (1966) quotes Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures
approvingly; "I think that we are forced to conclude that grammar is
I
autonomous and independent of meaning..." and goes on to say
(49) PSnlni Intuitlonally
,
without the modern equipment of
mathematical modelling, evolved a system of description which
(1) is independent of consideration of meaning as a factor
in description of forms... (p. Ill)
Thus there seems to be no evidence that PTTnini was using a
metalanguage in his A^^adhyliyT and, if Scharfe is right in the passage
quoted, what he is doing is employing "shorthand" for ordinary
Sanskrit expressions in order to compress the rules he gives.
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To say that Panini is using Sanskrit "shorthand" as his language
is to say that Sanskrit has in it abbreviation operators such as "In
this work I use X to stand for Y." Such operators cast a spell over
the book so that in the book, before doing the semantics of a string
of words, we must disenchant them. That is, we must substitute Y
for X before going ahead with a standard semantics for Sanskrit.
The fact that such operators yield standard Sanskrit sentences when
disenchanted shows that their use does not put us in a language different
from Sanskrit. The fact that their use is restricted to particular
domains (such as "this work") may have led Indian philosophers to say
that Sanskrit is a permanent, uncreated language xjhereas the language
of the Grammarians is nonpermanent and is created by men (Scharfe,
p. 2). (This view is not one which Bhartrhari held). . These philosophers
(and Scharfe) are mistaken in thinking that another language is em-
ployed by the Grammarians, but their point is understandable all the
same. It looks as though entirely new symbols and syntax are being
used in the enchanted sentences. Caught in the spell, one is apt to
think one is using a new language.
belief is that the formal languages in which modem researchers
do semantics (the language of the formalism in section 3, for example)
is the result of a similar convention. T-Jhen we have it told us in
logic classes that a sentence of the form
"pv<l** is true if and only if
at least one of p and q are true, what we are learning is a shorthand
device for representing ordinary English. The instructor is saying,
"When you see sentences of this form written by logicians, what they
mean is ..." Such statements throw an abbreviational spell over
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logic books such that, were the spell to be broken, the sentences of
the formal languages” would appear in their true guise: sentences
of ordinary English. All this is possible given the SR semantics,
but not given a Tarskian view. Furthermore, it seems to me to be a
correct description of the way I learned formal languages and the way
I think about and in them. According to the theory of formal language
learning just advocated, there is some mystery about the way we learn
ordinary English but, given that we have learned it, there is no
longer any mystery about the way we learn the languages of logic (or
Paninian syntax)
.
J.F. Staal, in an investigation of the use of metalanguage
apparatus by the Indian philosophers, is more circumspect than Scharfe.
He writes in Staal (1975):
(50) If there is a parallel between Indian and Western concepts, it
is certainly not very apparent. The notion of 'metalanguage’
occurs in \!estern logic almost always in the context of the
analysis of truth, and refers in general to formalized lan-
guages .... But the notion of truth, despite its importance in
Indian civilization from the Vedas onward, has never played a
very explicit role in Indian logic or linguistics, and fully
formalized languages or fragments of such languages do not
occur in Indian culture outside the areas of mathematics,
astronomy and grammar. (pp. 315-316)
The formalized languages of grammar do not seem to be metalanguages
in the Tarskian sense. The same seems to hold for the other cases,
in which the formalism involves abbreviatory devices for numbers and
formulae. In order to discuss parallels between the Indian and
Eastern use of formalized fragments of language, Staal uses a v;eaker
characterization of the metalanguage relation than that Tarski used:
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(51) An object-languat;e is a language consisting of expressions
which refer to non-linguistic objects.... A metalanguage is a
language consisting of expressions which refer to the expres-
sions of an obj ect— Ian guage
. . .
. The notion of metalanguage
may be related to other notions, e.g., ’artificial language'
or 'technical language’. (pp. 316-317)
In this article (called "The Concept of Metalanguage and its Indian
Background") Staal discusses the phenomena noted by Scharfe and others
using the definition of metalanguage given in (51). It is interesting
to note that he finds no uses which fall under the Tarsklan character-
ization of the metalanguage relation. For our purposes, then, I
take it that there is no need to use the metalanguage apparatus of
Tarski in representing the theories of Bhartrhari. ^-Thile the Indian
philosophers used notation which metalanguages must use (names for
syntactic expressions and translations of longer expressions) they
did not do any work explicitly using metalanguages in the Tarsklan
sense. The articles which have been quoted are the result of a
metamania induced by Western reliance on Tarsklan solutions to
Tarski’s Proof. This is, in my view, an aberration of our times
I
which is better disposed of than encouraged.
A Correspondence Semantics. The SR semantics assigns truth values
depending on the way the sentence under consideration corresponds to
the interpretation. If we think of the interpretation as a repre-
sentation of the world, then we may say (as it is often said) that '
the semantics is a way of relating our language to the world.
Something IJ this notion is found in the following passages
of the ^/SkyapadTya;
(51) In verbal usage, there is another Being, a secondary one,
which presents the real nature of things in all circum-
stances (VP III 3.39, Iyer)
1A4
Helaraja’s coninentary on this verse is summarized by Iyer in this way:
(52) Such a Being consists in their figuring in the mind. It is
called aupacariki
.
to distinguish it from Being outside the
mind, in the external world, (Iyer, p, 98)
Later on in this section, Bhartrhari writes:
(53) No meaning of a word can go beyond this secondary Being....
which is the cause of the use of all words.
(VP III 3.49 Iyer)
Iyer’s summary of Helaraja’s commentary on this passage reads:
(54) Thus, all words move in the realm of this secondary Being..,.
When we use the x-;ord ’asti' U-t exist^ in regard to a thing,
what we are doing is to say that it has outside reality in
addition to having secondary Being. Even external Being
becomes capable of being expressed by words only when it is
grasped by the mind. (Iyer, p. 105)
Bhartrhari goes on,
(55) Verbal communication relates only to a part of an aspect of
reality or to the determination by means of an external factor
or to a reversal of reality or to an absence of it,
('H> III 3.52, Iyer)
In these passages is found the following features of a correspondence
semantics: the way we describe things need not be the way they really
are; the way we use words may not result in true sentences— it is the
link between speech and the outside world which determines whether or
not we have spoken truly; we have the apparatus for describing rela-
tions between our speech and reality (it seems that a free logic may
;
be being used here, in that Bhartrhari and Helar'aja seem to allow
for the "mental" existence of nonexistent objects); we determine
whether or not we have spoken truly by determining whether or not the
relation or aspect of reality we have spoken of obtains as we have
said.
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The Changing Nature of Sentences fron Node to Node. In the
SR seraantics the assignment to a wff may change depending on the
Semantic Domain over which it is being evaluated. Since the Semantic
Domain may change as one goes down a tree, at different nodes on the
same tree a sentence may have different semantic assignments. One
way to describe this feature of the semantics is to say that a sen-
tence may change in meaning during the evaluation process~or, vie^^ed
from the standpoint of other sentences, it may alter in character.
Bhartrhari says something parallel to this in the following passage:
(56) When knowledge in the form of doubt has assumed the form
of ^e?a (meant for something else)
,
it cannot become the
object of another doubt without losing its original form.
(VP III 3. 23, Iyer)
(57) VThat is expressive cannot at the same time be the expressed.
What conveys something else cannot at the same time be conveyed
by something else, (VP III 3.26, Iyer)
In (56)
,
Bhartrhari suggests that the character of a statement may
change when it is the object of another statement. In (57) he
suggests that being expressed by another expression may be the same
sort of situation. This feature of his system is compatible with
the SR feature that a sentence may express a second sentence which, in
turn, expresses the first with a different Semantic Domain, 'Hie
first has lost its original character as meta on the second and has
become the*- object of a sentence which, at that node, is meta on it.
How the SP Semantics is Introduced into the Fragment, ”^0 add
the SR semantics to the fragment, we make the following additions
to the lexicon. To the constants add pj^, P 2 » ••• intended as names
for sentences of the fragment. To the adjectives (category CN/CN)
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which already include anithy-g ('true'), mithy? ('false'), and unda
('undetermined'), add satyavTk?a
.
mithy?vrksa
. and undavyk^a ('has an
acceptable semantic tree with x, W, T (or F or U respectively) and V
as first four members', where x is the argument of the adjective). It
should be noted that these adjectives are my own invention entirely,
except for mi thy
a
. Generally, satya seems to be used when "true"
would be used in English, but it is also used to mean "real", and I
have used it that way in the fragment. Finally, una is added to
the category of sentence modifiers. (una is the negation whose
translation is "“V*“-a8ain my own invention.)
Then, where p iff q means una p va g ca una q va p . the semantics
for the fragment may be expressed in the fragment as follows:
(58) sarvara vakyam satyam ^kyam iff satyavrk^am v^yam tad
sarvam ca vakyam mi thyam ^Takyam iff mithy'avrksam vakyam tad
sarvam ca v'akyam undam v'akyam iff undavrksam vakyam tad.
We may read (58) as "Every sentence is a true sentence iff it is a
truth-treed sentence and every sentence is a false sentence iff it
is a false-treed sentence and every sentence is an undetermined
sentence iff it is an undetermined-treed sentence." I assume that
the pragmatic factors discussed in Chapter I x;ill rule this the most
preferred of the possible readings of (58).
The mechanism for describing the syntactic predicates on which
the semanC-ics is based is not found in the fragment, because it would
involve too much expansion of the fragment to too little end to add
the logical machinery needed. However, the intended interpretation
of the predicates is that given in the previous sections of this chap-
ter, and it should be clear how the fragment might be enlarged to
include such a specification, were the project to be undertaken.
FOOTOOTES
1 In developing the semantics described in this chapter I have
relied a great deal on the comments, suggestions, and instruction of
Terence Parsons. Helpful comments on earlier versions of the semantics
for SR (usually in the form of telling counterexamples) were provided
by Earl Conee, Edmund Gettier, Alan McMichael, Terence Parsons, James
Waldo, and Rick Wiley.
2 Tarski's Proof, Convention T, and a discussion of their
implications are found in Tarski's "The Concept of Truth in Formalized
Languages," p. 15S of Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics
,
Oxford Press,
1956.
3 This position has striking similarities to the Third Man
Argument in Plato's Dialogues.
A For an exposition of an alternate formulation of the Kripke [
paper and a simpler version of the tree symbolism which is used in
the SR semantics, the reader is referred to Davis (forthcoming),
to be published in the Journal of Philosophical Logic .
5 Throughout the upcoming discussion I use SLS predicates
which are assumed to be another way of writing SR predicates in
standard SR form. Although "Rama" is not a constant of the SR
specifications, for example, it is understood that it is another
way of writing "a^", for some integer i.
147
148
6 It is assumed for simplicity that identity is a predicate
which satisfies the usual axioms. Henceforth it is written as
rather than in its standard SR form.
/
7 The negation operator makes a true sentence false, a
false sentence true, and an undetermined sentence true. This is in
contrast to the negation operator 'V, which makes a true sentence
false, a false sentence true, and an undetermined sentence undeter-
mined.
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I have not completed the development of a set of rules of
Inference for SR. The idea is straightforward enough, hut as always
there are tricky details to keep watch on.
It is a straightforward matter to show that there is no acceptable
semantic tree with topmost node of the form SD,T, V, i^ . Proofs
of the consistency of rules of inference need only show, then, that
if there are acceptable semantic trees for the premises, there is an
acceptable semantic tree for the conclusion. In most cases this is
i
a simple matter, but the exceptions are not yet worked out.
CHAPTER V
GRAMMAR AND BRAHMAN
In the preceding chapters we have Investigated Rhartrhari's
«
theory of words, a theory which was insightful but which was regarded
by him as of less value than his theory of sentences. The theory
of sentences was insightful, but it too was ultimately regarded by
him as of less value than a third theory according to which sen-
tences do not exist. A study of Bhartrhari's work which fails to
discuss this theory must distort his position to a great degree, for
it is a continually recurring theme in the VakyapadTya that Grammar
leads one toward salvation and that, having done so, it is dis-
pensible.
These ideas are treated most fully in VgkyapadTya
,
Book III,
sections 1-4, where Bhartrhari discusses the relation between grammar
and Brahman, the ultimate reality in the Vedic tradition. In the
process of the discussion a good many things are said which are
puzzling to the careful reader. Some of them (that Brahman cannot be
expressed, for example) appear contradictory and some of them (that-
study of Grammar leads one to salvation, for example) seem bizarre.
In this chapter an interpretation of Book III is developed in which
one may read Bhartrhari's remarks in a consistent way. The formalism
of the preceding chapters is used in developing this interpretation.
Each section of the chapter concerns one puzzling point, together
with an interpretation which renders it unproblematic.
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It is not my intention in what follows to present a theory which
I believe is true. (Indeed, I do not know whether the theory of
Advaita Vedanta is true; moreover, as I interpret it, there is doubt
whether any way of formulating it is correct.) Instead my intention
is to show how the system may plausibly be interpreted so that it
does not fall to the obvious objections and so that what appear to
be problematic passages make sense.
1. Assertions Abotit Brahman
Consider these passages from the V^yapadTya and Helaraja's
commentary on it;
(1) That one Reality is seen as the word, the meaning and their
relation. 1 (\T III 2.14 Iyer)
(2) Brahman... is the highest universal (W III 1.33, Helar'Sja
as summarized by Iyer)
(3) The Reality... is beyond all assertions ... .Thus it is not
possible to make any positive assertions about the Reality.^
C^rP III 2.12, Helaraja as summarized by Iyer)
In (1) is found the Vedic doctrine that Brahman is the only thing
which is real. In (2) it is asserted that this Reality is the
highest universal. In (3) it is denied that assertions may be made
of it. How are we to reconcile (3) with the assertions made about
Brahman in (1) and (2)?
This point is not explicitly addressed in the \^kyapadiya
or its commentaries, hut there are several passages which bear on
it indirectly. For example;
(4) Remaining on the path of Unreality one strives after Reality.
(V? II 238, Pillai)
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Sometimes passages of this nature are interpreted to mean that all
language is useless, or that contradiction is a part of the unreal
world in which we find ourselves and cannot be avoided. Combined with
(3), they are sometimes taken to mean that discourse is useless and
that Reality must be sought without thought. To render Bhartrhari's
position in this way x-7ould be to do it a great injustice. If
Bhartrhari is interpreted as one who blithely espouses contradictions
in order to provoke the cessation of thought, he is made out to be
a poor philosopher, and he was not that. A better reading of such
passages follows.
There is reference in (A) to a path one follows through T^nreality,
In considering the nature of this path it seems clear that (1) and (2)
describe one's position at a different stage of it than that described
by (3), As we shall see, Bhartrhari v/as a proponent of a system of
personal development called vagyoga (speech-yoga). Although very
little is now known about this system, according to Iyer it involved
stages of progress analogous to three stages of speech described in
Book III of the \^kyapadiya ;
(5) ...some kind of Yoga practice for the attainment of Brahman-
sabdatattva is an Integral part of the philosophy of Bhartp-
hari who. .. thought of the process as a kind of ascent from
the differentiated to the totally undifferentiated.
(Iyer (1969)
,
p, 142)
In Qj/.der to. interpret the passages which we consider in this
chapter, it is necessary to postulate three stages of this path.
At the first stage one holds what might be called the common-
sense metaphysical position. To hold such a position is to believe
that there are entities in the world—cows, pots, people, etc.—and
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that sentences are true or false depending on whether they describe
these entities correctly. One Interpretation of language based on
the common-sense position might be that the sentence I^raas dh'Svati
*!Cama runs' of SLS is true if and only if the entity named by 'Ramas'
is running. As we shall see, Bhartrhari thinks that such interpreta-
tions may be of two types. They have one important feature in common,
however. On the common-sense position in either version the adjective
satya 'real' holds of many men, women, cox'^s, pots, etc,
Bhartrhari 's view xjas that the common—sense position is that of
the philosophically unsophisticated Individual, It is not the position
of one v;ho has studied the Vedic treatises on the true nature of
Reality, for their subject is Brahman, often described (as in (1))
as the only real thing. Let us consider the meaning of the proper
name Brahman as 'Brahman' in the 'TP category of ST.S, It seems that its
meaning cannot be fixed for a language learner by ostension, for
according to the Vedas Brahman may not be perceived. Perhaps it would
be introduced by definite description in this way;
(6) Brahmanas satyas bhavln 'Brahman is the unique real being'
Suppose the noun specifier in (6) to be pragmatically determined as
the definite description specifier, as in the translation of (6),
Then no true positive assertions about Brahman may be made since,
\i7here P is a predicate asserted of Brahman, the translation of
the assertion will be of the form
(7) (Ex) ((y) (satya(yHx=y)&Px)
Mo assertion of this form will be true on a common-sense Interpretation
because according to the common-sense position there is no unique real
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entity. (More complicated positive assertions will fall to the same
each constituent discusses the nature of
Brahman.) This I take to be the explication of (3), that Reality
is beyond all positive assertions—no positive assertion about Brah-
man is true.
Consider another metaphysical position, that held by someone
who has undergone experiences which have convinced him or her of the
follovring theses: (1) there exists an entity which alone is real,
(2) the other entities named in ordinary speech are not real, and
(3) the entity which is real may not be thought about in the way in
which pots, cows, and people are thought about (we are not aware of
thinking about it, nor are we conscious of it when we are thinking
about it). These are beliefs of one school of Advaita Vedanta,
beliefs which it appears Bhartrhari held.
Let us represent the common-sense position by all the sentences
of the SLS fragment which are true on the common-sense interpretation.
Examples are
(8) a, na narasimhas bhavin satyas 'it is not the case that a
nan-lion is a real entity'
b, na Brahman bhavin satyas 'it is not the case that Brahman
is a real entity'
c. R5mas naras 'Rama is a man'
Let us call the second theory the AV theory, A proponent of
the AV theory would interpret the fragment just as the common-sense
theorist did, with one difference; the predicate satya 'real'
will hold only of Brahman on an AV Interpretation. In the AV version
of the fragment, those sentences not containing the words satya
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or Brahman will have the same truth values as in the common-sense
theory. Only sentences containing satya or Brahman may differ in
truth value. For example, according to the AV interpretation,
(9) na brahmanas bhavin satyas ’it is not the case that Brahman
is a real entity’
is a false sentence, whereas it was true on the common-sense inter-
pretation.
There are no contradictions in (l)-(3) when we view (1) and (2)
as proposed truths of the AV theory and (3) as a statement about the
common-sense theory. So viewed, (3) should be read
(3’) ^according to the common-sense theory^ reality is beyond
all assertions...
\-7hat appears to be a difficulty about all language is, according to
the interpretation I am advancing, a theory about properties of inter-
pretations of Sanskrit.
I believe the following passage suggests that the interpretation
just advanced is on the right track:
(10) Similarly, when forms such as earth disappear, primordial
substance, that is Brahman, remains. For this, the authority
is the written tradition. It would not he right to say that
all this universe proceeds from something which is non-existent
and inexpressible
.
(VP III 2.15, ^!elar*aja’s commentary as
rendered by Iyer. Italics mine.')
In the context of the written tradition—the Vedas—Helaraja is willing
to say that assertions nay be made about Brahman. This passage comes
two pages after the commentary in which Helaraja asserts (3). There
the context is discussion of Brahman when one is concerned with the
world of appearances— the world of the common-sense theory.
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2« Are Monistic Positions Inconsistent?
There is a third stage on the path of vagyoga which is sometimes
described as that of attaining Brahman, It consists of an experience
which is characterized as lacking form or content, but which is
valued above all others by people in the Vedantic tradition. The
position one holds at this, the final stage of the process of
achieving salvation, is described by Bhartrhari and Helar"aja as Monism,
the view that there is only one thing. (This may not be the best
description of it, for reasons to be detailed in section 5, but it
will do for now)
,
One difficulty with monistic positions is that it does not seem
that they can be consistently expressed. To express any position is to
use language— that is, to use a word or words whose meaning is what
the position is. In this use of language we must have at least tv70
things—words and meanings—as well as a person who is expressing the
theory. Consequently to express a monistic position seems to be to
give the grounds for denying it.
There are several solutions to this difficulty which do not
render Bhartrhari’s position accurately. One is to resolve the diffi-
culty by arguing that sentences about cow, pots, and people which
are true on the AV interpretation are true in the v;ay sentences in
novels and plays are true of their characters— that is, they are not
actually true, but we may speak as if they were in order to amuse
or instruct ourselves. The difficulty with this solution is that the
monistic position ought to be actually tru^ if it is to be adequately
rendered, and cn this solution even talk about Brahman will not be
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really true. At best it will be true in a fictional sense, but this
is not good enough. Bhartrhari's theory was that the third stage of
the process described earlier was the highest, and yielded the ultimate
insight. It will not do to interpret it as a fictional insight.
Another unacceptable solution is to argue that the Monism which
Bhartrhari held is not properly described by saying that there is
only one thing. Rather, it is the theory that there is only one
ultimately real thing. This viev: is compatible with an expression
of it, if one's vi.ew is (as is the AV view) that only Brahman is
ultimately real. According to this position there are unreal entities
—
mirages and things in dreams and stories—and there are real entities
—
the people, cows, pots, etc, which exist—and there is one ultimately
real entity—Brahman, We may talk about all these things.
This theory is the parinamav^da theory, one of the classical
versions of Vedanta, According to the p^inamav'adins the things in
the universe which we perceive and discuss are transformations of
Brahman--real transformations, although less real than Brahman, They
are real enough, for example, to be members of a universe of discourse
or to be used as referents of philosophical terms, although they are not
real enough to explain the existence of all the things which we find
in the world.
The parin"amavada theory is often contrasted with the vlvartav’ada
theory of Advaita ^^edmta, according to x^hich the things we perceive
and talk about, as well as the perceivers and talkers, are not real.
Only Brahman is real, according to the vlvartavada theory,
Iyer notes that it is not clear whether Bhartrhari was aware of
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the distinction between these two theories, nor is there agreement
among his commentators concerning which one he held. M. Biardeau
in Biardeau (1964), p, 10, notes that there is no text in the
Vakyapadlya stating directly that the things in the universe are
unreal. On the other hand, Helaraja and the jndian commentators
in his tradition tend to the interpretation of Bhartrhari as a
vivartavadin
,
as does Iyer, (For a discussion of the points of
scholarship involved, the reader is referred to Iyer (1969), pp. 16-22
and pp, 128-135,) IJhat is striking about this discussion is that
Iyer admits that no passage in the I’^yanadiya directly resolves matters,
and he is forced to use some complicated inferences from terminology
in other texts in order to support the vivartavada interpretation.
It is curious that this should be so, for there is strong philosophical
evidence that Bhartrhari held the vivartavada position, evidence which
is clear to a critical student of the monistic position, although it is
not evidence of the sort which a scholar like Iyer is used to seeking out
and it is not evidence which someone steeped in the monism of Sankara
is liable to notice (Sankara seems to talk in the way I have labelled
"second stage" or "AV" but seems to express third-stage positions with
the second-stage sentences. If one accepts this way of talking as
legitimate (and non-contradictory) then one will not believe that the
point about- to be made is of value,)
Formally, to interpret Bhartrhari as a paripam.avadin would not
be difficult. The word satya ’real' would be interpreted in such a
way that when modified by an adjective meaning 'ultimately', its
extens ion would be only Brahman,
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version of ttie VedSuta school of philosophy has been held
by many Indian thinkers, but it is clearly not the position Bhartrhari
held, for the follot<7ing reason. The theory is straightforwardly
expressible in the fragment of SLS Interpreted in the way just des-
cribed, The only problems one enounters concern making sense of
the word "ultimately". According to Bhartrhari, on the other hand,
there are deep difficulties in expressing the truth about the third
stage of vagyoga
.
For example,
(11) That vision of the sages which is based on Peality cannot
be put to ordinary use; their vision is not linked with
words, (VP II 13Q, Filial)
(12) ,,,the true knowledge which is indescribable is pointed out
as having grammar as its means of realisation,
(VP II 2 3't, Pillai)
I see no difficulty in linking the parin*amav"ada vision v;ith v;ords
,
nor can I ascertain any reason, on the parinamavada view, why the
true knowledge should be indescribable; there are, however, such
difficulties on the vivartavadin view,
I take it, then, that Bhartrhari is correctly interpreted as a
vivartavadin. Given such an interpretation, however, we are left
with the problem that the theory cannot be consistently asserted,
A better solution to this difficulty is the follc«>;ing.
For many Western philosophers it is standard working procedure to
attempt a-fair formulation of a position under consideration and then
use that formulation as a basis for deductions of its consequences.
If the system turns out to have contradictory consequences, as the
monistic position does, this is regarded as a sufficient condition
for rejecting it, I want to argue against such rejection that this
is not a sufficient condition for rejecting a position.
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Consider the sentence *'X never communicates", taken to be true
of a person X. If X were to express this sentence, it would be false.
In fact, the sentence expresses a position which X cannot consistently
express. This does not mean that X cannot consistently hold the position
expressed by the sentence, for there is no inconsistency in X's
believing or entertaining the proposition expressed by it as often
as X likes.
The monistic position is similar to this one in the respect
that, while it cannot be consistently expressed by one who holds it,
it can be consistently held. (Or at least, a position much like it
can be consistently held. See the remarks in section 5). Let us
follow Bhartrhari as I have interpreted him in identifying the (folding
of positions vrith the undergoing of flashes of insight. Then, on
Bhartrhari 's theory, to express a position p is to give a sentence
which has p as its meaning. To hold a position p is to experience the
flash of insight p, (Perhaps to keep on holding it the conditions
are less stringent, but this seems to be the way one begins to hold
the position,)
This distinction is important in discussion of the problem of
monistic inconsistency because we see that, as in the description of
x's non-coramunicativeness
,
a monistic position may not be consistently
expressed *by one who holds it. It may, however, be consistently
held. The way in which one holds it is, by Bhartrhari 's account,
to experience Brahman— an experience which he describes as
\
follows
;
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(13) Purity of knowledge consists in its embracing all objects
and not having (sense-contact as its) basis. \^en no form
of objects figures in it, purity, some say, reaches a still
higher stage. (VP III 3.56, Iyer)
Ilelaraja comments on this verse,
(14) In Cthe knowledge of the omniscient * si finished form, it
is pure Consciousness like the sea without the slightest
ripple on its surface. It is the supreme Brahman.
(Iyer's summary).
The highest state of vagyoga
,
the state of pure consciousness in which
there is no form or differentiation, is described in (13) and (14).
It is compatible with the account of this state offered in these
passages that one in it would not be able to describe it. The state
is one in which there is nothing to describe, nor is there anyone
apparent to do the describing. A well-known Vedic verse describes
this state in the following way:
(15) For where there is a duality (dvaita) as it were, there one
sees another ;... there one understands another. 'There,
verily, everything has become just one's own self, then
whereby and whom would one smell? ... then whereby and whom
would one understand? Lo, whereby would one understand the
understander? (BrhadSranyaka ^Tpanisad, II.iv.l4, ^ume)
As in (11) this state is a vision which would not be linked with words
for the one who has it. As in (12) it is a state which would be
indescribable by the person who knew it. In this interpretation
lies the explanation of what is sometimes called "The Paradox of
its inscrutability":
(16) It is conceived of by him by whom It is not conceived of.
He by whom It is conceived of, kncn-rs It not.
It is not understood by those who say they understand It.
It is understood by those who say they understand It not.
^
(Kena Upanisad, 11,3, Hume)
^ There is no paradox in describing this state, as long as one
4
allov/s the distinction between holding a position and describing it.
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3. Contradictory Assertions about Brahman
Bhartrhari wrote one verse which contains a series of contra-
dictory statments:
(16a) It does not exist and it does; it is one and it is many;
it is connected and it is separated; it is transformed and
it is not. 01? Ill 2.13, Iyer)
There is really no need for me to Interpret this passage so that it
appears consistent, for Helaraja has done just that. I mention it
only because there is a V7idespread belief among Western philosophers
that many Indian philosophers openly espoused contradictions, or
tacitly believed that the world is a contradictory place. To my kncn-;-
ledge, this belief is not founded on fact, although passages like
(16a) certainly seem to support it, Iyer's summary of Helar'aja's
commentary on this passage is as follows:
(16b) And yet it is Brahman which appears as everything else.
It appears as positive entities and as negative entities. It
appears as one and as many (as one in the case of universals
and as many in the case of the individuals.) It appears as
associated with things and as separated from them. It
appears as transformed and as not transformed. (Iyer)
In interpreting (16a) a pragmatic factor allows us to derive a sen-
tence meaning from (16a) which is different from the primary meaning
of (16a), It is more accurate (hut less dramatic) to phrase the
thought expressed in (16a) in this wa\ :
(16c) Some appearances of it exist and some don't; some appearances
of it arc single and some many; some appearances of it are
transformed and some are not.
Read in this way, there is no intended contradiction in (16a) and no
contradiction is intended to be read from it.
4, T-Thy Hold the Position?
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If the position one holds at the third stage of Bhartrhari’s
is one which cannot he consistently expressed, what possible
reason would a person have to adopt it? Descriptions of it carry
inside themselves the seeds of their refutation, being entities differ-
ent from their hearers and, therefore, parts of a plural world.
Although the monistic position may be formulated by someone who does
not hold it, there is no way to present a form.ulation of it to a
person in such a way that the person (holding a common-sense interpreta-
tion of language) could consistently accept it. This fact seems to
constitute grounds for rejecting the position, but I shall argue in
this section that it is not.
In describing, evaluating, and modifying our philosophical views
we use languages which are interpreted. It is on the basis of such
interpretations that we believe the sentence ’’Brahman is real” to be
true, false, or (for some, perhaps) undeterm.ined in truth value.
Sometimes it is demonstrated to us that an interpretation makes
certain of our beliefs inconsistent, A well—knox<ni example of such
inconsistency is the problem of free will and determinism, in which
it comes as a surprise to many people that their beliefs about free
will, determinism, and moral responsibility entail a contradiction.
In such cases we may modify our beliefs, our interpretations, both,
or (if puzzled or lazy) neither. Philosophy is an endeavor in which
one attempts to hold positions which are trtie. Because inconsistency
is a hallmark of a false position, the philosophically respectable
response to contradiction is to alter one’s position so that one’s
163
beliefs are compatible. A feature of the alteration process which is
of special interest to us is that thought about the contradiction and
description of alternative positions are carried out with the old
beliefs and in the language interpreted in the old way— that is,
inconsistently. It is with the aid of the defective interpretation and
beliefs that one thinks out new interpretations and beliefs to hold,
and it is in the terms of the old that one characterizes the new. In
our struggle for truth and consistency it may happen that the very
tools we use—our words—are shown to be unreliable, I^en this happens,
we forge new tools with the old and go on, because we have no other
tools to use.
This appears to be the situation with respect to Bhartrhari’s
third stage. People who have undergone experiences characterized
in (13) and (14) describe them in words. In so doing they cease to
hold the position which they describe. The flash of insight which is
without content is replaced by flashes containing words, meanings,
and worldly interaction. Nonetheless the position is one which is
believed by such people and in the very language in which the position
is false they set about describing v;hat it is and the way to go about
holding it again. Remarks in language about Monism, then, are of the
status of remarks of one who is endeavoring to escape contradiction
with the aid of a language and an interpretation which he or she
wishes to reject. (Perhaps '^arski's attempts to create a consistent
language out of natural language is another example of this sort
of endeavor.)
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I take this to be the explication of Bhartrhari's remark in (A)
that, '•Remaining on the path of Unreality, one strives for Reality."
One uses language to go as far as one can and, having experienced a
position which goes beyond it, one jettisons the language. This
point is illustrated in another passage from the I’^kyapadlya
,
reminiscent
of a later remark by the philosopher Uittgenstein:
(17) (Grammarians) propound means (for the understanding of
language) which, once grasped, can be throi-yn overboard,
(VP II 38a, Pillai)
5, Is the Position Monism?
The discussion has proceeded on the assumption that the position
one holds at the third stage of -va^yoga is the position that there is
only one thing. Brahman, If the experience one undergoes is as des-
cribed in (13) and (lA)
,
however, it is doubtful that Monism is the
proper rendering of it. According to Bhartrhari and HelSr'aJa, the
experience is "pure consciousness", undifferentiated. A more accurate
rendering of it would seem to be something like "Brahman exists",
or, as described in this passage, "It is":
(18) Not by speech, not by mind.
Not by sight can He be apprehended.
How can he be comprehended
Otherwise than by one’s saying ’He is’?
(Katha Up an is ad 6,12 Hume)
The "only" in the monistic position that there is only one thing ^
must have some form as its basis. ' Either the position held at the
third stage is different from the description Bhartrhari and Helataja
give tis or it is not correctly described as Monism, The problem is,
what is the source of the "only"?
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Several answers suggest themselves. One is to conclude that
the description in (13) and (lA) is not completely accurate, and that
there is a faint ripple of consciousness somewhere that there are no
other things when one holds the third stage position. This solution
does not seem to me to be a good one, for it introduces into the
third stage position the elements which would render it inconsistent
—
conceptions of things other than Brahman. The position would then
be subject to the internal inconsistencies discussed in section 2.
Another solution is to take the obvious way out and deny that
the third stage position is monistic. It might then be called ''Brah-
manism" or some other name, purged of the restrictive connotations of
"Monism". As described the position is after all of a thing rather
than of a thing beside which there are no others . According to this
solution, ilonism would be a second stage position, an untenable
position which is a steppingstone to the desired third stage. This
solution would not be acceptable to Bhartrharl for two reasons. First,
he describes Monism as the truth rather than a step on the way to it,
and second there are passages in the T^panisads which do the same and
Bhartrharl 's aim was to achieve compatibility with the T^pani^adic
doctrines, lliere is a long tradition of describing the third stage
position in Monistic terms, and it would not be appropriate to inter-
pret this tradition as a mistake if there were a more reasonable
interpretation available.
The solution v;hich seems best is the following. The third
stage position itself is not accurately described as Monistic, but
taken together with the transition to and from a second stage posi-
described. We have not discussed here what it is supposedtion, it is so
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to be like to go from the second stage in which one uses conceptual
apparatus which one believes to be discredited to the third stage in
which the differentiated world disappears. One analogy found in the
Vedas which is used by Bhartrhari is that the process is like waking
up from a dream, in that what was once thought to be real is dis-
carded in favor of a new view of reality;
(19) Just as, in a dream, the one mind appears in contradictory
forms... in the same way, while the ultimate reality is unborn,
eternal and devoid of inner sequence, we see it as having
birth and other contradictory attributes,
(VP III 2.17-18, Iyer)
Helaraja comments on this passage in this way;
(20) One should not wonder that all the plurality which we see
before us is being denied and the unity which one does not
see is being advocated. Because that kind of thing is happen-
ing all the time. The world which we see in our dreams is
contradicted in the vjakeful state. Similarly, the world
which we see in the wakeful state does not persist in the
turiya (the state beyond deep sleep). So that may also be
looked upon as unreal, (Iyer's svimmary)
According to the interpretation of these passages which I am advanc-
ing, the third stage position is not ^!onistic, but it is reached through
a process of belief that everything one experiences and thinks about
at stage one is dreamlike and unreal. The position at stage three is
described by people at stage two who have been to stage three and
returned. Such people characterize Monism as the truth, given that
what they are talking about is not only the stage three position, but
the process of getting to it and returning, in which everything which
once seemed to be real fades into a single, undifferentiated state of
consciousness which is perceived to be real in the process of the
fading
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It has not been my practice in the body of this work to discuss
the many parallels between Bhartrhari*s theory and other theories,
Eastern and Western. The temptation to do so briefly at this point
is overpowering, for the Ttonlsm of Bhartrhari and the interpretation
I have advanced for it are strikingly similar to the Monism of the
Eleatlc philosopher Parmenides as interpreted by Montgomery Furth in
Furth (1968), At the conclusion of a fascinating exposition of
Parmenldean elenchus, Furth writes that Parmenides’ conclusion is
(21) The only true thought is the thought that it is, (p, 130)
The comparison with (18) is striking. In a postscript entitled
”0n Saying IThat Cannot Be Said”
,
Furth argues that Parmenldean
statements such as "Thou canst not be acquainted with what is not,
nor indicate it in speech" which seem self-contradictory are Instead
to be regarded as devices to speed the process of imparting the truth:
(22) Ideally, Parmenides should say nothing at all, but Instead
should administer some simple negative reinforcement—e.g.,
hitting Betathon over the head—each time Betathon 'says
what is not'; and Betathon being assumed an apt pupil, he
might be hoped in sufficient time to get the idea, (p. 131)
In this respect Furth's interpretation of Parmenides differs from mine
of Bhartrhari, since I do not believe a person who holds the Monistic
position is capable of deciding on appropriate reinforcement, nor
would such a person be capable of administering the reinforcement at
the correct time, for to do so would involve understanding the words
Betathon utters. After all, according to the theory, there is nobody
to do the reinforcing and nobody to reinforce, nor are there utterances
to call for the appropriate reinforcement. The theory of stages seems
in this respect better than a reinforcement theory of Furth' s type.
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6, Graramar and Salvation
In this section the basis for Bhartrharl's claim that the
study of Grammar is an aid to salvation is discussed. There are
several passages in the VakyapadTya in which the claim is made. The
most extensive occurs in Book I, 10-22. Some excerpts from this passage
follow;
(23) The wise say that grammar, nearest to the Brahman and the
foremost spiritual training is the most important (of such)
subsidiary texts of the Veda.
It is a direct path towards that holiest of lights, that
supreme essence of the kind of speech which has assumed
distinctions of form.
Words are the sole guide to the truths about the behaviour
of objects; and there is no understanding of the truth about
words without grammar..,.
It is the first rung on the ladder towards liberation; it
it the straight Royal Road for those desirous of (reaching)
that goal.
That pure light which is the supreme essence of speech,,
,
—that Supreme Brahman is attained by having recourse to
grammar. (Pillai.)
The benefit of Grammar stressed most frequently in Book I is
that of furnishing the student with an ability to read and speak
correct Sanskrit, It was Bhartrharl’s belief that Sanskrit was a
language uniquely fitted to convey human thought, and that the
relation between the expressions of Sanskrit and their meanings
was eternal and divinely fixed. 1 will not discuss this part of
the position in detail because I do not find myself sympathetic to
it. There is no evidence I know of to support a claim that any
language is best fitted to represent thought. Given the theory of
sphopa as I have interpreted it, any way of expressing the truth
should be as good as another.
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A second benefit of Grannar study mentioned in the Vakyapadlya
is that of making the Vedas accessible to the student. I shall not
discuss this topic either, as it does not bear on the issues I am
interested in.
The third benefit of the study of Grammar is that it leads one
to accept the Advaita Vedantist position. How this acceptance comes
about is one subject of Book III, sections 1-A, where the argument is
the following; There are two Grammarian theories about the meanings
of words. One, put forth by Vyadi and others, is that all words
denote substances. The other, put forth by VajapySyana, is that all
words denote universals, Bhartphari doesn't adopt either theory.
Instead he argues for two theses: All theories of meaning known to
I
him fall under one or the other of these two headings, and both theories
imply the conclusion that all words denote Brahman. He concludes
from these two facts that the study of any system of Grammar leads
one to knowledge of Brahman.
The structure of Bhartrhari's arguments that all words denote
Brahman is extremely Interesting. The points to which I shall draw
attention are two: To represent these remarks adequately, the
metalanguage formalism is not servicable, and Bhartrhari's
objective
of producing a theory which is compatible with all the disciplines
turns out to be different in practice from what one would suppose.
Concerning what a universal is, Bhartrhari writes:
(24) Similarity consisting of absence of difference
or the powers
which are the very essence of things, these might be des-
cribed as the synonyms of the universal. (VP III 1.92
Iyer)
(25) After all, the universal is nothing more
than something in
the individuals which causes a similarity of cognition.
(\T III 1.92, Helai^ja, Iyer)
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Let us refer to a semantics which specifies a universal as the meaning
of every word as a jatl (universal) semantics. One might wonder just
how it is that a jat
i
semantics assigns universals as the denotation
of words other than the natural candidates. Rhartrhari considers
several cases about which we might be puzzled. Concerning proper
names
,
the theory is this
:
(26) Even proper names denote universals. The name of a person
stands for that unchanging recognisable element which persists
in all the changes which he undergoes. (Helar”aja on VP III, 1.12)
Concerning verbs, adverbs, prepositions and adjectives, the theory
is this;
(27) Similarly, the verb denotes the universal aspect of action,
present in the different moments of action and causing the
same cognition and the use of the same word. The universal
of the accessory ( Icaraka ) conveyed by a verb plays a subor-
dinate part in the cognition produced by a verb. .. .According
to this view, prepositions ( upasarga ) also express the
universal, because they do no more than denote a peculiarity
in the meaning of the verb V7hich is a universal. A post-
position is also based on the universal of a relation.
Similarly, words like 'sukla (white) express the universals
of qualities... (HelarSja on VP III 1.2, Iyer)
There is no mention of logical operators such as na ’not' or va 'or
in this passage.
I shall not attempt a full explication of the theory here,
especially since Bhartrhari does not commit himself to it.
interest is in the use Bhartrhari makes of it, particularly in his
claim that two other theories of his time are theories which employ
a j'^ti semantics.
The Ny'aya-Vaisef ilea semantics assigns universals as the deno-
tation of some words, but as we have seen in the last chapter
their
theory of universals differed from that of the Grammarians in
that
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the Nyaya-Vaisesikas believed that there are no universals over univer-
sals. As we have seen, Rhartrhari argued that the Nyaya-Vaiseslkas
were wrong in holding this view. VJith respect to the other categories
proposed by the Ny”Sya-Vaisesikas
,
Bhartrharl argued that their members
are universals also. The claim he makes upon completion of these
arguments is that the Nyaya-Vaisesika semantics is a jSti semantics.
He does not mean by this that the Ny3ya-Vaisesikas assert that their
semantics is a jati semantics, because they do not. Rather he means
that the semantic statements made by the MySya-Vaisesikas may be
Interpreted by a jati semanticist as though the meanings of the words
assigned were universals.
Bhartrharl ’s treatment of the Viji\anavadin school of Buddhism
was more striking, in that the Vijnanavadins denied that universals
existed. Nonetheless, Bhartrharl made them out to be jati semanticists
.
Helar"aja’s summary of their position is this:
(28) According to the Vijnanav'adins , this attempt to show that
words like aka^a (space^ also denote the universal is futile,
because, according to them, there is no such thing as the
universal at all, 'they do not believe in the reality of the
external vjorld. They only believe in the different states of
consciousness and, in them, some things figure as common
properties while others appear as distinguishing features.
A word denotes only this thing which figures in the
consciousness and this is what is called jati ,
(Helar'aja on VP III 1,19, Iyer)
The Vijnanav’adins specifically deny the existence of universals, but
th is does not prevent them from being classed as jati semanticists
in the following v;ay:
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(29) ...for Grainmarians
,
meaning ( artha ) is just what the word
conveys. The.
.
.principle enables them to explain the
universal according to the Vijn'Snavadins. According to the
latter, the universal is something which occurs in the mind
when a word is heard. In other words, it is 'sabdartha
Cjord-meaning’i and for Grammarians also, artha means
sabdartha
.
(Ibid, Iyer)
This solution seems to amoimt to this: The Vijnanavadins believe that
common properties of states of consciousness do what universals (on
the Nyaya-Vaise^ika view) do. So do Grammarians. But Grammarians
call these common properties universals. Therefore the Grammarian
notion of universal is employed by the Vljnahav'adins. (Unlike the
Nyaya-Vaisesikas
,
Bhartrhari does not commit himself to the existence
of an external world at stage two, and he is able to assimilate the
Buddhist theory, in which only the contents of consciousness exist,
to his ovm.)
These two cases throw light on a point which puzzled me for
some time. Iyer and Helaraja both point out that it was important
to Bhartrhari that his theory be "common to all the disciplines"
(this goal was discussed in connection with the problem of universals
over universals in the last chapter). The meaning of this statement
is not that every statement of every discipline ought to be true in
the Grammarian system, for the Nyaya-Vaisesika assertion that there
are no universals over universals and the Vijnanavada statement that
there ^re no universals at all are not true in Bhartrhari*s theory.
The statement does not mean that the statements of the Grammarians
must be compatible with those of the other disciplines, for the same
reason. The claim seems instead to amount to this:
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(30) The compatibility doctrine; Every true sentence of any
discipline which describes grammatical speech or describes
the relation of speech to meaning must be true on the
Grammarian interpretation.
(There are some interesting parallels between the translation of
other languages into SR and the interpretation of sentences of
other systems by the Grammarians, They will not be traced here.)
Some theses of the Nyaya-Vai^esika system, for example
are these;
(31) a. There are no universals over universals. Actions are
not universals,
b. The meaning of Ramas dhavatl *Rama runs' is that the ac-
tion of running inheres in the substance in vrhich the
soul named by"Rama" inheres.
According to the compatibility doctrine as formulated in (30), it
is only the statement in (31b) which must be true when Interpreted
in the Grammarian way. As we have seen, the interpretations of actions,
substance, individuals, and relations are to be universals in a j ati
semantics, so (31a) will not be true in the .-jati semantics. There
is a tacit distinction between those statements of the theory which
are peculiarly semantic and those which are metaphysical——the distinction
between the sentences of (31a) and (31b)—-which underlies Bhartrhari s
theory. The theory itself concerns the way the Grammarians would
Interpret the statements of other schools, rather than their own
interpretations*. -*I find these two points very interesting.
Of course, if (31) is a correct Interpretation of the doctrine,
then the Tarskian framework would place Bhartrhari' s remarks in a
language which was (at least) meta on a metalanguage for Sanskrit.
Rut his remarks are part of the system of vagyoga , a way to
the greatest
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merit. Bhartrhari would not regard as adequate a formulation which
represented those remarks in a language different from Sanskrit,
(Nor would he be sympathetic to a system based on the conclusion
that ordinary Sanskrit is intrinsically flawed as a vehicle for
conveying truths.) The SR semantics seems a better system within
which to formulate Bhartrhari 's remarks than the Tarskian system
for these reasons. As already stated, it is possible to view
i Bhartrhari* s remarks in SR as remarks of Sanskrit which are enchanted%
! SO that they appear to be sentences of a language different from
!
Sanskrit,
Bhartrhari’ s treatment of the view that all words denote sub-
I
^
I
stance is similar in relevant respects and will not be considered in
!
detail here. Those disciplines which he classes under this head
—
the Car^ka and Samkhya—are straightforwardly substance semantics
and there is little need to tinker with them to get them to fit
i
(except that Bhartrhari uses his definition of "substance" to put
souls in the category of substance. The Sa^hyas place souls in
a distinct category.)
Having argued that the semantic theories of his time are true
!i In a universal semantics or a substance semantics, Bhartrhari turns
j
to the argument that on either theory it is Brahman which all words
denote,. Helaraja summarizes the argument as follows:-
(32) Jati and dravya |substanceQ are only two x-zays of understand—
i^ri”Brahman. vmen it is thou_ght of as the persisting feature
in everything, it is called jatl . Nhen it is thought of as
a finished thing, it is called dravya . Thus both the views
really stand for the^same view, namely, that all words denote
Brahman. (Helaraja on IT HI, 1.35 Iyer)
I
I
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With respect to a j atl semantics, the argument is this:
(33) It is Being which, being differentiated according to the
object in which it is present, is called the universal.
All words are based on that. III 1,33 Iyer)
Hel‘3?Sja elaborates on the nature of this Being;
(34) When words convey objects the things so conveyed have a
Being distinct from their external Being. It consists in
their figuring in the mind,.., In verbal usage, it is this
secondary Being \jhich plays the main part..,.When all usage
can be explained in terms of this Being, if one still wants to
think of some other kind of Being,... let one do so. But
such a Being cannot enter into verbal usage.
(VP III 3,39, Helaraja’s remarks, Iyer)
The argument goes on to assert that all words denote consciousness
in the sense that they denote some aspect of it or other. There is
a Vedic tradition of identifying consciousness with Brahman, Follow-
ing such tradition, the conclusion is that all words denote Brahman.
It is the semantic features of this argument rather than its
soundness which concern me here. With respect to the substance
semantics the argument is similar. "Hie reduction of substances to
mental entities is accomplished in this way:
(35) V/hat is called the seen, or the objective world figures in
the consciousness. Its very essence is, therefore, conscious-
ness, If it were not so, it could not be illuminated,
(Hel5r*aja on VP III 2.14, Iyer)
The assimilation of consciousness to Brahman is carried out in this
way:
(3h) That which persists in all states is the only thing which is
real. Consciousness is the only thing which so persists,,..
This experiencer, the transmigrator, being essentially
conscious, is Brahman ... .Therefore, it is the eternal sakti
^powerj of Brahman which manifests the unreal vjorld, the
perceiver and the perceived and creates this world dream.
It is the function of philosophers to remove this universe
which is charming as long as we do not reflect,
(Helaraja on VP III 2.17-18 Iyer)
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(In some v/ays this theory resembles a theory held by Berkeley, although
its conclusion is quite different. Here, to be is to be conceived
of, and the objective is to do away with conceiving.) The remarks
made earlier on the unsuitability of a Tarskian semantics for rendering
the jati semantics seem to apply to this part of the theory as well.
It seems to me that Bhartrhari is theorizing about all human language
in these passages, although his points are made with reference to
Sanskrit. If the wider application is intended, no Tarskian rendering
of the remarks will work, for the metalanguage will be in a human
language and the intent is that it is included in the quantif icational
domain of the theory.
In all this is the basis for Bhartrhari’ s belief that Grammar
%
is the ’’Royal Road" to salvation. The Vedas state that salvation is
realizing the nature of Brahman, The study of Grammar, according to
the arguments just quoted, leads one to see that the meanings of words
are mental entities and that the study of meaning is the study of
consciousness—Brahman itself. No matter what theory of meaning one
held in India at the time Bhartrhari wrote, Bhartrhari was able to
describe a way to produce a grammar compatible with it which referred
all meaning ultimately to Brahman, In the sense that Grammar used
this way could focus all thought about anything tox'/ard thought of
Brahman, it was a way to salvation. As we have seen, it was a way
which was ultimately dispensed with, but it was considered useful
early on
7, Graroraar as Metaphor
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Discussion of the relation between word meanings and sentence
meanings is a persistent theme in Books II and III of the VakyapadTya
.
Helafaja encapsulates Bhartrhari's vievjs on that relation in a passage
summarized in this way:
(37) ...in the Science of Grammar, meanings of words, agreeing with
worldly usage, are isolated for the purpose of explaining
the formation of words. The sentence is indivisible and so
is its meaning.,..So there are no word-meanings. There cannot
be any question of their previous separate existence. The
hearer does not understand the meaning of the whole sentence
all at once. He understands it little by little, part
by part and then joins the parts together.,,.As the indivisible
sentence-meaning cannot be understood in a flash all at once,
the unreal word-meanings are abstracted in the middle as
mere means to an end. Once the sentence-meaning is under-
stood, they disappear. (Helaraja on VP III 4.1-2, Iyer)
This view of the relative reality of word meanings and sentence
meanings was peculiar to the Grammarian school of Indian philosophy.
Consider the following aspects of the theory! It is apparent to
common sense that there are words and word-meanings. We communicate
with words as a matter of course and when we characterize our thoughts
and experiences we nearly always do it v;ith words. Words are the
linguistic entities which are the most familiar to us. We see them,
hear them, and think with them as a matter of course. Sentences,
on the other hand, are not so familiar. When we see a sentence we
tend to see it as made up of words. When we think about sentences,
we think in thoughts which are read off in words. l?hen we introspect
about sentences to determine what it is to grasp their meanings we
are aware of very little, and what we are aware of we describe with
words. In all this there is tremendous support for the view that words
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the basic unit of thought and communication, and the sentence and
sentence meaning are built up out of words and word-meanings,
Rhartrhari spends most of Book II of the VakyapadTya arguing
against this view. It must have been an astonishing insight for
the Grammarians to discover that sentence meanings do not have parts
—
that in understanding them words and word-meanings play no part
in what is understood and it is as if they never existed. Such an
insight must have been especially striking in that it ttims the
common sense view of language completely around. The entitles which
common sense takes to be most real do not exist in the mind when
thought have finally been communicated, and the thoughts are only
artificially divided into words when communication is initiated.
This theory has striking parallels with the vlvartav'adin
view of the way one comes to understand Brahman, On a common sense
view there are no objects more real than the things we perceive \-7ith
our senses. Reflection on our perceptions and on the Vedas may lead
students to undergo experiences of Brahman (the sort described earlier
as stage three experiences), Ilhen that happens, the world of
differentiation appears as unreal, an artificial manifestation of a
higher, unified truth.
It must have struck the Grammarians that their ability to argue
convincingly against the common sense view of language as made up of
parts strengthens the vivartavadin position that the common sense view
of reality as made up of parts is false.
Nowhere does Bhartrhari write that these parallels make Grammar
an apt metaphor for the process of getting to stage three,
but it is
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Impossible to avoid surmising that he viewed this feature of Grammar
as making it worthy of study. Perhaps the discipline of vagyoga used
the Vakyapadiya as a text for meditation. These connections between
the insights of Grammar and the insights of the Vedas seem to merit
further research
FOOTNOTES
1
This passage is suggestive of the via negative of Maimonides
and Aquinas, whereby no positive assertions tnay be made about God,
but negative attributions may be made to him. I do not believe one
can read the via negative into Bhartrhari's theory because there
are many positive assertions made about Brahman
— (2), for example.
2
Compare Martin Buber's statement that "God is the Being that,,,
may properly only be addressed, not expressed," ( I and Charles
Scribner's sons, 1958, pp, 80-81,) Buber refers to the Upanisads in
this work. Did he intend a parallel to this TTpanisadic doctrine?
3
Compare Paul Tillich's statements in Systematic Theology
(University of Chicago Press,,vol, I, 1951, pp. 172-3):
If God is brought into the subject-object structure of being,
he ceases to be the God who is really God. ... Theology must
always remember that in speaking of God it makes an object
of that which precedes the subject-object structure and that,
therefore, it must include in its speaking of God the
acknowledgment that it cannot make God an object.
Some difficulties similar to those atributed to the Monistic position
and its express ibility seem to apply to Tillich's, if God really does
"precede the subject-object structure."
4
There is a distinction used in this solution between holding
a position and believing it. Holding a position is a stronger act
than believing it, since according to the interpretation I am advanc-
ing one may believe the Monistic position at stage two while not
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holding it. (I believe that holding implies believing, but I an not
certain.) Bhartrhari says very little about the flashes of insight
I identify with position-holding, and I an not clear in my own mind
what an adequate characterization of them would say. Hence this
feature of the solution is somewhat skimpy.
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APPENDIX
The wffs of any language hierarchy H are translated into SR by
following this procedure:
Begin with each language L. which is meta on no other language of
<J
H. Let the interpretation of L be <D ,V.>. Let the i nterpretation of
J J J
SR be <D,V>. The translation function T on the expressions of L.
is defined as follows:
(1) for each constant of the form a
.
, T(a
. )=a i , i . V(T(a )=V (a )
'
' j i
when a. names a member of D. which is not a wff. If a. names a wff
‘ J 1
of L. then V(r(a;))= T(V.(a.)).
J I ' J I
(2) for each nonsemantic predicate of the form p"^. 7'(p'^)=p'^ and
m' m m,j
V iTiP^ . )=7'(V (P^) ) , where TCVCP"^) ) is the set of n-tuples which is
m,j m ' m ^
V(P|^) with any wff of L^. replaced by its translation into SR.
(3) for each wff w of the form p'^a....a
,
7"(w)= T(p'^)7'(a
. ) . . .T(a ).min ml n
(4) for each wff w of the form p, T(w)= ~T(p)
.
(5) for each wff s of the form (pvq),T(w)- (7'(p)v?'(q) )
.
(6) for each wff w of the form (Ex) (0x)
,
T(w) = (Ex)~(xti,D. v^(0x) )
.
Now translate the wffs of those languages whose domains of i nterpretati on
include wffs of the languages just translated using clauses (l)-(6) and
this clause:
(7) for each w of the form Ta . , 7^( w) =Ta . ,T(D.).
I
'
» J J
(Where D. is the domain of L., (D.) is the set of translations of the
J J J
members of D. which are wffs, together with the non-wffs of D. as
J
they were in .
)
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Now we prove that, where p i s a wf f of some L. of H, it is true
in SR that, where a. names p,
(8)r(p)= rCTa.)
We may assert (8) over the Semantic Domain W if there is an acceptable
semantic tree with topmost node of the form <t'(p)=T(ja
_ )
^
T, V, i .
The upper nodes of such a tree will look like this ("p=q" here
abbreviates "~pvq&~qvp")
:
(9)
n <*-r(p)vr(Ta.)&-r(Ta. )vr(p),W,T,V, i>
n <-7'(p)vr(Ta ),W,T,V, i> n <~7'(Ta . ) vTCp)
,
W,T,V, i >
/ \ \
<~r<p),W,T,V,i> <r<Ta.),W,T,V,i> <~7'(Ta . )
,
W,T,V
,
i> n^<r(p) ,W,T,V, i>
n4<7'(p),W,F,y,i> n5<7-(p),V.’-».,T,V,i><ma.),W,F,V,i>
ng<r(p), W-~.,F,V,i)
etc.
We must show that n. or n^ is labelled a and that n^ or n_, is labelled
4 b — D /
a
.
First we prove a I emma
.
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Lemma; Nodes n4-n7 are labelled by Procedure I.
Proof: First we show that any node of the subtrees directly
dominated by n4-n7 has a translation of a wff of H as first member ot
is labelled Immediately by Procedure I. This holds for n4-n7^ for
consider the nodes directly dominated by n, any of n4-n7.
If n Is of the form <^p,SD,T or then the node directly domin-
ated by n has a translation of a wff of H as first member.
It cannot bp that n i s of the form <(-ip,SD,T or F, i']) because the
condtions on T yield no wffs with "-j" or "U" as translations of wffs
of H.
If n is of the form <(pvq, SD,T or F,i^ then the nodes directly
dominated by n have translations of wffs of H as first members.
If n is of the form <^(Ex)"^(x ^'^(Dj )v^x) ,SD,T, i^ then the nodes
directly dominated by n are of two sorts. Either the instantiation Is
to a member of l(Dj) (and hence to a wff which is the translation of
a wff of FI) or it is to a non-member of \(Dj), I f to a non-member, the
node Is labelled na in two more steps by Procedure I.
If n is of the form <C'(Ex)'^(‘>'x'cT(D. ) V'^C^x) ,SD,F, i') then the nodes
directly dominated by n are of two sorts. Either the instantiation is
to a member of ^(D.) or it is to a non-member of l(Dj), If it is to
a non-member, it is labelled ^ in two more steps by Procedure I.
If n is of the form <Ja
j
j^(Dj ) ,SD,T or F,i> then n directly dominates
a node of the form <p,SD-a
j
j*,T or F,i>. From condition (I) on \,
p is the translation of aj in Lj of FI,
These considerations apply to any node on the subtrees dominated
by n4-n7. If the first member of the node is not a translation of a
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wff of H, the node is labelled in two steps. Otherwise the labelling
is carries out with nodes the first member of which is the translation
of a wff of H.
Now we show that every dominance path from n4-n7 contains a node
labelled by Procedure I. We have just seen that dominance paths which
trace through nodes with first members which are not translations
of wffs of H are label led by Procedure I
,
so here we need only consider
dominance paths containing nodes with first members which are translations
of wffs of H. We see by inspection of the conditions on semantic trees
that each node v/ith a nonsemantic wff as first member directly dominates
nodes with wffs which are less complex as first member. For example,
a node with a wff with five logical operators as first member directly
dominates a node with four logical operators as first member, and so on.
Hence a dominance path from any node n contains an atomic node in k
steps, where k is the number of logical operators in the first member
of n. The first member of n i n the dominance paths we are considering
is the translation of some wff w of a language Lj of H. The transla-
tion procedure guarantees that its atomic constituents are also the
translations of wffs of Lj or are of the form x£T(Dj). There are two
possibilities. The atomic wff may be nonsemantic. If so, it is labelled
by Procedure I, If it is semantic it is of the form <^Ta
j
j^(Dj ) ,SD,T or F,
This node may be terminal because a.j doesn't name a wff, in which case
it is labelled by Procedure I. It cannot be the case that this node
is terminal beca use 7( D.) is not a member of SO, for suppose not. Then
SD is W-aj^ where the ajjjj are the constants in
the first member of each semantic node on the path to n. Thus there is
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a member d of '(D.) which is a member of one of the a- • *. Let which-
J
'
i J i
ever set d is a member of be We know from the recursive def-
inition of a * that there is a sequence of members of a * wi,.,w
such that (I) each Wj is an atomic semantic wff, (2) Wj=d or W| is an
atomic constituent of d, (3) contains a name of a wff which has Wj^j as
atomic constituent, and (4) w is Ta^^TtO^), Fa^^'^CDn)
The definition of T guarantees that, where d is a wff of L^, d
d
contains as atomic semantic constituents translations of wffs of L^.
Hence W| is By condition I on"*^, b|^^ names the translation
of the wff names in L^, Hence W 2 is an atomic semantic constituent
and w„ must be the translation of a wff of H,
of the translation of a wff of Similarly for each of the wj.
Furthermore, each Wj is the translation of a wff of H which occurs in
a different language of H, each of which is meta on the next by
condition (la) on M. Thus there is a sequence of languages of H
Lj,.,Lp, such that d is the translation of a wff of L^, Ta^^l (D^) is
the translation of a wff of and each language is meta on the next.
Now consider the nodes containing semantic atomic wffs on the path
after the node which contains Ta^^\(D^) as first member. Each first
member of such nodes is the translation of a wff of H, Each such wff
is a member of a different language of H. By condition (la) on M,
each such language is meta on the next. Combining this sequence with
the one just derived, we have a sequence of languages Lj..,Lp.,.Lj
such that d is the translation of a wff of L^, Tajj^(Dj) is the trans-
lation of a wff of Lj , and such that each member of the sequence is
meta on the next. But condition (la) on M requires that Lj bo meta on
every language containing a member of Dj
. Since d is a member of
T(Dj), d is the translation of a wff in D-. Condition (la) on M
J
requires that Lj is meta on L^. But this fact, together with the fact
that there is a sequence of languages as just described, violates
condition (Id) on M. Hence the assumption is false and ^(Dj)^D.
It cannot be the case that this node is terminal because
V(aij)^SD, for parallel reasons. (Such an assumption would entail that
there is a sequence of languages of H beginning with L- and ending with
J
Lj such that each, is meta on the next. Condition (Id) on M prohibits
this.)
If the node is terminal, then it is labelled by Procedure I. If
it is nonterminal the next node of the dominance path is of the form
^p,SD-aj j*,T or p'^r)' where A. . names p. p is the translation of a wff
J J
of H and the considerations just given apply to it as well—where n is
the number of logical operators in p, in n steps or less any dominance
path will contain a node labelled by Procedure I or an atomic node.
If the atomic node is terminal it is labelled by Procedure I. If
not, the next node is the translation of a wff of some language L of
H. And so on.
It cannot be the case that some dominance path of this sort goes
on infinitely without containing a node labelled by Procedure 1, for
consider: all nodes containing as first members wffs which are not
franslations of members of H are labelled in two steps by Procedure I.
Those nodes containing as first members translations of wffs of H
occur in the following patterns: where n is the first node contain-
ing a translation of a wff w of Lj and k is the number of logical
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operators in w, the next k nodes on the path contain as first members
translations of wffs of Lj , The kth node must be semantic if the path
is to continue. The next node contains as first member the translation
of the wff named by the constant in the kth node. By condition (la)
on M, this wff is a member of a language L such that L, is meta on L .
m k m
Since there is no infinite chain of languages of H each of which is
meta on the next there will be no Infinite series of translations of
wffs of the languages of H in any dominance path. Thus every dominance
path containing nodes with first members which are translations of
wffs of H contains a terminal node of the form which is labelled by
Procedure I.
Consider the subtrees directly dominated by n4-n7. Every dominance
path contains a node labelled by Procedure 1 at some finite length from
n. Let k be the length of the longest such dominance path. Procedure
I labels any node which directly dominates a set of nodes each member
of which is labelled. Hence in upward labelling from level k, each
node of the subtree in question will be labelled by Procedure I. The
Lemma is proved.
Consider the subtrees directly dominated by n4-n7. It is imposs-
ible that both n4 and n7 are labelled ina. If so, we could trace a
path downward to terminal nodes such that the members of the path on
both trees have identical first and second members, one has F and one
has T as third member, and both have the same acceptab i I i tv labelling.
(The path is traced in a fashion similar to that used in Chap-
ter IV.)We see by inspection of the labelling rules that it is
impossible to have two terminal nodes with identical first and second
members, opposite third members, and same label. Hence n4 or n7 is
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labelled (It can't be that the two nodes aren't labelled, by the
Lemma). However, if n4 is labelled £ so is n6 and if n7 is labelled
£ so is n5. We show this for n4. The removal of ajj* from W does not
prevent n6 from being labelled a if n4 is labelled a, for consider.
The only cases in which the difference in Semantic Domain makes a
difference are the cases in which p i s of the form (Ext'^C^xCtCDi )V'^x)
or p is of the form Ta^|^^(D^). In the first case the diminution of
the Semantic Domain will make no difference, for the members of a..*
U
are not members of l(Dj). (If they were, we would be able to shov/
that the languages in H failed to satisfy condition (Id) on M as in
the proof of the Lem.ma.') In the second case the diminution of the
Semantic Domain will make no difference, since T(D^) is a subset of
W-ajj* (or else an analogous contradiction would be derivable.)
This reasoning applies to each node of the trees.
In a simi lar way, if n7 is label led £ then n5 is label led £.
Hence we know that one of n4 and n5 is labelled £ and one of n6 and
n7 is label led £. This is sufficient to label n £ by upward labelling.
The tree Is an acceptable semantic tree. We may assert (8) over W.


